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Introduction 
During the Cold War, a cornerstone of East German foreign policy was the policy 
of aid towards those Third World countries that had a socialist orientation. One of 
the many aspects linked to these forms of cooperation was the willingness for the 
GDR government to let the citizens of the aforementioned countries migrate in East 
Germany for reasons of work, study and military training. This migration took place 
by virtue of bilateral treaties concluded between the GDR and those countries, and 
was therefore regulated and controlled by these agreements, as was the stay of 
migrants in East Germany, which had limited time. According to a widespread vision 
in the Soviet bloc, solidarity against imperialism and neo-colonialism, economic and 
even military aid played a fundamental role in expanding its influence over 
developing states to defeat capitalism. In practice that objective translated into efforts 
to consolidate the new ‘peoples’ democracies’ in Europe and Asia, and from the 
1960s onwards increasingly in sub-Saharan Africa. In addition to preferential trade 
arrangements and technical cooperation, education and training of those perceived 
likely to become key figures in their respective countries was a prominent strategy. 
The former German Democratic Republic was an important player in these efforts, 
seeking to create an ‘emotional predisposition’ towards socialism. Such policy of 
international aid towards Third World countries was functional to this goal, and the 
offer to spend a period of their lives in the GDR, both for study and for work 
reasons, for the population of these states was part of this policy; it was aimed to 
educate and form an elite that could become a bridge between the Soviet bloc and 
their country of origin. As numerous authors claimed, the ultimate goal would have 
been to educate such an elite and form it on the basis of socialist ideology.  
The aid policy of the GDR has involved many Third World countries. One of the 
closest cooperation developed with the newly independent People’s Republic of 
Mozambique from 1975 onwards. Such cooperation included an extensive contract-
worker programme that entailed training and professional development components, 
2 
as well as a scheme offering education to students and training to troopers in the 
GDR. Mozambique is one of the most interesting cases because of the close 
intergovernmental relations that were created with the GDR, which developed even 
before the country obtained independence from Portugal, with the FRELIMO 
liberation movement. In addition, Mozambicans were, after the Vietnamese, one of 
the largest groups in the GDR. 
Therefore, this paper aims to analyse in detail the mobility of Mozambican 
citizens towards the GDR, in the period that goes from 1975, the year in which 
Mozambique obtained independence from Portugal, to 1989-90, years of the collapse 
of the GDR and the German reunification. In particular, three different migrant 
groups from Mozambique will be taken into consideration, namely contract workers, 
students and soldiers who were trained in the GDR. The migratory movement that 
was taken in analysis constitutes a rather interesting movement, both from an 
historical point of view and from that of international relations. Basically, as already 
mentioned, Mozambican mobility in the GDR was based on a series of bilateral 
agreements between Mozambique and East Germany. Therefore, the field within 
which this work was carried out is that of the history of international relations. The 
approach used throughout the research was both historical and political, since it is 
not possible to focus on such migratory flow without taking into account the 
international relations between the two countries – East Germany and Mozambique – 
as they were the reason of the migratory movement itself.  
Recently this topic has attracted the interest of many scholars and researchers. 
However, the focuses of their research were particular aspects of migration, while 
relations between Mozambique and the GDR have played a rather marginal role in 
the aforementioned research. The relevant treaties between the two countries were 
briefly mentioned, without making an in-depth description of the bilateral relations 
by virtue of which migration happened. Among the research carried out until now on 
this topic, clearly those written by German authors stand out, both because for their 
contribution, and because they make up the most literature about the issue. 
Therefore, from this point of view, this paper represents an effort to show in detail 
what happened prior and during the migration period. In other words, it aims to 
provide a complete picture of the migratory phenomenon of the Mozambican 
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population in the GDR, without leaving aside an accurate analysis of the relations 
between Mozambique and East Germany, and of course the goals that both states had 
set and what they aimed to achieve with such planned migration.  
In order to reconstruct the relations between GDR and Mozambique, and the 
premises that led to the migration, the official foreign policy documents of the GDR 
were analysed, namely the Dokumente zur Außerpolitik der DDR of the years 1975-
1985, available at the University library of the University Leipzig. After the German 
reunification, the official documents relating to the five-year period 1985-1990 were 
no longer published; therefore, the information concerning the period in question was 
derived from various newspaper articles of the newspaper Neues Deutschland. From 
1946 to 1989, the newspaper was the central organ of the Socialist Unity Party of 
Germany and as such published articles related to the government and its politics, as 
well as to meetings with representatives of other countries and treaties. The 
newspaper has proved to be a useful tool for reconstructing the relationship between 
the GDR and Mozambique. However, the articles were consulted critically; it should 
not be forgotten that the newspaper was still a propaganda tool in the hands of the 
Socialist Unity Party of Germany. Another key element to derive the framework of 
relations between Mozambique and the GDR were the bilateral treaties between the 
two countries and the meetings between the respective representatives, which were 
analysed and taken into consideration within a broader historical framework. 
For the focus of the thesis, that is the investigation on the migration phenomenon 
and its modalities, various and numerous sources have been used, in particular 
bilateral treaties that regulated the migratory flows from Mozambique towards the 
GDR. In addition, essays and monographs by various authors were consulted; the 
overwhelming majority of them were to be found only in Germany. On the one hand, 
the treaties provided a theoretical basis of how the permanence of Mozambicans in 
GDR should have been carried out. On the other hand, the authors showed 
profoundly conflicting views on how the permanence in DDR actually was like. 
Many argued that it was mere exploitation, operated by East Germany and its 
companies that needed cheap workforce, or advanced the hypothesis that the 
migration was functional to the political indoctrination of students. Others argued 
that it was a form of co-operation between states that actually benefited Mozambican 
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migrants, providing them with skills and, even temporarily, with a standard of living 
impossible to obtain in their country of origin. Both opinions will be presented in this 
work, but eventually, as will be seen through the consultation of interviews made to 
former migrants from Mozambique, one will prevail over the other. The interviews, 
then the direct experiences of the Mozambicans, represented another important 
source for the purpose of describing the phenomenon, given the fact that they 
allowed obtaining a privileged view of what the situation they experienced was like. 
Obviously it is not possible to think the experience of all Mozambicans in GDR are 
to be generalised in the sense proposed by the respondents. In any case, the sources 
considered for this research have led to one result rather than another, and this cannot 
be ignored. Unfortunately, during my stay in Leipzig it was not possible to find a 
Mozambican community that remained after the German reunification, and therefore 
the interviews taken into consideration were made by German authors, many directly 
in Mozambique to those migrants who returned to their country of origin after the 
German reunification.  
With regard to the sources used, even if this research does not deal directly with 
linguistic and translation issues, the methodology used to write it required the use of 
linguistic skills, starting from the research and analysis of the sources. Without 
adequate competence and knowledge of the German language, it would have been 
impossible to consult the most literature that was eventually used for the analysis of 
the migration, in particular official documents and bilateral treaties. At this point a 
premise regarding the language chosen to write this thesis work is also necessary. 
The English language was chosen jointly with the rapporteur, Professor Elena 
Calandri, basically for two reasons. Firstly, Professor Calandri, although having a 
good knowledge of the German language, preferred to work in English, as she was 
able to follow the thesis work in a more thorough and immediate way, knowing the 
English language better. Secondly, on the international scene the problem has not 
been analysed until recently, so the literature on this subject is rather limited, 
although expanding. By writing the thesis in English, it may be possible to contribute 
to widening the international literature on the subject and bring to the surface this 
particular phenomenon that has remained in the shadows until recently. It follows 
that the thesis work was essentially also a translation work, not only with regard to 
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some articles of the bilateral treaties that will be presented as sources, the latter 
translated from German to English, but also for specific terms of the consulted 
documents that were systematically translated into English. The final result, i.e. the 
thesis, is presented in English, but the process of researching and consulting the 
sources required excellent competence in the German language, without which it 
would have been extremely difficult, if not impossible, to carry out a work of this 
kind.  
Another determining factor for the success of the thesis was my stay in Leipzig, a 
city of the former DDR where numerous groups from Third World countries once 
worked and studied. In particular, in the law library of the University Leipzig it was 
possible to find the necessary sources that could support research, namely official 
documents and bilateral treaties concluded by the GDR. In addition, the stay in 
Leipzig enabled me to consult with experts within the field of history of the GDR, 
such as Professor Detlev Brunner, a research associate at the Department of German 
and European History, which ended up becoming the foreign supervisor of the thesis 
during my stay in Leipzig and helped me carry out this project during my stay in 
Leipzig. 
Basically, the aim of the thesis is to provide a complete picture of the migration 
phenomenon regulated by bilateral treaties. Migration is here considered as the result 
of close intergovernmental relations between Mozambique and the GDR, and all the 
research has been carried out on the basis of this premise. In other words, there 
would have been no migration to the GDR if there were no agreements between the 
GDR and Mozambique that had promoted and supported it, and there would have 
been no such agreements between GDR and Mozambique if the two countries had 
not entertained intense international relations giving rise to these forms of 
cooperation. The thesis therefore starts from an accurate analysis of both the foreign 
policy of East Germany that has led to the search for international relations with 
socialism-oriented countries, both of the international relations themselves, and then 
to the analysis of migration and the terms dictated by the treaties to rebuild a clearer 
and complete picture of the situation.  
In the first chapter the foreign policy of the GDR towards the countries of the 
third world will be introduced, in particular the policy towards the states of the 
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African continent, with particular attention to Mozambique. First of all, the role of 
the GDR within Soviet bloc will be clarified, ascertaining its relative independence 
from the latter. East Germany can be considered rather as an affiliate and not as a 
puppet state as many historians have claimed. After having clarified the East German 
position in the context of the Soviet bloc, its foreign policy towards African 
countries, the so-called Afrikapolitik, will be analysed, taking into consideration the 
rationale that pushed the GDR to seek cooperative relations with African countries. 
Finally, the early relations between GDR and the FRELIMO liberation movement 
prior to the independence of Mozambique will be presented. Indeed, it was in the 
period preceding the independence of Mozambique, namely during the struggle for 
independence against the colonial power, that the foundations for future 
intergovernmental relations were laid. 
In the second chapter the bilateral relations between Mozambique and the GDR 
from 1975 to 1990 will be described. First of all, the premises for the realization of 
the cooperation between the two countries will be presented. The development of 
bilateral relations will be reconstructed starting from the independence of 
Mozambique. Through a systematic and thorough analysis of official documents, 
official visits, bilateral treaties and articles from the Neues Deutschland newspaper, 
it was possible to reconstruct in detail the bilateral relations between Mozambique 
and GDR. Particular emphasis will be placed on the Treaty of Friendship and 
Cooperation of 1979, which marked a turning point in the history of bilateral 
relations between the two countries. From this point on, the cooperation between the 
two states will become much more intense and this resulted in the treaties that 
regulated and encouraged the migration of Mozambicans to the GDR. The rationale 
behind the migration project for work, study and military training will also be 
clarified. 
The very core of the thesis will be addressed in chapter three: the Mozambican 
contract workers and their stay in the GDR. First of all, some fundamental premises 
will be clarified in order to deliver a better understanding of the motives that have 
pushed the two states to elaborate such contract workers program in the 
GDR. Therefore, a short economic background of both states will be presented: on 
the one hand labour shortage in GDR, on the other hand the saturated job market in 
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Mozambique and the lack of experts to enhance economic growth. A particular 
aspect highlighted by many German authors, i.e. contract workers as a means of 
propaganda for the East German government, will be briefly introduced. The actual 
organisation of the contract work project in GDR will be then discussed. The main 
source used in this regard is the basis for the employment of the Mozambican 
contract workers in the GDR, namely the Agreement between the Government of the 
German Democratic Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of 
Mozambique on the temporary employment of Mozambican workers in socialist 
enterprises of the German Democratic Republic, which was signed the same day of 
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, in February 1979. On the basis of the treaty, 
only a limited number of Mozambican citizens could have emigrated to the GDR in 
order to work as a contract worker, and then the criteria for the selection of contract 
workers will be presented. Once arrived in the GDR, the Mozambican workers had 
to comply with certain rules so that they could stay in the GDR, but also the 
companies in which they were employed had to observe some conditions: they had to 
comply with what was provided by the agreement. The control processes put in place 
by the East German government to ensure proper compliance with the treaty will 
therefore be illustrated. Indeed, the terms of the treaty provided that the workers 
should receive training in a specific profession; they had not to be employed as mere 
workforce by the companies of the GDR. In this regard, there are authors who argued 
that the employment of Mozambicans was not carried out as prescribed by the treaty, 
but that East German companies entrusted Mozambicans with simple tasks or with 
the one that German workers refused to assume. Eventually it will be shown how 
other authors and the interviewees have dismantled this conception. Then, the results 
that this contract work project has actually brought will be presented. After ten years 
of existence and implementation of the agreement, the contracting parties decided to 
draft a summary assessment. On the 24th February 1989 a document was drawn up 
by both states, which focused on the results of the program. During the guest 
worker program altogether 21,600 Mozambican workers spent time in the GDR 
between 1979 and 1989. Officially, the problematic aspects of the stay of 
Mozambican contract workers were not addressed in this official document, 
nonetheless there have been obviously some, and they will therefore be briefly 
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discussed. Finally, interviews with Mozambicans who worked contracted in the GDR 
will be taken into consideration, providing additional support to the literature that 
was consulted regarding how the project was actually carried on. 
The fourth chapter will address the topic of young Mozambican students in the 
GDR. The experiment of the Schule der Freundschaft was taken as a case in point. 
Within this project, a total of 899 young Mozambicans went to the GDR, precisely in 
the city of Staßfurt, in order to undertake the educational project which lasted 6 
years, from 1982 to 1988. Arguably, it can be considered one of the most 
ambitious educational projects in terms of education towards socialism. The reasons 
behind its creation were mainly two. On the one hand, the project was meant to 
educate an elite of socialist-oriented professionals who were to assume crucial 
positions in the future social, political and economic development of Mozambique. 
On the other hand, it was meant to train qualified personnel who would work in new 
joint ventures between East Germany and Mozambique. The objective of the chapter 
is to reconstruct the context within which migration took place and describe its 
modalities. Premises and reasons behind the realization of the project will therefore 
be presented, paying particular attention to the educational situation in Mozambique 
immediately after independence. The negotiations between GDR and Mozambique 
for the educational project will be decisive, even if the Mozambican leadership 
aimed at the education of a much greater number of students. The proposal came 
precisely from the Mozambican government, and the motives on the basis of which 
the GDR accepted such a form of cooperation will be explored. This will lead to the 
description of the organisation of the educational project, first of all by presenting the 
criteria agreed between the two countries for the selection of young Mozambicans 
who were eligible to attend the Schule der Freundschaft. The practical organisation 
of the project and the subjects of study will be presented. The composition of the 
staff of the Schule der Freundschaft will be illustrated, as the project saw the 
migration of Mozambican teachers in GDR, who could teach particular subjects such 
as Portuguese. Finally, the issues related to ideology and discipline that emerged 
from the educational project will be mentioned and some experiences of the 
Mozambican pupils during their stay in the GDR will be presented.  
9 
Besides economic, technical and educational cooperation, the GDR and 
Mozambique cooperated also in the field of military training, meaning that many 
Mozambican troopers stayed in the GDR to follow a military training. The fifth 
chapter will have to do with the military training that the Mozambican soldiers 
received in the GDR. In contrast to the other states of the Soviet bloc, the GDR did 
not provide large quantities of weapons and similar, but rather training for the army 
of Third World countries, either by sending experts on the spot, or by training their 
soldiers on their territory. The training of Mozambican soldiers on the territory of the 
GDR was made in virtue of two clauses contained in the Treaty of Friendship and 
Cooperation. The stay of Mozambican soldiers in GDR will be taken into 
consideration as well as the rules that the soldiers had to comply with during the time 
spent in GDR, which could last from 2 to 4 years, depending on the type of training 
they had to undergo. Particular emphasis will be placed on the objective of training, 
which was particularly permeated by socialist ideology, as will be discussed. The 
chosen location for the training, Prora, on the island of Rügen in the Baltic Sea, will 
then be discussed. Finally, data on the number of Mozambicans who received 
training and how long they stayed on East German territory will be presented. 
According to plans, a total of 289 Mozambicans had participated in military training 
in the GDR. 
In the sixth chapter, some references to the situation of Mozambicans who were 
still on the East German territory after the dissolution of the Soviet bloc and German 
reunification will be made. The aim is to observe how the new German government 
managed the situation and to discuss the rather compulsory choice to which the 
remaining Mozambicans, about 15,100 in 1989, were subjected. 
In conclusion, a comment on the results of these migration programs will be 
made, especially focusing on the lives of Mozambicans after their return to 
Mozambique and the problems they had to face.  
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1. East Germany foreign policy towards Mozambique 
and Africa from the 1960’s 
Since the earliest days after the German Democratic Republic was established, 
East German foreign policy has been concerned with its acceptance as a separate 
political entity, other than West Germany. Nonetheless, international recognition 
played a major role and was functional to the objective of being considered a fully-
fledged sovereign nation. At the same time, East Germany provided accommodation 
to the Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, having signed the Warsaw Pact and being 
a member of the Comecon. The GDR was one of the Soviet Union’s staunchest 
allies, therefore its foreign policy was extended to include global interest. 
The foreign policy of the GDR was set out in its Constitution itself. Among the 
GDR Five principles, established in Article 6, East Germany was underlain to be 
perpetually and irrevocably allied with the Soviet Union1. The principle of solidarity 
with liberation movements fighting for independence was endorsed in the 
Constitution as well:  
The GDR supports in their efforts to achieve social progress those states and peoples which 
struggle against imperialism and its colonial rule, and for national freedom and independence 
(Constitution of the German Democratic Republic, Art. VI, §3, 1974) 
East German foreign policy in Africa in the post-recognition period became 
motivated by factors not, at first sight, immediately akin to the quest for diplomatic 
recognition which had so dictated the GDR’s manoeuvrings on the continent prior to 
1972. Nevertheless, the continuing perceived need for Honecker to establish more 
firmly the legitimacy of the ‘socialist’ GDR remained a key determinant in the 
GDR’s Afrikapolitik.2  
                                                
1 Costitution of the German Democratic Republic, Art. VI, §2, 1974. 
2 Winrow, G. M., The foreign policy of the GDR in Africa, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2009, p. 85. 
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In the years between 1973 and 1975, once obtained general recognition, East 
Germany focused its attention towards the European environment, where 
negotiations on issues of fundamental importance concerning political and military 
security were conducted, such as the Conference in European Security and 
Cooperation and the talks on Mutual Balanced Force Reductions in Central Europe. 3 
East Germany attention was shifted back to the African continent after the liberation 
of the Portuguese colonies in southern and eastern Africa, an event that offered 
further opportunities to increase the GDR leverage in the Third World. 
1.1. The GDR as an affiliate of the USSR 
East German foreign policy in Africa is worthy of serious analysis, as the GDR 
acted relatively independently from the USSR. As theorised in recent history studies, 
the GDR was not merely an appendage of Soviet activities on that continent.  
East Germany managed to make itself economically and politically indispensable 
to the Soviet Union in a variety of ways, enough to be considered as an affiliate or 
junior partner, having earned a certain degree of independence. Indeed, the new Cold 
War history, which is based upon research conducted in the archives of East bloc 
countries, has rejected the traditional idea of the GDR being a mere proxy or 
surrogate of the USSR4. East Germany boasted the highest standard of living among 
the socialist countries of Eastern Europe as its economy was highly developed 
compared to the one of the other Comecon states. Thus, it was the first among the 
socialist economies to move into the field of high technology and other intensive 
forms of production. The importance of the GDR for the USSR was also enhanced 
for the reason East Germany could act as a conduit between the European Economic 
Community (EEC) and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon). 
As argued by Gareth Winrow in his fundamental 1990 work on the GDR in 
Africa, The foreign policy of the GDR in Africa, the relations between GDR and 
                                                
3 The foreign policy of the GDR in Africa, p. 85. 
4 Lorenzini, S., “East-South relations in the 1970s and the added value of GDR involvement in Africa. 
Between bloc loyalty and self interest”, in The Globalization of the Cold War: Diplomacy and Local 
Confrontation, 1975-85, M. Guderzo and B. Bagnato, London, Routledge, 2010, pp. 104-105. 
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USSR were rather based on an ‘asymmetric interdependence’.5 New findings have 
pointed out the degree of independence in GDR foreign policy, both in Europe and 
outside of it, although many western observers in the past were assuming that the 
GDR was compelled by the USSR to pursue an active Afrikapolitik; therefore, the 
degree of independence of the GDD regarding its Afrikapolitik has proved 
considerably difficult to assess, since the prevailing orthodoxy was maintaining the 
GDR role in Africa was simply that of a surrogate/proxy for the USSR.6 
As Winrow observed, the GDR represented an affiliate state rather than a proxy or 
a puppet state. In fact, with the conscious pursuit of a strategy of affiliation, namely a 
policy carried out to demonstrate the GDR’s value as that of a faithful ally of the 
USSR, East Berlin succeeded in reaching a certain measure of freedom of 
manoeuvre and at the same time enhanced its leverage.7  
To quote the international relations expert Holsti, the role of a faithful ally is “one 
in which the policy-makers declare that they will support, with all means possible, 
their fraternal allies. They are not so much concerned with receiving aid as with 
giving the appearance of committing aid to others”.8 As Winrow emphasised, the 
GDR was voluntarily and consciously pursuing a strategy of affiliation, where Soviet 
interests were supported in order to receive, in exchange, rewards and backing for its 
own initiatives and policies9. In June 1961, when establishing the guidelines for 
cooperation within the Comecon, each delegation had to present its vision. But all of 
them, and in particular the politically prudent members like East Germany, intended 
to leave the Soviet Union free. Sensing that the Soviets already had clear ideas and 
priorities that they were unwilling to renounce, the directive for representatives of 
the German Democratic Republic openly said that in the interest of good relations 
                                                
5 See The foreign policy of the GDR in Africa, pp. 9-14. 
6 The foreign policy of the GDR in Africa, p. 7. 
7 Ibid., p. 9. 
8 Holsti, K. J., International Politics – a Framework for Analisys, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 
Prentice Hall International, 4th ed., 1983, p.119. 
9 One must add though, that there is no concrete proof that, through such an affiliation strategy and the 
commitment in Africa, East German leadership attempted to secure preferential economic treatment 
or political support from the Soviets, as argued by Winrow. Actually, former East German 
politicians have denied such intention. See: Engel, U., and Schleicher, H., Die Beiden Deutschen 
Staaten in Afrika: Zwischen Konkurrenz und Koexistenz 1949-1990, Hamburg, Hamburger Beiträge 
zur Afrika-Kunde, 1998. 
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with the Soviet Union it was not appropriate to criticize the intentions of the USSR.10 
This deferential attitude must not, however, mislead.  
The effectiveness of this strategy is not to be doubted, as it resulted in the gradual 
transformation of the GDR’s status from that of a Soviet satellite to that of a junior 
partner, or ally. Indeed, as East Germany followed the Soviet political lead and 
continually tried to persuade other Soviet allies to make the same, Western observers 
described East Germany as the Soviet Union's ‘junior partner’ within the Warsaw 
Pact. In fact, the term ‘junior ally’ was first used by the political scientists 
Brezezinski, referring to the changing nature of the relations between USSR and East 
European–Comecon states, as the latter were able to secure increasing freedom of 
manoeuvre in the conduct of their policies. By the late 1970s, having pursued a 
successful affiliation strategy, the GDR was entitled to regard itself as the most 
important junior ally of the USSR.11 However, even if East Germany was pursuing 
an affiliation strategy, it did not always maintain an equally condescending 
behaviour, as one may be lead to think. Within the Comecon, cooperation was often 
only partial and characterized by mutual agreement: it only took place if everyone 
agreed and limited to the common interests.12 
East Germany's role as the Soviet Union's junior partner also came into play in the 
Third World, especially in the African continent. The GDR, in line with its general 
foreign policy, consciously adopted a strategy of affiliation with the USSR in Africa 
too. Once having secured international recognition, the East German leadership 
willingly embarked on an enhanced political and military involvement in Africa, its 
Afrikapolitik. As the Soviet leadership gradually perceived the GDR as an important 
junior partner, it was willing to accord it increasing autonomy in the conduct of its 
policies in Africa. One could also argue that the affiliation with the USSR facilitated 
the generating of legitimacy by promoting the differentiation of the foreign policies 
of the two Germanies, being the GDR provided with certain freedom of manoeuvre. 
                                                
10 Direktive für das Auftreten der Delegation der DDR auf der 1. Sitzung der Ständigen Kommission 
des Rates für Gegenseitige Wirtschaftshilfe für die Koordinierung der technischen Unterstützung, 
BArchB, DL2 VAN 76, quoted by Lorenzini, S., Una strana guerra fredda, p. 116. 
11 The foreign policy of the GDR in Africa, p. 10. 
12 Wettig, G., Community and Conflict in the Socialist Camp: the Soviet Union, East Germany and the 
German Problem 1965-1972, London, C. Hurt, 1975, p. 150.  
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1.2. An overview on East Germany foreign policy towards Africa  
East Germany promoted two foreign policy interests in the Third World. Firstly, 
between the late 1960s and 1970s the GDR, functioning as a divided state enjoying 
little international status as compared with West Germany, it aimed to gain 
recognition, and offered economic and technical assistance to the African states in 
exchange. Secondly, a propaganda campaign was launched by East Berlin addressing 
West Germany as the heir to Germany's imperial past, while representing itself as the 
German state able to offer all the positive qualities usually associated with Germans, 
but without the taint of a colonial past.  
The architect and mind of Afrikapolitik was Werner Lamberz, a brilliant exponent 
of the German-Eastern Communist Party (SED), long-time Commissioner of the 
‘agitation and propaganda’ and member of the Politbüro. He soon became a key 
figure in the new management of Erich Honecker. He was convinced that the GDR 
needed to integrate its foreign relations with the Third World in order to favour the 
development of the economic planning of East Germany, which eventually ran as an 
important partner for many African countries, ousting Czechoslovakia and placing 
itself in second place among the donors of Central and Eastern Europe after the 
Soviet Union.13 
1.2.1. The 1960s and the seek for recognition 
Prior to the 1970s, the securing of diplomatic recognition was the primary 
objective of East German foreign policy in Africa. Indeed, recognition would 
effectively squash the repeated Western accusation towards the so-called ‘Soviet 
Zone’, considered merely as an appendage of the USSR. Furthermore, in their quest 
for recognition, East German authorities were also attempting to render redundant 
the Hallstein Doctrine by denouncing West German ‘neo-colonialist’ policies and by 
discrediting Western involvement in Africa, a strategy which was at the same time 
complementary with Moscow’s ambitions to acquire influence in the Third World. 
                                                
13 Lorenzini, S., Una strana guerra fredda: Lo sviluppo e le relazioni Nord-Sud (Studi e ricerche), p. 
178. 
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Throughout the 1960s the GDR was actively engaged in Africa, having developed 
consular relationships and having established trade missions in several African 
states. In the endeavour to obtain diplomatic recognition, the GDR opened and 
expanded ties with African regimens also by other means. For instance, links were 
cultivated with national liberation movements, with the intention of harvesting 
potential future results. As a consequence, in such cases diplomatic recognition 
would have been secured, together with the possibility to exert political influence on 
the country.14 In fact, although the most pressing and immediate aim was recognition, 
East German officials were clearly aware of possible longer-term benefits that could 
emerge as a result of their condemnation of neo-colonialism and support of national 
and social liberation movements in Africa.15 In particular, one means used to initiate 
contacts and eventually gain recognition were gifts of solidarity, such as medicine, 
clothes, food and agricultural equipment, that were distributed to states at times of 
national disaster.16 The term ‘solidarity’ will often appear in this work. This term was 
largely used in all kind of documents and speeches, as socialist terminology directly 
appealed to the tradition of anti-imperialist solidarity. It therefore did not use the 
term ‘aid’, but rather spoke of cooperation on a footing of equality, or of ‘solidarity’. 
Solidarity involved different forms of aid, which were aimed to help and support 
both national liberation movements and the already independent states. 
Cultural activities were used as well as means to denigrate the FRG’s role in 
Africa, which was depicted as a neo-colonialist state, as already mentioned. Actually, 
within the Comecon, cultural policy issues towards the third world had no place, 
whereas only East Germany and Czechoslovakia wanted to engage in this sense.17 
This shows once again how the Afrikapolitik was, in fact, the result of freedom of 
manoeuvre of the GDR, and therefore it was not imposed by the USSR leadership as 
it was believed at the time.  
 The SED as well as social organisations, such as trade unions and women 
organisations, had a special responsibility in taking care of relations with national 
liberation movements. The youth organisation FDJ (Freie Deutsche Jugend) had a 
                                                
14 Winrow, The foreign policy of the GDR in Africa, p. 47. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., p. 48 
17 Politisches Archiv des früheren Ministeriums für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten der DDR. 
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special role in providing training and assistance. Especially noteworthy were the 
Friendship Brigades (Freunschaftsbrigaden) introduced in 1964; they were the East 
German version of the Peace Corps. The Freundschaftsbrigaden, the Peace Corps of 
the Eastern Bloc, were composed of young technicians from the GDR, men aged 21 
to 30, skilled, unmarried and without first-degree relatives in West Germany, who 
were employed in the newly independent states with the purpose of "developing 
friendly relations among peoples and training personnel for future diplomatic 
missions".18 They helped in centres for training and apprenticeship or worked as 
mechanics on products provided by the GDR, so as to constitute a sort of technical 
assistance network for East German products in the African market. They also had 
full capacity for political representation and the accessory task of carrying out 
socialist propaganda. The first Brigades were sent in 1964 to Ghana, Guinea, Mali 
and Algeria.19 Moreover, the GDR offered scholarships and provided training and 
education in party organisation and trade union policies, and taught propaganda 
techniques. Cultural policies were considered essential in order to educate the future 
elite who would cooperate with socialist countries. 
This kind of ‘indoctrination’ of Africa’s future political elite was rather part of a 
long-term strategy; the aim was not only gaining recognition, but also securing a 
long-term influence on the continent.20 Eventually, this policy of help and ‘invective’ 
against the neo-colonialist West appeared to impress certain African national 
liberation movements. Solidarity with these movements was emphasised, in order to 
influence political groups, which the GDR hoped were destined to lead future 
independent states.21  
1.2.2. GDR international policy towards Africa in the 1970’s 
In the mid 1970s Africa became a major battlefield for East-West competition. 
Independence of the former Portuguese colonies and the developments in the Horn of 
Africa opened new perspectives for socialist countries. In the 1970s, East Germany 
                                                
18  Politisches Archiv des früheren Ministeriums für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten der DDR, 
Kollegiumsitzung of 19 August 1963. 
19 See Büschel, H., Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe. Deutsche Entwicklungsarbeit in Afrika 1960-1975, Frankfurt 
a. M., Campus Verlag, 2014, pp. 452-481.   
20 Winrow, The foreign policy of the GDR in Africa, p. 48. 
21 Ibid., p. 60 
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continued to pursue an active policy in the Third World, particularly in Africa, both 
because such strategy was part of its role as a Soviet ally, and because this vigorous 
policy could advance its own specific interests.  
The liberation of the colonies, together with more than two decades of carefully 
cultivated relations with African countries and liberation movements, would finally 
aid Honecker in the endeavour to upgrade further East German contacts with the 
African continent.  
From 1975 onwards, the GDR sought to strengthen the bonds of solidarity and 
friendship with certain Africa states, in order to impress upon the USSR and obtain, 
as Winrow argued, preferential economic treatment. In this context, an active 
Afrikapolitik were followed and military and security operation in Africa were 
expanded.22 Furthermore, trading relationships were developed with a number of 
Third World states. East Germany imported mainly raw materials, such as cotton, 
tropical fruits, coffee beans, and nuts. 
Anti-neo-colonialism was still one of the leitmotivs of the GDR foreign policy; in 
September 1973, once formally admitted into the UN, the GDR took advantage of 
the international forum to present an anti-colonial and non-racist profile, whilst 
openly condemning the West for its imperialist activities, together with the FRG.23 
Thus, confidence in decolonization was strong in Soviet ideology. Evgeny Varga 
noted that the disintegration of the colonial system would have shaken the 
foundations of imperialism, which in broader terms would have meant the general 
crisis of capitalism.24 
In the post-recognition period, to tighten its relations with Africa states and 
strengthen its role in the African continent, East Germany concluded treaties of 
friendship and cooperation not only with African states, but also with parties, 
national fronts and liberation movements. Undoubtedly, the extensive contacts with 
African political parties in this period were essential to the propagation of Marxism-
Leninism throughout the whole continent in the interest of the Soviet bloc.25 These 
agreements called for cooperation in the fields of health, economic, scientific, 
                                                
22 Winrow, The foreign policy of the GDR in Africa, p 86. 
23 Ibid., p. 93 
24 See Varga, E., “On Trends of Development of Contemporary Capitalism and Socialism”, in World 
Economy and International Relations, 1957, vol. 4, pp. 36-48.   
25 Winrow, The foreign policy of the GDR in Africa, p. 89. 
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political, and educational affairs. In chapter 2, along with a detailed reconstruction of 
bilateral relations between GDR and Mozambique, it will be widely spoken about the 
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between East Germany and Mozambique. 
The GDR also supported the development of ‘vanguard parties’ in the democratic 
phase of socialist orientation.26  
Military aid represented an essential part of international relations between 
African states and GDR. In the mid-1980s, East Germany had a significant military 
presence in Africa. The United States Department of Defence reports that in 1981 
“East Germans were serving in the Middle East and Africa, specifically in Angola, 
Ethiopia, Guinea, Mozambique, Algeria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the People's 
Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen)”27. Distinctive was that East German 
troops did apparently no fighting; they acted primarily in an advisory and training 
capacity. Third World military and security personnel would also travel to East 
Germany to be military trained, a subject matter which will be addressed in detail in 
chapter 5 as regards to Mozambican troops.  
1.3. Solidarity against imperialism: the ideological justification 
The GDR built its friendly state ‘myth’ by depicting itself as the antagonist of 
imperialistic and racist West Germany, whilst sustaining the policy of 
Völkerfreundschaft, a friendship between peoples which aim was to provide 
developing nations with military, financial and political support.  
GDR assistance to developing countries was underpinned by political, ideological 
and economic factors. In fact, for the SED, the Socialist Unity Party, aid was the 
means through which the construction of a new socialist international order would be 
realised. Therefore, rather than using the term ‘aid’, the SED preferred using 
                                                
26 Nimchowski, H., Probleme der Einheitsfront der anti-imperialistisch-demokratischen Kräfte in 
Staaten mit sozialistischer Orientierung, AAL, vol. 5,4, 1977, p. 536. 
27 www.country-data.com, based on the Country Studies Series by Federal Research Division of the 
Library of Congress 
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‘economic socialist assistance’. 28  Hence, special relations were developed with 
countries with a ‘socialist orientation’, such as Mozambique. 
In 1976, during the 9th SED Congress, Honecker stressed the revolutionary 
potential of the developing States and liberation movements, and ‘anti-imperialist 
solidarity’ was ranked as one of the most important foreign policy goals.29 At the 
same time, helping liberation movements fight against colonial regimes was seen as 
a step forward in the annihilation of Capitalism. The struggle for freedom was 
classified by the SED as a ‘fair war’, and consequently approved by the 
government30. Normally, foreign interventions were not allowed, but African affairs 
represented an exception in the broadest context of the fight against Capitalism.31 
Positive developments in Africa were particularly stressed. In two major speeches in 
1978 Honecker referred to Africa specifically as a continent in which “peoples were 
substantially contributing to the continuing change of the international balance of 
power in favour of Socialism”.32 
Even if the SED argued that its economic links with Third World countries were 
founded on equality, respect for sovereignty and especially on mutual advantage, in 
practice, as many authors underlined, the aids resembled to those of capitalist 
counterparts. Economic interest played actually a vital role in the developing of the 
aid programme. Authors are generally convinced that the GDR, like western 
capitalistic countries, aimed to secure supplies of raw material to favour its industry, 
by fostering at the same time a market for its products. 
                                                
28 See Schulz, B. and Hansen, W., “Aid or Imperialism? West Germany in Sub-Saharan Africa'” in 
The journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 22, issue 2, Cambridge, Cambridge Universiy Press, , 
June I984, pp. 287-3I3. 
29 Honecker, E., Bericht des Zentralkomitees der Sozialistischen Eniheitspartei Deutschlands an der 
IX Parteitag der Sed, Berlin (East), Dietz Verlag, 1976, p. 27. 
30 Rabenschlag, A., Völkerfreundschaft nach Bedarf. Ausländische Arbeitskräfte in der Wahrnehmung 
von Staat und Bevölkerung der DDR. Stockholm, Stokholm University, 2014. P. 56. 
31 Storkmann, K., “’Aktive Solidarität?’ Akteure und Motive des politischen Entscheidungsprozess zu 
Militärhilfen der DDR für die sogenannte Dritte Welt”, in: Zeitschrift des Forschungsverbunden 
SED-Staat, Nr.24, Berlin, Freie Universität Berlin, 2008, pp. 131-153. 
32 Neues Deutschland, 18/19 February 1978, speech to Kreis SED first secretaries, and, 8 Tagung des 
ZK der SED,  24/25 May 1978. Berlin (East). Dietz Verlag, 1978, p. 15. 
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1.4. The case of Mozambique 
Having provided a general overview on GDR foreign policy towards African 
countries, it is now possible to turn the attention to a major recipient in Africa of the 
GDR assistance, namely FRELIMO, the Mozambique Liberation Front.  
The SED nurtured a particular interest in Mozambique, both for economic and for 
ideological reasons. On the one hand, ideologically speaking, the main interest was 
to guide the former Portuguese colony through the development of a new socialist 
society. On the other hand, economically speaking, Mozambique was a great source 
not only of raw materials, but also of labour force and could represent a market for 
East Germany exports.  
Before analysing the relations between the two countries, it is necessary to briefly 
introduce the political and economic background of Mozambique right after the 
independence from Portugal.  
1.4.1. Political and economic background of Mozambique  
Mozambique obtained independence on the 25 June 1975, after a long war 
between FRELIMO, the liberation movement, and Portugal, namely the Mozambican 
War of Independence (1964–1974). 
After World War II, while many European nations were granting independence to 
their colonies, Portugal maintained that Mozambique and other Portuguese 
possessions had to remain territories of the mother country. However, especially 
during the Cold War, Communist and anti-colonial ideas were spreading out across 
the African continent; they were certainly inspired by the social revolution on the 
Soviet model, but in the case of African colonies, the conflict was not primarily 
between workers and capitalists, but rather between colonists and colonizers. 
Therefore, it didn’t take long for liberation political movement to be established. In 
1962 several anti-colonial political groups joined, creating FRELIMO, the Front for 
the Liberation of Mozambique. FRELIMO initiated a guerrilla campaign against 
Portuguese rule in September 1964. The ten-years conflict became soon one of the 
fronts of the cold war. FRELIMO had received the solidarity of the Soviet Union and 
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the countries of Eastern Europe that had sent arms, emergency aid, councillors and 
technicians.33. 
 By April 25, 1974 FRELIMO  was in control of more than one-fourth of the 
territory of Mozambique.34 General António de Spínola, the new head of government 
in Portugal, called for a ceasefire and negotiations between the country and 
FRELIMO officials helped with the signing of the Lusaka Accord on September 7, 
1974. In the accord, all power was handed over to FRELIMO without elections, and 
the country’s formal independence was set on June 25, 1975, which was the 13th 
anniversary of the founding of FRELIMO. 
After independence, FRELIMO ceased being a political movement fighting a 
guerrilla war and became a political party assuming control of a government. 
Therefore, FRELIMO is said to be “an example of the actuality of a victorious 
liberation movement which, on the morrow of its victory and accession to power, 
transformed itself from a movement for national liberation into a Marxist-Leninist 
vanguard party for a continued and uninterrupted revolutionizing of society and 
state”.35 
At independence, the People’s Republic of Mozambique inherited an extremely 
catastrophic and perilously backward economic and financial situation, defined by 
Samora Machel, the first president of independent Mozambique, as the "result of 
unbridled plunder, the financial conditions imposed by colonialism and the 
disorganised exploitation of our potential”.  Mozambique was faced with a foreign 
debt  of $800 million, a trade deficit of $24 million, high inflation and few foreign 
reserves. Thus, forty per cent of Mozambique's annual budget came  from rail and 
port tariffs, and between seven and ten per cent came from the remittances of mine 
workers to South Africa.36   
In 1976, a United Nations report concluded that the kind of development carried 
out in Mozambique has been unable for many years to absorb the growing 
population into productive employment and the large number, over a quarter of a 
                                                
33 Lorenzini, Una strana guerra fredda, pp. 3-4. 
34 Schneidman, W. J., “FRELIMO’s foreign policy and the process of liberation, in Africa Today”, in: 
Southern Africa: Confrontation and Conflict, Indiana, Indiana University Press, Vol. 25, No. 1, Mar. 
1978, p. 63. 
35 Nwafor  , A., “FRELIMO and Socialism in Mozambique  ” in Contemporary Marxism, No. 7, 
Revolution in Southern Africa, San Francisco, Social Justice – Global Options, Fall 1983, p. 31 
36 Keesing Contemporary Record, Vol. 15. No. 20, Oct 4 1971. 
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million, who found employment abroad became a major source of foreign exchange 
for Mozambique and Portugal, and increased the dependence of Mozambique on 
surrounding countries. Moreover, the liberation in Mozambique did not however 
mark the end of the clashes, which continued at the borders. Here the RENAMO 
(Mozambican National Resistance), the group born in 1975 and supported by 
Rhodesia and South Africa of apartheid, used to fight the guerrilla to defend the 
government of the white minority against the armed uprising of the patriotic front. 
A further problem for Mozambique was the lack of specialised labour force, being 
the higher position covered by the Portuguese. After the independence, FRELIMO 
made the Portuguese leave the country. This was going to be one of the fundamental 
premises to the cooperation between GDR and Mozambique, as reflected in chapter 
2 and 3.  
1.4.2. Early relations between FRELIMO and the GDR  
The GDR was the first East European state to conclude party-level agreements 
with FRELIMO. 37 Ascertaining the precise details of the nature of such party 
agreements is quite complicated, although it may be assumed that such connections 
were employed to increase East German leverage over the internal and external 
policies of the state.38 According to East German sources, party relations were a 
source of ‘impulses not only for inter-state cooperation but also for ties with social 
organisations’39 
However, relations between GDR and FRELIMO date back before Mozambique 
gained its longed-for independence. As a liberation movement aspires to form a 
government, it is useful to view it as an embryonic governmental structure. 
FRELIMO was a Marxist-Leninist-oriented liberation movement, which would have 
given rise to a new socialist government in Mozambique. This clearly explains why 
such relations between SED and FRELIMO began before the independence of 
Mozambique. In particular, mutual delegation visits between SED and FRELIMO 
                                                
37 von Plate, B., “Aspekte der SED-Parteibeziehungen in Afrika und der arabischen Region” in 
Deutschland Archiv 12, 1980, pp. 134-5. 
38 Winrow, The foreign policy of the GDR in Africa, p. 89. 
39 Zenker, J., ‘Zusammenarbeit der SED mit revolutionär-demokratischen Parteien in Afrika und 
Asien’, in: Deutsche Außenpolitik, vol. 22, October 1977, p. 105. 
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took place in preparation for what would come after the independence. For instance, 
in 1974 a FRELIMO delegation was invited in East Berlin and the whole meeting 
between SED and the delegation followed the protocol of state visits, meaning that 
FRELIMO was considered the rightfully representative of Mozambique.40 
As mentioned before, intervention in foreign matters was to be avoided; still, the 
struggle for independence was considered a ‘fair war’. In addition, FRELIMO made 
its voice heard through the United Nations, condemning Portugal in many occasions. 
As a consequence, several relevant resolutions were passed by the General Assembly 
which related to FRELIMO's struggle. For instance, Resolution 1514 (XV), Dec. 14, 
1960, called for the granting of independence to all colonial territories, and 
Resolution 2787(XXVI), 1971, confirmed the legality of people's armed struggle 
against colonialism and alien self-rule. Given the fact they were passed by the 
General Assembly, these resolutions were non-binding for the members of UN, 
anyway they did direct the attention of the world to Mozambique, and they also gave 
a legal as well as a moral basis for aid to the liberation movement .41 
Consequently, GDR could deliver concrete aid to FRELIMO; it concerned material 
aid – food and clothing – as well as political and military education, and the 
supplying of significant quantities of arms.42  
Interesting was the Medienpolitik, one particular means of influence employed by 
the GDR in Mozambique. From the reports in the newspaper Neues Deutschland, it 
appears that in the period between 1973 and 1979 the VDJ, the GDR Union of 
Journalists, concluded agreements with journalists’ union in many African states, 
among which also Mozambique. The aim was the training of journalists in courses 
and seminars organised by the East Germany specialists at the Internationales 
Institut für Journalistik near East Berlin. In total, 432 journalists coming from 39 
Third World countries were reported to have been trained at the Institute.43 The 
nature of the training and how it was carried out are unknown. 
                                                
40 Döring, H. J., und Rüchel, U., Freundschaftsbande und Beziehungskisten. Die Afrikapolitik der 
DDR und der BRD gegenüber Mosambik, Frankfurt am Main, Brandes & Apsel, 2005. 
41 Schneidman, W. J., “FRELIMO’s foreign policy and the process of liberation”, in: Africa Today, 
Vol. 25, No. 1, Southern Africa: Confrontation and Conflict, Indiana, Indiana University Press, 
March 1978, p. 60. 
42 Ibid. 
43 von Löwis of Menar, H., “SED-Journalismus als Exportartikel – die Entwicklungshilfe der DDR”, 
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It could be concluded that this exercise of what one Western source has referred 
to as ‘applied Proto-Leninism’44, to exert increasing East German influence through 
party contacts and organisational ties, was for the GDR fundamentally an extension 
and continuation of policies commenced in the pre-recognition period. After the 
independence of Mozambique, the ties between FRELIMO and SED became tighter; 
the bilateral relations between the two governments would bring to a new level of 
cooperation, where many Mozambican citizens were sent to GDR to follow 
particular education plans, vocational and military training. In the next chapter, the 
bilateral relations between the GDR and the newly formed People’s Republic of 
Mozambique will be analysed in detail. 
  
                                                
44 See Croan, M., “A new Afrika Korps?”, in: The Washington Quarterly, No. 4, Winter 1980, p. 22. 
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2. Bilateral relations between East Germany and 
Mozambique: from Mozambique’s independence to the 
collapse of the GDR (1975-1990) 
In this chapter the bilateral relations between the People’s Republic of 
Mozambique and the German Democratic Republic will be reconstructed. To this 
end, Documents on East Germany foreign policy (Dokumente zur Außerpolitik der 
DDR) were used; in particular, treaties, meetings and speeches are the foundations of 
this study. Moreover, the daily newspaper Neues Deutschland, the official party 
newspaper of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), was used to retrieve 
further information about how the SED perceived such relations.  
A problem had arisen during the research, namely the absence of documents about 
the GDR foreign policy between the years 1986 and 1990. The Documents on East 
German Foreign Policy were in all likelihood stopped being published after the 
German reunification, as the more recent one was published in 1988 and referred to 
the year 1985. 
Mozambique, classified as a developing country with a socialist orientation, was 
one of the most important African countries within the frame of East German foreign 
policy and maintained intensive relations with the former GDR. Such cooperation 
between the GDR and Mozambique was realised mainly through party relations, 
solidified with agreements. Eventually, an extensive agreement-system was brought 
to life, with more than 800 agreements and conventions.45 In particular, 70 state-level 
agreements were reached on many fields, such as economic, scientific, technical and 
cultural cooperation. As already mentioned in the previous chapter, the GDR 
provided also assistance in such areas as education, communications, cadres training 
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and military/security operations.46 On the basis of this agreement-system, many 
Mozambicans studied on the GDR territory, and around 22,000 Mozambicans 
worked in East Germany, they were the so-called ‘contract workers’47.  
Strong emphasis was however placed on economic relations, to the point that the 
development of economic relations became broad and complex as with no other 
African country.48  
Despite the exploration of many possibilities for international cooperation, 
Mozambique strongly relied on the support from the GDR and on future relations 
with it in the course of its social development. The transition to complex cooperation 
in political, scientific-technical and cultural fields meant entering a new territory. 
However, both sides were quite aware about their mutual political interests since the 
beginning. In addition, the problematic nature coming from such an extensive 
agreement-system was mutually known.49 
2.1. Reasons behind the cooperation between East Germany and 
Mozambique 
It’s clear that the tight cooperation between the German Democratic Republic and 
the People’s Republic of Mozambique relied upon mutual interests.  
First of all, the GDR was politically ready to help Mozambique overcome its 
colonial legacy, i.e. to support it in building a national economic and social base. On 
an ideological level, it was driven by the desire to assist the former Portuguese 
colony in the construction of a new socialist society. Politically, East German 
support for Mozambique enabled the GDR to extend its influence to Southern 
Africa50. In other words, East Germany was eager to ‘export’ its socialist model, 
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extending at the same time the influence of the USSR on the continent and bringing 
Mozambique under its influence area, as a way of contributing towards the 
construction of a new socialist international order. At the same time, the FRELIMO 
leadership wanted to build a socialist system in Mozambique, and the introduction of 
economic policies and state structures similar to those of the GDR was therefore 
sought. 51 
Whilst ideological and political factors took precedence in the I970s, economic 
interests played a vital role in the shaping of cooperation projects, especially after the 
impending crisis of the mid-1980s. The SED always maintained that, as opposed to 
Western neo- imperialism, its economic links with poorer countries were founded on 
equality, mutual advantage, respect for sovereignty, and territorial integrity. Many 
authors underlined how they bore a striking resemblance to those of its capitalist 
rivals. Howell argued that, like Western capitalist countries, the GDR held a keen 
interest in securing supplies of raw materials for its industry52. Key  projects included 
coal and pegmatite mining, state farms, the textile  factory in Mocuba, the 
reconstruction of the Moatize railway, the production of radios, medical assistance 
and licensed fishery. The focus was on East German support on Mozambique’s 
industrialisation, the development of agriculture by large enterprises, the 
development of technical infrastructure, the search for and the extraction of raw 
materials, and especially the development of a national education and health system. 
The GDR was furthermore interested in creating a long-term receptive market for its 
products, in particular the one from the sectors of mechanical engineering and 
metalworking industry.  
As already mentioned, the cooperation would have brought both countries mutual 
advantages; Mozambique needed basically everything an industrial state could offer: 
machinery, chemicals, consumer goods and in particular expertise. Since during the 
Portuguese rule Portuguese employees were employed in the highest working 
position, the ones requiring expertise, once Mozambique obtained its independence it 
was left without specialised workers. Given the lack of experts, the GDR and 
Mozambique cooperated also in this field; East German experts were sent to work in 
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Mozambique and, vice versa, Mozambican workers could undertake a training 
programme in the GDR. These projects served mainly two purposes. Firstly, they 
provided the respective countries with industrial expertise, thus contributing to the 
formation of a skilled workforce and a potential working class. Secondly, they were 
a way of dealing with the GDR's acute labour shortage, a result of both low birth 
rates and the loss of population following the construction of the Berlin Wall.  
Not all cooperation projects were the result of a thorough analysis and careful 
economic calculations. Some projects also arose on the occasion of political 
encounters between representatives of both states, led by the wish to quickly 
overcome the underdevelopment of the country and to achieve profound social 
change. However, the agreed cooperation projects were generally the result of 
negotiations regarding the economic development of Mozambique.  
What many authors underlined, is that the cooperation would have brought in 
general to mutual advantage to both countries. As Butters argued, there were no 
projects that the GDR has pushed only for its one-sided benefit and to the detriment 
of Mozambique.53 
In the period between 1977 and 1980 the major agreements were signed. 
However, it should be mentioned that at the beginning of the 1980s severe problems 
arose because of the massive destabilisation of the country carried on by RENAMO, 
the anti-communist and reactionary militant organisation, against the ruling party 
FRELIMO. At the time, their devastating effects on the realization of most of the 
GDR projects could not yet be estimated nor identified. On the contrary, on the side 
of the GDR, it was assumed that since Mozambique achieved independence, the 
progress of the country on the basis of existing resources were to develop rapidly. 
The destabilisation carried on by RENAMO, however, eventually affected 
Mozambique’s capacity to export severely.54  
                                                
53 Butters, H., Zur wirtschaftlichen Zusammenarbeit DDR – Mosambik, p. 209 
54 Howell, J., The End of an Era: The Rise and Fall of G.D.R. Aid, p. 315. 
31 
2.2. 1975-1978:  Early relations after the independence and the birth of 
the People’s Republic of Mozambique 
Right after Mozambique’s independence, on 25 June 1975, the GDR recognised 
the People’s Republic of Mozambique55 and, vice versa, Mozambique recognised the 
GDR. The sole German delegation in attendance at the independence celebrations for 
Mozambique on that day was the one of the German Democratic Republic, led by 
Bernhard Quandt, member of the SED Central Committee and member of the 
Council of State, in the presence of guests from over 50 countries.56  
Naturally, diplomatic relations between the two countries immediately 
commenced.57 Already on 24 May 1975 a communiqué announced the establishing 
of diplomatic relations with Mozambique right after its independence. As written in 
the report:  
Based on their solid alliance in the anti-imperialist struggle and the long-standing solidarity 
relations between the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and the Front for the Liberation of 
Mozambique, as well as the effort to promote and deepen this cooperation in the future, the 
German Democratic Republic and Mozambique will, on the basis of the objectives and principles 
of the Charter of the United Nations and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, with 
effect from 25 June 1975, establish diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level.  
(Dokumente zur Außenpolitik der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Staatsverlag der DDR, 
1975, vol. 1, p. 604, translated by the author). 
Although FRELIMO started to develop complex cooperation measures as soon as 
political power was taken over, firm commitments by the GDR were only taken after 
lengthy scrutiny and cautious analysis. During the period of the interim government 
under Prime Minister Chissano, the GDR sent a delegation that had a friendly 
exchange of views with FRELIMO President Machel at the GDR embassy in Dar es 
Salaam. The planning for cooperation was boosted by the GDR when its economic 
situation worsened in the second half of the 1970s, and connecting its projects in 
Mozambique with the solutions for upcoming problems of the GDR economy 
appeared to be the right solution.58 
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In the same year, on the 13 August, an agreement regarding cooperation in the 
field of science and technology was signed. Such agreement stipulated that the GDR 
should admit on its territory citizens of the People’s Republic of Mozambique, with 
the aim of providing vocational training or further education by allowing them to 
work in companies and institution of the GDR59. 
In the following year, in 1976, Oskar Fischer, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
the German Democratic Republic, made an official state visit to Mozambique on 13 
December and on this occasion two agreements were signed; one regarding 
cooperation in the field of fishing, and the most noteworthy was the Consular 
Agreement between the German Democratic Republic and the People's Republic of 
Mozambique, as the GDR and Mozambique wanted to strengthen their relations by 
regulating and developing their consular relations. 60 
In 1977 the links between the two countries were further strengthened. The first 
trade agreement between the governments of the GDR and Mozambique was 
completed on 15 April 197761. It was inter alia agreed that trade relations should be 
developed and deepened in accordance with the principles of sovereign equality of 
states, non-interference in internal affairs and mutual benefit.  
The cooperation between the GDR and Mozambique also included culture and 
propaganda; as already mentioned, East Germany held in high regard cultural 
activities, especially if they were linked to party propaganda. A perfect example is 
the Agreement between the State Broadcasting Committee of the Council of 
Ministers of the German Democratic Republic and Radio Mozambique on 
cooperation in the field of broadcasting of 24 May 1977. The agreement stipulated 
that the two countries had to exchange broadcasting material, especially on politics, 
economics and culture. Programmes such as folk and classical music, work songs 
and even battle hymns were to be shared. On request, it could also be possible to 
have Mozambican speakers trained by the Rundfunk der DDR, the East German 
radio organisation62. 
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In 1977 another official state visit took place, this time in East Berlin, on 12 
September, between the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the GDR, Willi 
Stopf, and the head of the party and government delegation of the People's Republic 
of Mozambique, the Minister Mario da Graca Machungo. Themes of the official 
conversation were information exchanges between the two about the development of 
their countries. The fact that the two parties converged in the same political ideas 
was always emphasised in such official conversations: the fight against imperialism, 
racism and neo-colonialism. Both representatives would underline they were looking 
forward to developing further relations and take further steps towards new fields and 
forms of cooperation. 63  
The first significant concretization of economic cooperation between the two 
countries took place as a result of negotiations of a delegation headed by the former 
Minister for Development and Economic Planning, Marcelino dos Santos, in 
November 1977 in the GDR. It resulted in the adoption of important agreements on 
economic, scientific and technical cooperation, cooperation agreements in selected 
areas and the creation of a Joint Economic Committee. On 15 November another 
agreement regarding cooperation in the field of economics, science and technology 
was signed during the visit of a government delegation of the People's Republic of 
Mozambique in the German Democratic Republic. In this occasion, support in the 
training of cadre by the GDR was also offered. 64  
After the Politburo of the SED decided in December 1977 to form the "Politburo 
Commission for the Coordination of Economic, Cultural, Scientific and 
Technological Relations with Developing Countries in Africa, Asia and the Arab 
World", economic cooperation with Mozambique also received the highest political 
support and economic priority.65  
In 1978, the Wirtschaftssauschusses (Joint Economic Committee) GDR– 
Mozambique was founded. Each year until 1983 a conference was carried out in 
order to assess, discuss and organise the cooperation between East Germany and 
Mozambique. It had many subcommittees for specific areas. The most noteworthy 
                                                
63 Dokumente zur Außenpolitik der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Berlin	(East),	Staatsverlag	der	DDR,1977, vol 1, pp. 698-699.  
64 Dokumente zur Außenpolitik der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik,1977, vol 1, pp. 699-701. 
65 See Butters, H., Zur wirtschaftlichen Zusammenarbeit DDR – Mosambik, pp. 201-202. 
34 
were foreign trade, scientific and technical cooperation and finance; mining and 
geology; construction, education and workforce. In particular, the latter was focused 
towards the diverse support of vocational training and continuing education of 
Mozambicans in Mozambique and in the GDR, with emphasis on qualifying them 
for later employment in the enterprises to be built by the GDR in Mozambique, the 
establishment of vocational training centres in Mozambique and support for 
elementary school, technical and university education. 
On the 10 July 1978, the 1st meeting of the Joint Economic Committee GDR - 
VR Mozambique took place in Maputo. The GDR and the People's Republic of 
Mozambique signed a Memorandum of Understanding for the deepening of their 
cooperation on 10 July 1978 following the successful conclusion of the first meeting 
of the Joint Economic Committee. It saw a significant increase in the mutual 
exchange of goods both in 1979 and in the following years. At the same time, the 
two sides concluded intergovernmental agreements on aviation, maritime traffic and 
postal and telecommunications services. The GDR agreed to support Mozambique in 
the development of its mineral deposits as well as in the construction of a lorry 
assembly plant and a textile combing facility. At the same time, the GDR agreed to 
provide vocational training for Mozambican workers in their homeland and also in 
the GDR.66 
On 2 November 1978 a meeting between Erich Honecker and the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Mozambique, Joaquim Chissano took 
place in Berlin.67 Both interlocutors praised the rapid development and the high level 
of cooperation between the GDR and Mozambique in various fields. Then the results 
of the first meeting of the Joint Economic Committee DDR-Mozambique were 
emphasised, as they gave new impetus to the dynamic and all-round development of 
economic relations between the two countries. As reported by Neues Deutschland, 
Willi Stoph and Joaquim Chissano reaffirmed the intention of their states to further 
develop bilateral relations for the benefit of both peoples68.  
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Shortly thereafter, in February of the following year, the most significant bilateral 
agreement between East Germany and Mozambique would have been signed, 
namely the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. It marked a turning point in the 
relations between the two countries. 
2.3. The Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the German 
Democratic Republic and the People’s Republic of Mozambique 
(24 February 1979): a turning point in the relations between the 
two countries 
The Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the GDR and Mozambique69 
can be taken as the most relevant bilateral treaty in the history of their relations. It 
represented a turning point in the relations between the two states, as allowed their 
cooperation to become even tighter. 
The Treaty was concluded in occasion of Honecker’s first tours of Africa in 1979, 
marking the pinnacle of success of East German involvement in Africa in this period. 
Basing on article 15, the Treaty was supposed to have duration of 20 years. During 
his tour through the African continent, Honecker concluded other twenty-year 
Treaties of Friendship and Cooperation, namely with Angola and Ethiopia. One East 
German report published shortly after the February tour, portrayed the first Honecker 
mission as a high point in the history of the foreign policy of the German Democratic 
Republic. It especially praised the GDR African policy, since it impressively 
reinforced the bonds of solidarity between the GDR and those peoples of the African 
continent struggling for their national and social liberation. 70  Honecker’s 1979 
mission to Africa was regarded as the culmination of assiduously cultivated relations 
stretching over several years, including pre-independence wars of liberation, 
especially in the case of Mozambique and FRELIMO.  
On 28 June 1979, addressing the Volkskammer, Fischer referred to the GDR 
treaties with Mozambique emphasising the fact that the cooperation was based on 
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proletarian internationalism and Marxism Leninism. Such principles, broader 
speaking, reflected part of that policy agreed during the session of the Political 
Consultative Committee of the WTO in Moscow in November 1978. At the session, 
the Soviet bloc was urged to develop relations with ‘states of socialist orientation’ in 
the Third World.71 One West German analyst was prompted to assert that the GDR 
had come to regard itself as a ‘pacemaker’ [Schrittmacher] of the world 
revolutionary process by the side of the Soviet Union.72  
By reading the Preamble of the Treaty one could easily understand what were the 
intentions of both sides by concluding such an agreement: 
The German Democratic Republic and the People's Republic of Mozambique, in view of the 
fraternal friendship and cooperation between their parties and peoples, already forged during 
the armed liberation struggle of the Mozambican people, based on Marxism-Leninism and 
proletarian internationalism; 
determined to contribute to the creation of favourable conditions for the continuation of the 
revolutionary process in the world; 
guided by the desire, with the further deepening of fraternal friendship and cooperation 
between the German Democratic Republic and the People's Republic of Mozambique, to 
contribute to the consolidation of the natural anti-imperialist alliance between the socialist 
states and the national liberation movements, as well as to the further unity of all to provide 
peace, democracy and social progress to the struggling forces; 
filled with the ideals of the struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, 
racism and apartheid; 
determined to contribute to the consolidation of the peace and security of all peoples; 
willing to further develop the social and economic advances of both countries and to support 
each other; 
reaffirming its loyalty to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations; 
have decided to sign this agreement of friendship and cooperation […].  
(Gesetzblatt der DDR, Teil II, 1979, nr. 4, p. 60. Translated by the author, see p. 121 of 
Appendix for the original version). 
As one can see, the natural anti-imperialistic alliance between the socialist states 
and the national liberation movement is rather stressed, together with the aim of 
further the ‘revolutionary process in the world’. It can therefore be argued that the 
                                                
71 Dokumente zur Außenpolitik der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1979, vol. 1, Berlin (East), 
Staatsverlag der DDR, pp. 489-91. 
72 L. of Menar, Die DDR als Schrittmacher im weltrevolutionären Prozeß. Zur Honecker-Visite in 
Äthiopien und im Südjemen. In Deutschland Archiv 1/1980, p. 41. 
37 
contracting parties were convinced that the unity between socialist states would have 
helped win the fight against capitalism. 
The Treaty called for cooperation in numerous fields such as science and 
technology, politics and culture. Particularly stressed were economic relations, 
industrial cooperation and trade, cooperation in the field of telecommunications, and 
the training of Mozambican workers. Moreover, in Article 2 it was set out that 
economic relations were to be realised on the base of mutual advantages and the 
interests of both countries.  
The Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation also contained Articles on military 
cooperation. Article 5 provided for military cooperation with the aim of 
strengthening the defence capabilities of the two states. Furthermore, according to 
Article 10, should a situation arise which was threatening or violating peace, both 
states should immediately contact one another in order to harmonise and coordinate 
their positions regarding the elimination of the looming danger or the restoration of 
peace: 
Art. 10: In the event of a situation that might threaten or violate peace, the High Contracting 
Parties will immediately contact each other to coordinate their positions to eliminate the 
threat or to restore peace.  
(Translated by the author, see p. 123 of Appendix for the original version) 
In accordance with Article 5, a Protocol of Military cooperation was agreed on 
May 1979 in the occasion of the visit of the officiating Minister of National Defence 
of Mozambique, Armando Emilio Guebuza, in East Berlin.73 However, it must be 
noted that the published military clauses in such treaties between the GDR and 
individual African states promised by no means a definite military commitment of 
troops in the event of conflict. In fact, an extension of the applicability of the so-
called Brezhnev Doctrine to the African continent in the name of socialist 
internationalism was unlikely to happen74. In short, the Bezhnev Doctrine could be 
summarised as follows, quoting the speech of Brezhnev himself in Warsaw on 
November 12, 1968:  
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 When external and internal forces hostile to socialism try to turn the development of a given 
socialist country in the direction of restoration of the capitalist system, when a threat arises to 
the cause of socialism in that country—a threat to the security of the socialist commonwealth 
as a whole—this is no longer merely a problem for that country's people, but a common 
problem, the concern of all socialist countries. 
This Treaty can be taken as a further proof supporting the fact that the relations 
between Mozambique and the GDR were tighter than the ones with any other 
African state. For instance, Western analysts have noted the omission of the clause 
concerned with military cooperation in treaties of friendship and cooperation with 
other African states, in contrast to the GDR-Mozambique Treaty (Art. 5). Similarly, 
Articles 9 and the already quoted Article 10 stressed the harmonising of foreign 
policy actions, which underpinned a close relationship between the two states: 
Art. 9: The High Contracting Parties will exchange information and opinions and hold 
consultations at various levels to deepen and widen their cooperation, coordinate foreign 
policy activities and discuss international issues of mutual interest to both sides.  
(Translated by the author, see p. 123 of Appendix for the original version) 
East Germany concluded a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the former 
Portuguese colony Angola as well, but such harmonising was not present in the 
Treaty, which supports the argument that the GDR had developed closer relations 
with Mozambique.  
Basing on a Joint Communiqué, on the wave of the Treaty on Friendship and 
Cooperation other agreements were signed, including a party agreement between the 
SED and FRELIMO for the years 1979-1980, and a programme on long-term on 
economic cooperation up to 1990. This programme was the first of its kind 
concluded by the GDR with an African state75. 
2.4. Relations between the years 1980-1990: civil war in Mozambique 
and the German reunification  
After the Friendship and Cooperation Treaty was ratified, the relations between 
the GDR and Mozambique flourished. In the first half of 1980s, many official visits 
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took place; in the Documents of GDR foreign policy and in the daily newspaper 
Neues Deutschland the friendly and collaborative atmosphere between the 
representatives of the two countries during such official visits is always emphasised.  
Hereunder a table showing all the visits between the representatives of GDR and 
Mozambique, both in the GDR and in Mozambique, in the years 1980-1985: 
 
Date Place  Representatives 
21 August 1980 East Germany 
Erich Honecker and Minister for National Defence of 
Mozambique Alberto Joaquim Chipande 
17-20 September 
1980 
East Germany 
Erich Honecker and President of FRELIMO and of 
Mozambique Samora Machel 
23 October 1980 East Germany 
Erich Honecker and Member of the Council of Ministers 
Sergio Vieira 
24 October 1980 East Germany 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the GDR Oskar Fischer and 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mozambique Joaquim 
Chissano 
30 October 1980 East Germany 
Minister of National Defence of the GDR Heinz Hoffmann 
and Minister of National Defence Alberto Joaquim 
Chipande 
29 May 1981 Mozambique 
Head of the Free German Trade Union Federation Harry 
Tisch and President of FRELIMO and of Mozambique 
Samora Machel 
9 June 1981 Mozambique 
Member of the Central Committee of SED Gerhard 
Schürer and President of FRELIMO and of Mozambique 
Samora Machel 
25 September 1981 East Germany 
Chairman of the Council of Ministers Willi Stoph and 
Minister in the President's Office José Oscar Monteiro 
12 November 1981 East Germany 
First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers Alfred 
Neumann and Minister of Port and Land Transport Luis 
Maria Alcantara Santos 
11 January 1982 East Germany 
Politburo Member and Secretary of the Central 
Committee of SED Paul Verner and Minister to the 
President of Mozambique José Oscar Monteiro 
6 April 1982 East Germany 
Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the GDR 
and Chairman of the State Planning Commission Gerhard 
Schürer and National Director for Planning of the National 
Planning Commission Marcelo Andrade 
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16 April 1982 Mozambique 
Delegation of the Volkskammer of the GDR and its 
President Horst Sindermann and Marcelino dos Santos. 
27 May 1982 East Germany 
Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the GDR 
and Chairman of the State Planning Commission Gerhard 
Schürer and Secretary of the Central Economic Committee 
Marcelino dos Santos 
3-4 March 1983 East Germany Erich Honecker and Samora Machel 
1 September 1983 East Germany 
Member of the Politburo and Secretary of the Central 
Committee of SED Günter Mittag and Member of the 
Politburo and Secretary of the Central 
Committee of FRELIMO Marcelino dos Santos 
20 September 1983 East Germany 
First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers Werner 
Krolikowski and Minister of Infrastructure and Water 
Management Júlio Zamith Carilho 
3 February 1084 Mozambique 
President of FRELIMO and of Mozambique Samora 
Machel and Ministry of Ore mining industry, metallurgy 
and potash of the GDR Kurt Singhuber 
21 May 1984 East Germany 
Chairman of the Council of Ministers Willi Stoph and 
Minister of Education and Culture of Mozambique Graça 
Machel 
26 October 1984 East Germany 
First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers Werner 
Krolikowski and Secretary of State for Labor Aguiar Real 
Mazula 
26 June 1985 Mozambique 
Party and government delegation of the GDR under the 
direction of Herbert Weiz, member of the Central 
Committee of the SED and deputy of the Chairman of the 
Council of Ministers of the GDR, Minister of Science and 
Technology and President of Mozambique and FRELIMO 
Samora Machel 
11 September 1985 East Germany 
Chairman of the Council of Ministers Willi Stoph and 
Minister of Justice of Mozambique Ussumane Aly Dauto 
14 October 1985 East Germany 
Delegations of the GDR and the Mozambique headed by 
the candidate of the Political Bureau of the Central 
Committee of the SED Gehhrard Schürer, Deputy 
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the GDR and 
Chairman of the State Planning Commission, and the 
Member of the Politburo and secretary of the Central 
Committee of the FRELIMO party Marcelino dos Santos 
Table 1: Visits between the representatives of GDR and Mozambique in the years 1980-1985. Source: 
Dokuments zur Außenpolitik der DDR, Berlin (East), Staatsverlag der DDR 1980-1985. 
41 
On 20 September 1980, for instance, on the occasion of the official friendly visit 
of the President of the FRELIMO Party and President of the People's Republic of 
Mozambique Machel in the German Democratic Republic, a Joint Declaration was 
signed. Upon invitation of Honecker, Machel, attended an official friendly visit to 
GDR from 17 to 20 September 1980. 
During the meeting, according to the Archiv des Staatsrates der DDR, the 
representatives of both countries noted with ‘great satisfaction’ that the relations 
between the GDR and the Republic of Mozambique were developing excellently in 
accordance with their goals and policies. They also agreed to actively further develop 
these relationships and, in particular, to continue the lively exchange of experiences 
and opinions. It was decided that Both sides would develop friendly contacts and 
links between their Parliaments and between their cities; between the youth 
organisations, trade union and women's associations, in the field of sport, arts, 
culture and science; and within the framework of Joint Economic Committee GDR–
Mozambique. Both sides reaffirmed their ‘firm determination’ to resolutely pursue 
and expand the fraternal cooperation that underlies the interests of both peoples. To 
this end, during the official friendship visit, Machel signed various agreements and 
protocols in the GDR. Namely: the agreement on further cooperation between the 
SED and the FRELIMO party for the years 1981 to 1985; the Protocol to deepen the 
economic and scientific-technical cooperation between the GDR and Mozambique, 
discussed during the friendly visit of the President of the FRELIMO Party and 
President of the People's Republic of Mozambique; the Protocol between the 
Government of the German Democratic Republic and the Government of the 
People’s Republic of Mozambique on the coordination of important tasks of the 
GDR and Mozambique linked to the economic plans for the period 1981 to 1985; the 
Protocol between the Central Council of Free German Youth (FDJ) and the National 
Coordinating Council of the Organisation of Youth of Mozambique (OJM) on 
cooperation with the aim to support the Moatize coal program in Mozambique; the 
agreement between the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Food Industry of the 
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GDR and the Ministry of Agriculture of Mozambique on the deepening of mutual 
cooperation in those fields.76 
In the second half of 1980s, the work on some projects, including the state farms, 
the  Mocuba textile factory, and the Moatize railway, had to be stopped due to 
military attacks to infrastructures by RENAMO and the consequent worsening of 
economic conditions77. RENAMO guerrilla activity was still going on, and East 
German technician in Mozambique were targeted by its forces. In July 1984 the East 
German Embassy in Maputo ordered the withdrawal of its nationals working in 
Inhambane’s gas fields, following a land mine incident in Macovane in which two 
Germans were killed.78 
Nevertheless, German experts continued to be recruited for other assignments. For 
instance, in 1988 the GDR Government agreed to send 50 specialists in Mozambique 
for a three-years period, and other 10 for a six-months period.79 East Germany also 
continued rendering political support to FRELIMO, providing advisors to the Prime 
Minister from 1986 to 1987 and from September 1989 till November 1991. Their 
tasks were the drafting of documents and the discussing of general issues, as well as 
formulating proposals aimed at improving the Mozambican state apparatus and 
solving economic problems of the country. 
The collapse of Eastern Europe in 1989 marked the virtual end of socialist aid to 
the developing world. The end of the GDR in 1989 and the reunification of Germany 
in October 1990 left big question marks over the future of assistance development. 
After the formal dissolution of the state in November of that year, new organisational 
arrangements were rapidly made to deal with the aid legacy. With the discrediting of 
the SED and its associated bodies, many of those political forces who had formerly 
been marginalised and repressed in the policy process during the Cold War years 
began to play a more prominent role. The GDR’s interim Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation was disbanded right after the reunification and the aid programme came 
fully under the jurisdiction of the FRG’s Ministry of Economic Cooperation. 
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Therefore, from then onwards only those projects that were compliant to and 
compatible with the development principles of the former West Germany were to be 
continued.  
Quite problematic was the fact that there was no central coordination or 
monitoring of GDR aid, and a comprehensive assessment only became possible in 
the interim years of 1989 and 1990, period in which fast decisions had to be made 
about the desirability and the convenience of continuing various projects80.  
The newly reunited Germany faced the immediate problem of dealing with 200 
cooperation and intergovernmental agreements with 60 developing countries. As 
many as 11 Free German Youth Brigades and 1,200 experts were still overseas81. In 
addition, there were around 10,000 students and trainees enrolled in long-term 
courses, as well as 72,000 foreign workers in East German factories 82. Undoubtedly, 
with the rapid pace of reunification, there was little time for in-depth analyses or 
plans to solve such situations in the best and most effective way. In chapter 6 an 
overview on the situation of Mozambican in East Germany after the reunification 
will be presented. 
From October 1990 the DAZ assumed responsibility for the on-going German 
assistance in Mozambique, where the rapid evacuation of experts had left the country 
with an immediate shortage in some key areas. Further support  for the engineering 
and forestry faculties at the University of Maputo was agreed, together with support 
of experts to assist the banking and coal sectors, the national and provincial planning 
commissions on education, the fishery school in Matola on marine biology, and the 
completion of water supply to Mocuba textile factory83.  
However, the termination of contracts of the GDR experts in mid-1991 heralded 
the end of technical assistance to Mozambique.  
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3. Mozambican contract workers in East Germany  
In February 1979 the GDR and the Mozambican Ministry of Labour signed an 
agreement for the employment and training of Mozambican workers in East German 
factories. As examined later in this chapter, this project should have helped East 
Germany alleviate its labour shortage, while providing Mozambique with an 
opportunity for developing industrial skills. Furthermore, such training would have 
helped foster the emergence of a working-class in the long run, which was regarded 
as an essential step forward in the construction and maintenance of a new socialist 
society.  
The entry of foreigners into the territory of the GDR was regarded as an extreme 
exception for the local German population as well as for the leadership of the ruling 
state party, given the fact that the internal mobility in the GDR and the migration to 
its territory were, except for the Soviet troops, comparatively low over its forty-year 
existence. In contrast, the migration from the GDR, despite considerable fluctuations, 
was a mass phenomenon, and was a major problem for East German economy. 
This chapter therefore aims to track the phenomenon of the recruitment of 
Mozambican people in the German Democratic Republic from 1979, when the guest 
worker agreement was signed, to the fall of the GDR in 1989. The majority of 
Mozambican people that went to the GDR were labour migrants, the so-called 
Vertragsarbeiter (contract workers).  
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3.1. Historical, economic and political premises for the development of 
the contract workers program between the GDR and Mozambique 
3.1.1. East German economic situation prior the realisation of the 
contract workers program between the GDR and Mozambique 
With no doubt the division of Germany in two states in 1949 was a major catalyst for 
the guest-worker programs since 1950s, both in the Federal Republic of Germany 
and in the German Democratic Republic. During the “Economic Miracle” years, in 
West Germany the labour shortage was most acute in those areas bordering on the 
East, areas where the militarisation and the political uncertainty scattered thousands 
of families into the zones under the influence of the Allied forces.84 East Germany 
had labour shortage problems as well, but this shortage was quite widespread 
throughout the whole state. The GDR was losing millions of its citizens to the West, 
and even 10 years after the Berlin Wall was erected it continued suffering crippling 
labour droughts. Each month, East Germany was losing between 10,000 and 20,000 
of its most able-bodied residents to the West’s open door policy, until the “antifascist 
border wall” was constructed on August 13, 1961.85 The long-term effects of mass 
exodus over the zone borders, together with sluggish birth rates eventually left East 
Germany with labour shortage. 
In 1963 the GDR signed its first guest-worker contract with Poland. In the 
following years many other socialist countries agreed to send workers in East 
Germany. In 1967, Hungary sent 13,000 workers, and additional contingents 
followed from Algeria (1974), Cuba, (1975 and 1978) and of course Mozambique 
(1979). The contract workers that arrived in East Germany came mainly from 
socialist and communist countries, which were already allied with the Soviets; the 
SED used its guest-worker program to build international solidarity among fellow 
communist governments. 
The advent of the agreement with Mozambique is particularly interesting. In 
November 1977, the government office responsible for employment and wages in the 
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GDR rejected the placement of untrained Mozambican workers as politically 
intolerable. Nonetheless, in early 1979, this policy expired, and 2,000 Mozambican 
could soon accept “paid employment in socialist factories”. Mozambique’s fiscal 
debt to the GDR must have played a role in this policy change in the opinion of some 
authors. According to the agreement, the debt was supposed to be amortised through 
the partial remuneration of the contract workers86. 
After the building of the Berlin Wall on August 13, 1961, not only were West 
Germany and East Germany virtually divided, but also their labour markets. This 
initially brought to a state of confusion and disorder, in particular in the cities close 
to the border and, of course, in Berlin. This brought to labour shortage in West 
Berlin, as it was already pointed out in an internal report of the Berlin Senate of 
October 18, 1960, where it was reported that if East German frontier workers would 
have no longer been able to work in West Germany, a demand of more than 36,000 
workers would have remained.87  
The frontier workers who lived in the East and worked in the West were available 
to the economy of the GDR after the construction of the Berlin Wall. But scarcely a 
decade later, there was such a great need for workers in both parts of Germany that 
foreigners had to be recruited in the GDR and in the Federal Republic.88 
In fact, the frontier workers did not cover the demand of labour force in the labour 
market, for many reasons. Firstly, GDR economy was characterised by low labour 
productivity; a larger amount of labour was therefore needed. Secondly, missing or 
inadequate modern technologies required a labour-intensive production process per 
se. 
Hence, an increasing greater number of African workers arrived in East Germany 
from that time on. Since the mid-1970s, some hundreds of contract workers from the 
African continent, especially from Mozambique, went to the GDR. The number of 
foreign workers employed in the GDR economy rose steadily. In January 1985, 
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85,000 foreign citizens were already working in the GDR.89 In 1987, the number of 
foreigners living in the GDR had already increased to about 95,400 people.90 At this 
time, about 7,800 Mozambican workers lived in East Germany. According to the 
GDR Interior Ministry, by the end of 1989 about 15,500 Mozambicans (8.1 per cent 
of foreigners in the GDR) were living in the country.91 
3.1.2. A matter of propaganda: contract workers as ‘socialist friends’ 
As almost every other activity carried out in the GDR, the recruitment of contract 
workers served also largely propagandistic purposes for the East German 
government. Contract workers in the GDR represented an extension of socialist 
solidarity, upon which the state was established. Universal solidarity among workers 
provided the ideological background for the contract workers program to be 
developed. The GDR attempted to present the contract workers program as a 
socialist exercise in solidarity through the instrument of political rhetoric. The 
program was presented as a good chance for workers from Third World countries to 
go to the GDR and work or attend school before returning to their countries of origin, 
culturally enriched with qualifications and know-how.  
Foreign workers and students had been going to the GDR since the 1960s, where 
there was always a labour shortage despite the building of the Berlin Wall. The state 
signed a short term Qualification Agreements with socialist states. Official 
propaganda represented the presence of foreign workers in the ‘Worker and Farmer 
State’ as ‘workforce cooperation’ within the framework of socialist economic 
integration. As long as the GDR was economically superior to the other socialist 
states, workers would come from those states to build socialism in their homeland 
after their residence in the GDR. The GDR promoted this cooperation as a kind of 
solidarity through training, meant to aid other countries’ liberation movements as 
well as younger nation-states. 
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Continuing on the same policy line against capitalism and neo-colonialism and 
basically against West Germany, the SED sought to distinguish its ‘socialist friends’ 
from capitalist West Germany’s guest workers. In 1954, during the first ceremonial 
embrace of North Korean orphan children in the GDR, the party framed its 
immigration policy in terms of a visionary struggle against the ‘American aggressor’ 
and its West German accomplices. This widely heralded magnanimity toward 
refugees should serve as a potent symbol of East Germany’s commitment to human 
rights and the Geneva Convention. The first image of the guest worker in West 
Germany was that of a single, able-bodied person. In contrast, the first public images 
of non-Soviet foreigners in East Germany were war-ravaged children and 
adolescents. The press hailed the residence halls that housed refuges, children, and 
contract workers, equipped with all the amenities necessary for a thriving collective. 
First East German publicised reports on its foreigner residents were exalting the 
newly arrived guests for their patriotic bond to their homeland. Their “courageous 
gesture of faith” in the new socialist German state and their “confidence in the 
GDR’s unique capacity to provide less-developed socialist societies with expert 
medical care, technical training and financial subsidy” were also emphasised92. The 
GDR press showcased East German role as an “industrial leader and global ‘outpost 
of peace’ for the future of socialism”.93 On the other hand, contract workers were 
depicted as ambassadors. Some reports even maintained that the newly arrived 
workers could sing the GDR anthem in German, as a “gesture of spontaneous praise 
for their hosts”94. 
An interesting article from Die Zeit of August 18, 1973, reports how the contract 
workers were considered in East Germany, and, in contrast, how they were 
represented in Western countries: 
 Last year, in the GDR magazine Wirtschaft, Jozsef Rozsa, a high-tanking administrator of 
the Labour Ministry of the People’s Republic of Hungary, was asked, “What is the 
fundamental difference between the guest-worker system in capitalist countries and 
organised labour-power cooperation in socialist countries?” He got a quick and ready answer: 
“The difference is essentially that in capitalism the underdevelopment of various countries 
necessitates labour migration. In socialist countries, there is no such pressure. These 
countries – Hungary, for example – can guarantee employment for all citizens of working 
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age. Socialist governments seek out opportunities for international cooperation so that certain 
workers may acquire further training in their field and supplementary experience in dealing 
with modern technology. Furthermore, coming to a new country lets workers learn a new 
language and earn about life in another socialist partner country”.[…] 
These people are not merely supposed to acquire greater knowledge of their profession, the 
German language, the country and its people; they are expected to put their labour power at 
the disposal of the GDR. The population of the GDR is, after all, ageing faster than its birth-
rate is growing. Furthermore, the country is not growing as quickly as an aspiring industrial 
nation ought to. Another problem is that the GDR’s workers are very competent and are 
constantly improving their qualifications; thus, a few are willing to perform unskilled labour. 
It is thus no coincidence that many of the working guests are employed in service industries 
as cooks and waiters, maids and sales clerks. Most, however, work in factories and obtain 
continuous training there. Of course, these guest workers are not coming to their socialist 
brother country only for professional development and the beautiful German language. […] 
Foreigners working in the GDR are between 18 and 25 years old, and their contracts last two 
to three years. They enjoy parity with their German counterparts in salary and social benefits. 
(Menges, M.,“In the GDR, They’re Called Friends”, Die Zeit, Aug. 18, 1973, in Germany in 
Transit: Nation and Migration, 1955-2005, translated by David Gramling, p. 76) 
One could therefore argue, that the contract workers were considered and depicted 
as ‘socialist friends’ in East Germany, but Western authorities were rather sceptical, 
since they constantly emphasised the fact contract workers were actually being 
‘exploited’ by GDR’s companies. However, in the following paragraphs it will be 
self-evident that, normally, Mozambican contract workers were given the chance to 
obtain qualifications and to be employed in qualified works. Their personal 
experiences will be also taken into consideration. 
3.1.3. Serving the interests of both nations. Mutual advantages in 
carrying out the contract workers program 
The GDR was ready to help by offering contract work. Of course, this offer was 
also an end in itself; workforce in the GDR was needed. In any case, the offer from 
the Mozambican side to send young people to the GDR came just at the right time. 
During the colonial period, young Mozambicans were constantly migrating to 
work in the mines of South Africa, on plantations and in the industrial enterprises of 
apartheid states. When Mozambique became independent in 1975, migratory flows 
towards those countries almost stopped. Hence, the Mozambican labour market had 
suddenly surplus labour95. Therefore, the intergovernmental agreement with the GDR 
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would have relieved the market from the steadily rising unemployment. In turn, as 
already mentioned, the labour demand in the GDR could not be satisfied. Some 
authors highlighted that the appearance of pure brotherhood was actually deceiving. 
For instance, Ahmed Fahrah argued that the importation of cheap labour from the 
former colonized countries into an industrialized country, whether its socialist or 
capitalist form of society, represents a mere economic calculation. Therefore, 
Mozambican workers would have enabled the GDR to meet the basic needs of its 
people and increase its export capacity without investing in new and more efficient 
technologies96. However, the interviewed Mozambican workers did not mention such 
treatment; on the contrary, they were actually given the chances the agreement 
provided for. 
Work and training, “Arbeit und Ausbildung”, was the motto of the program, 
which was agreed by both sides. Trained skilled workers would have taken over 
production in the young country in the south-east of Africa, be it in mining, in the 
textile industry or in other areas, in order to fight underdevelopment and poverty in 
the future.  
Such training program, however, had a crucial weakness; the long-term goal was 
to educate and train workers who would obtain qualifications and know how but, in 
fact, the devastation of the civil war prevented the implementation of contractually 
regulated economic projects and the implementation of the plans to build a high-
performance industry in Mozambique, for which skilled workers were needed. 
Towards the end of the 1980s, it became clear that skilled workers were no longer 
needed to this extent, at least in the foreseeable future. The Mozambican side, 
however, kept attaching great importance to sending young people to Europe, to the 
GDR since Mozambique was increasingly insecure, unsettled by a series of raids 
further north by the political insurgent group RENAMO. As a result, young people 
did not have many chances in their country; hence the best option for them was to go 
to work in the GDR. And so it happened that in the last three to four years of the 
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existence of the GDR, young people entered the GDR to be employed primarily in 
the production process. 97  
3.2. How was the contract workers program between the GDR and 
Mozambique organised 
The Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the GDR and the People’s 
Republic of Mozambique signed on 24 February 1979 was the prelude to the 
subsequent moving stories of Mozambican contract workers in the GDR. The basis 
for the employment of the Mozambican contract workers in the GDR was the 
Agreement between the Government of the German Democratic Republic and the 
Government of the People's Republic of Mozambique on the temporary employment 
of Mozambican workers in socialist enterprises of the German Democratic Republic. 
Two distinct stages in the employment of Mozambican contract workers have 
been identified98. The first goes from 1979 to 1985. During these years, the workers 
who were sent to the GDR were carefully selected from all over the country. The role 
of their occupational qualification was not to be underestimated in the first period the 
implementation of the intergovernmental agreement. Their training in East Germany 
was well-organised: it should have lasted up to three to four years. Thereafter, in the 
period between 1985 and 1989, the GDR's critical need for extra labour led to an 
increase in recruitment with less careful selection, while Mozambique kept sending 
an increasing number of labour force. Hence, even workers with lower qualification 
were accepted. Due to the increasingly difficult economic situation of the GDR, the 
implementation of the agreements was more geared towards economic needs, while 
Mozambique wanted to achieve a relief of its labour markets and, as argued by a 
partial debt relief of their obligations to their lender. 99  
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3.2.1. General organisational aspects: selection and employment of 
Mozambican contract workers and conformity controls in GDR’s 
companies 
The organisational aspects and relative tasks connected with the stay and the 
employment of Mozambican contract workers in the GDR were diverse, but also 
extremely interesting. For instance, the Ministry of Labour coordinated aspects such 
as the number of the workers who should have been employed, in which company 
and at what time100. The Ministry of Labour would even designate the airline 
company the contract workers should have been transported with. The on-going 
cooperation process continuously brought new insights, which in turn had to be 
incorporated into the existing arrangements. East Germany and Mozambique 
therefore agreed on requiring that relevant arrangements had to be set out in annual 
protocols that were then signed by both states101. This resulted in a process of 
concretisation and completion of the agreement guidelines through the years. 
The contract workers were recruited from all the provinces of Mozambique. 
Before being selected, they had to undergo an examination, which initially took place 
in Maputo, but eventually the candidates could be examined in their respective 
provinces. Firstly, a mixed medical team, made up by experts from the GDR and 
local doctors, carried out a medical check-up. The contract workers had to be proven 
fit for labour in order to be eligible to be employed in enterprises of the GDR. 
Another requirement to be satisfied in order to be eligible was to have at least a 
fourth-grade primary education level. The selected Mozambicans were then 
accompanied to Maputo’s airport where the Ministry of Labour of Mozambique and 
the SAL representative would formally say goodbye to them. Once landed in the 
GDR, they would then again be greeted by the Representatives of the Ministry of 
Labour of Mozambique and by SAL representative at the airport Berlin-
Schönefeld.102 Most of these contracts workers had been living in small villages for 
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their whole lives, they had never or rarely travelled and almost all of them had never 
boarded a plane before this trip.  
The SAL (Staatssekretariat für Arbeit und Löhne der DDR, the supreme state 
authority for the control of labour, pay and social policy, which existed in this form 
between 1972-89) was the main State body in the implementation of what the 
agreement provided for. Its main task was organising all that operation meant to 
realise the program set out in the agreement, task that was rather complicated, since 
the public had limited access to the content of the agreement. Besides this 
preparatory scenario, the real focus of the work of the SAL was controlling that the 
employment of the Mozambican contract workers in the factories was planned and 
carried out in compliance with the agreement. Control consultation were also carried 
out; besides the SAL, the competent ministry of the respective enterprise, the council 
of the district in which enterprise was settled, and of course the foreign agreement 
partner were taking part. Representatives of the board of the Free German Trade 
Union Confederation (Freien Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes, FDGB) and those of 
the FDGB district board often took part in deliberations and inspections. 
The control activities required appropriate specifications. These specifications 
were drafted by the SAL in the form of guidelines, and then agreed with the councils 
of the districts and the relative ministries, and the resulting document was given to 
the companies as action documents. Such policy paper was a framework directive 
that applied to all contract workers coming from a wide range of employment 
nations. This framework guideline was then revised if, for example, changes from 
the expiry process resulted necessary or new specifications had to be added for the 
respective country of assignment. 103 
As far as regulations directly concerned the foreign workers, these had to be 
agreed and signed with the foreign partner. In these papers, little was left 
unconsidered and unregulated in terms of the company’s compliance with the 
agreement and the working life of the Mozambican. These papers were then 
continuously adapted to current conditions and needs. In preparation for a control 
consultation, the companies were required to send a control report to the SAL, the 
relevant ministry and the county council in accordance with these guidelines. This 
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report had to be drafted in preparation for the operation by the SAL and the Ministry 
of Trade and which was aimed at fulfilling the conditions of the agreement. The 
inspections took place on the basis of the report and the operational concept 
submitted by the company. Then an on-site inspection would have taken place 
directly in the company. As mentioned earlier, the participants included the Ministry 
of Labour of Mozambique, the SAL, the Ministry of Education and the County 
Council. On the part of the company participated the Director of Operations, the 
Party Secretary, the President of the Union, the FDJ Secretary, the Mozambican 
group leaders and the Mozambican representatives of the unions and youth 
organisations. It should be mentioned that in some companies these control 
consultations brought to clashes, as the management had its own views and ideas on 
the matter; sometimes this resulted in the refusal to accept the terms of the agreement 
for the employment of Mozambican workers, who were seen as mere productive 
forces. However, if the operation did not or could not fully comply with the terms of 
the agreement, it was stopped and the Mozambican workers transferred in another 
company where the conditions of the agreement could be fulfilled. 104 
At this point, it seems reasonable shedding light on one of the most critical 
aspects of the Vertragsarbeiter program, namely the fact that Mozambican contract 
workers would only be employed in unskilled jobs. This was true at the beginning of 
the employment of the Mozambican labour force, as qualified work requires 
qualification. During this qualification phase, they were therefore entrusted with 
works that were very easy and sometimes dirty. This triggered some protests. Once 
having made some experiences and increased their theoretical and practical 
qualifications, the contract workers were then entrusted with more qualified tasks. 
Usually, after this period of ‘training’ no complaints arose on this problem. That 
does not mean, however, that all Mozambican workers were engaged in skilled work. 
Moreover, especially in the last years of employment starting in 1988, a considerably 
larger number of Mozambican workers arrived in the GDR compared to the previous 
years. In order to send such an increasing number of workforces in the GDR, one of 
the terms and conditions of the agreement was undermined by Mozambique, namely 
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the minimum requirement of four-grade primary education105. This in turn meant that 
without such minimum qualification, employing Mozambican workers in qualified 
works was no longer possible on the scale as before. 
 
 
Figure 1: Rostock, 18.4.1984, apprentices from Mozambique. These young Mozambicans were undertaking 
several years of specialized training in various professions related to deep-sea fishing from the VEB Fischfang 
Rostock. Source: Bundesarchiv Bild 183-1984-0418-302	
 
The transfer payment system is a relevant aspect of the Mozambican contract 
workers program, and therefore should not go unmentioned. The contract workers 
received wages and bonuses in accordance with the labour law provisions of the 
GDR. At the beginning, up to 25 per cent of this could be transferred to 
Mozambique, but from 1986 onwards the Mozambican contract workers were 
obliged to transfer 60 per cent of their monthly net wages exceeding 350, - Mark to 
Mozambique. In addition, 50 per cent of their contributions to East German 
compulsory social insurance and the accident surcharge were transferred by the GDR 
to Mozambique. These funds served to adjust Mozambique's existing loan payment 
obligations. Such transfer system was a consequence of the non-conforming loan 
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repayment by the People's Republic of Mozambique and should therefore help 
stabilize the increasingly worsening economic situation of the GDR106. Even today, 
many of these former contract workers are struggling to get their transferred funds. 
According to official information, this problem has already been resolved. According 
to unofficial information, there are still a few specific isolated cases that are not yet 
clear.  
The employment of Mozambican contract workers was stable until the late 1980s. 
As already mentioned, a larger number of Mozambican working people arrived in 
the GDR during the last years of the program, namely from 1988 onwards. The 
previous maximum had been the entry of 3,203 Mozambican workers in 1987; this 
number doubled in 1988 with the entry of 6,464 Mozambican women and men. 107 
Such situation inevitably led to an increased control effort by the competent 
authorities, but this effort was not sufficient to control the totality of over 200 
companies, in which thousands of Mozambican was working. Therefore, the 
authorities realised too late, or in some cases didn’t realise at all, that in some 
companies the employment did not comply with the agreement conditions. 
3.2.2. Organisational and legal aspects in the life of Mozambican 
contract workers during their stay and employment in the GDR 
Since 1979, Mozambican contract workers have been arriving in the GDR every 
year in groups. They were between 18 and 25 years old. In order to save social 
follow-up costs, they were brought without their family members. For this they 
should receive a "separation compensation" of 4 marks per day, which, however, was 
made dependent on their "work discipline"108. The Mozambican contract workers 
were provided a temporary residence permit according to the agreement, so they 
didn’t need to take any effort to obtain such permit, since the GDR aliens law 
expressly granted a residence permit for reasons of vocational training. The 
intergovernmental agreements constituted the factual basis of the right of residence 
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of contract workers in the GDR. With the departure from the GDR, the issued 
residence permit would expire.  
The contract workers had the duty to attend German language courses as soon as 
they had been employed and began their activities in GDR’s factories. Linguistic and 
professional training was moreover granted paid leave throughout the duration of the 
training period.109 
Travelling to third countries was expressly been excluded in the labour 
agreement. Despite this restriction, many workers tried, after the expiration of their 
contract, to obtain an extension of their stay in the GDR. Thus, 20 per cent of the 
Mozambican contract workers with the “best performance and qualification 
requirements" was granted a one-year extension of their residence permit, and later 
on they could be granted a stay in the GDR for up to five years longer. From 1989, 
the length of stay was extended to a maximum of ten years. 110 
The Mozambican contract workers struggled to stay in the GDR and the 
authorities from Maputo repeatedly asked the GDR whether more workers could be 
admitted in the GDR. This request was noticed in particular by the responsible staff 
of the Ministry of State Security of the GDR and therefore it was reported to their 
Minister, that "the People's Republic of Mozambique justified its growing interest in 
the employment of Mozambican working people in the GDR with the complicated 
economic situation in their own country".111 
A premature termination of the employment contract together with the residence 
permit was possible by mutual agreement of the respective institutions of both states. 
Otherwise, certain events that would have led to a premature termination of the 
contract were already set out in the agreement. In the event of a breach of the law in 
the host country, or if a worker blatantly violated "socialist labour discipline" or if he 
permanently failed to meet the labour standards, the person concerned could be sent 
                                                
109 See Beyer, H., “Entwicklung des Ausländerrechts in der DDR”, in: Heßler, Manfred, Zwischen 
Nationalstaat und multikultureller Gesellschaft. Einwanderung und Fremdenfeindlichkeit in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Berlin, 1993, pp. 211-229. 
110 van der Heyden, U., “Zu den Hintergründen und dem Verlauf des Einsatzes mosambikanischer 
Vertragsarbeiter in der DDR-Wirtschaft” in Mosambikanische Vertragsarbeiter in der DDR-
Wirtschaft. Hintergrunde, Verlauf, Folgen , p. 58. 
111 Bundesbeauftragter für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen 
Demokratischen Republik: Ministerium für Staatssicherheit der DDR, Zentrale Auswertungs- und 
Informationsgruppe des MfS, nr 4574, Bl. 128 
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back to Mozambique. Furthermore, apart from criminal cases, a premature 
termination of the work permit would have taken place only if the ability to work 
after illness or accident could not be restored "in the foreseeable future", usually after 
three months.112 In some cases women were subjected to particular restrictions; in the 
event of pregnancy they had to leave the country or were even asked to have an 
abortion; a stipulation that, as Ulrich van der Heyden argued, had been included in 
the contract at the request of the Mozambican side.113 
Part of the earned wages of the contract workers from Mozambique were 
transferred from the GDR to Maputo, which was then to be paid out to the workers' 
relatives or themselves upon their return from the Mozambican government. In this 
way, the debt of Mozambique to the GDR should have been reduced. As noted 
above, the agreement allowed for the transfer of part of the workers' earnings: 25 per 
cent of their net income could be remitted to Mozambique after four months of 
employment, and 40 per cent over  M 350 after a further two months. These 
remittances were in theory to be deployed for the reintegration of the workers upon 
their return. For the Government in Maputo they represented export earnings to be 
used for the payment of imports or debts. 114 The Mozambican government did not 
adhere to this definition, and some of its former contract workers had and still have 
to fight to disburse their transferred funds, more than two decades after they returned 
from Germany.  
                                                
112 See Brozinsky-Schwabe, „Die DDR-Bürger um Umgang mit “Fremden”. Versuch einer Bilanz der 
Voraussetzungen für ein Leben in einer Multikulturellen Welt“, in Kleff, Sanem et. al., editors, 
BRD-DDR. Alte und neue Rassismen im Zuge der deutsch-deutschen Einigung. Frankfurt a.M., 
1990, p. 10 
113 Van der Heyden, U., “Zu den Hintergründen und dem Verlauf des Einsatzes mosambikanischer 
Vertragsarbeiter in der DDR-Wirtschaft” in Mosambikanische Vertragsarbeiter in der DDR-
Wirtschaft. Hintergrunde, Verlauf, Folgen, Lit Verlag, Berlin, 2014, p. 59. 
114 See Stach, A.; Hussain, S., Ausländer in der DDR. Ein Rückblick, ed. by. the Foreigners 
Commissioner of the Senate of Berlin, Berlin, 1994, p. 12. 
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3.2.2.1. Service	 Protocol	 on	 the	 residence	 of	 noncitizens	 in	 the	
German	 Democratic	 Republic.	 “Protokoll	 No.	 041/77”	 by	 the	
Minister	of	the	Interior	and	Chief	of	the	German	People’s	Police	
on	December	20,	1976115	
Mozambican workers in the GDR, as any other foreign contract worker, had to 
comply with the rules contained in the Service Protocol on the residence of 
noncitizens in the German Democratic Republic, or they could be sent back to their 
respective countries. 
The protocol provided as follows. 
Permanent residence may be withheld from persons who: 
1. Let it be known that they oppose the socialist societal order of the GDR or 
can be expected not to integrate into the socialistic life of the GDR; 
2. Are considered as having a criminal record according to the laws of the 
GDR or who have been prosecuted abroad for a crime that would be 
considered an indictable offense in the GDR, or those for whom the 
character of their felony demonstrates they cannot be integrated into the 
societal life of the GDR; 
3. Do not carry identifying documents and the identity of the person cannot be 
determined in short order; 
4. Are mentally disturbed, incurably ill, or are so ill that the convalescence 
process requires a longer period of time that can reasonably be accepted, or 
are drug addicted; 
5. Knowingly make false statements in order to obtain residence in the GDR; 
6. Live in ambiguous familiar relations; 
7. Are, on account of their age or other reasons, incapable of working or are in 
need of supervision and have no close relatives in the GDR, or whose family 
in the GDR have denied them assistance and supervision; 
8. Are clearly to be seen as asocial elements, and integration into societal 
relations is not to be expected; 
                                                
115 Translated version taken from Germany in Transit: Nation and Migration, 1955-2005, ed. Deniz 
Göktürk, David Gramling and Anton Kaes, trans. David Gramling, Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2007, p. 79.  
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9. Have left behind large financial responsibilities and personal debts and are 
hoping to evade these by taking up residence in the GDR, or are suspected 
of seeking residence for personal gain; 
10. Are not in possession of work papers or have had no orderly employment in 
the past due to their own actions, and will most likely not change their 
attitude toward work once in the GDR; 
11. For whom a permanent residence does not appear to be in the interest of 
state and society; 
12. When considerations of foreign affairs appear to compel such action. 
3.2.3. Ten years after (1979-1989): outcomes of the program and data 
about Mozambican workers that were employed in the GDR 
After ten years of existence and implementation of the agreement, a summary 
assessment was made. On the 24th February 1989 a document was drafted by both 
states, which focused on the results of the program. The following information was 
retrieved from the mutual assessment about the contract workers program.116  
First of all, the document assessed that through the entire realization process, the 
agreement contributed to the deepening of friendship relations between the working 
people of the two countries both at work and during leisure time as well. Then, some 
data regarding the number of Mozambicans that worked in the GDR until that 
moment were reported. For instance, in the second half of 1979, 447 Mozambican 
contract workers began operating in 8 companies in the GDR. By the end of 1988, 
18,886 Mozambican workers were employed in as many as 245 industrial, 
construction and agricultural East German enterprises. In that current period, namely 
in February 1989, 14,675 Mozambican workers were employed in 220 companies. 
As a result of the 10-year agreement implementation, it was furthermore estimated 
that the Mozambican workers with high discipline and eagerness to learn were able 
to gain knowledge and acquired practical skills and abilities achieving good results in 
production. Moreover, the success of the 5-month familiarization period was 
                                                
116 Gemeinsame Einschätzung des SAL und der mosambikanischen Vertretung für die Leitung des 
SAL, Privatarchiv Straßburg. See also: Ralf Straßburg,  “Persönliche Reminiszenzen zu den 
Verträgen” in Mosambikanische Vertragsarbeiter in der DDR-Wirtschaft. Hintergründe - Verlauf – 
Folgen, pp. 122-124. 
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declared ‘worthy’, since an average compliance of more than 100% was 
documented. This preparatory phase, which all contract workers had to undertake, 
was aimed to teach them basic knowledge of the German language and to familiarise 
them with the life in the GDR, as well as preparing them for their employment in 
production.  
The vast majority of Mozambican working people were said to have taken advantage 
of the opportunity offered by the companies’ training offer to gain a successful 
professional qualification. Approximately, two-thirds of the working people who 
started their journey home after their four-year assignment were qualified as skilled 
workers, while one-third of them obtained degrees for having reached expertise in 
specialist areas or specific knowledge. The Mozambican workers with the best 
results in professional qualification and productive activity could obtain further 
qualifications; the highest one was the Meisterqualifizierung. So far, in February 
1989, a total of 75 Mozambican workers already obtained this qualification, and 
other 75 workers were following the Meister training. 
During the process of professional and political-ideological qualification, some 
Mozambican working people who had already been working in the GDR for many 
years were made responsible for groups of new comers; in the original document 
they were called ‘Leitungskadern’. They were designated as leader in groups of 
newly arrived Mozambicans and had therefore the task to help newcomers through 
the process of getting familiar to “the social life of the GDR”. 
Nonetheless, already in February 1989 it was clear that the complicated social and 
economic situation in the People's Republic of Mozambique meant that not all the 
workers who would have returned to Mozambique could be integrated in the 
domestic economy. Therefore, in occasion of the drafting of the document, it was 
agreed that the Mozambican workers, by mutual agreement with the companies, 
could have been employed up to 10 years in the GDR. About 80% of the 
Mozambican Vertragsarbeiter who travelled home after a four-year stay in the GDR 
returned to the GDR.  
In February 1989, about 3,200 Mozambicans were granted an extension for more 
than 4 years and therefore kept working in GDR enterprises. The contract workers 
were moreover given the opportunity to obtain a qualification for a second 
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profession, or they could obtain specific qualifications such as diplomas or driving 
licences. 
Of great importance was definitely the political-ideological work with the 
Mozambican contract workers in the factories. How emphasised in the official 
report, it was believed that using the example of real socialism in the GDR, the 
contract workers could acquire the necessary political tools to be used later, once 
they would return to their homeland.  
It certainly does not need to be explicitly mentioned that in the official 
assessment, the critical situations were not brought to the fore. Such information 
followed later and was divulged by the management of the SAL. Of course positive 
results were shown, but also the unsatisfactory ones. It should not be left 
unmentioned that in some cases the Mozambican contract workers carried out 
activities that profoundly shook the foundations of East German laws; for instance, 
they organized strikes117. When such events happened, GDR authorities reacted 
relentlessly and the organizers – even without the consent of Mozambican authorities 
– were sent back to Mozambique with the next possible aircraft. Striking was held as 
a state crime in the GDR and no matter whether it was a foreigner or a GDR citizen; 
the legal organs reacted with great severity. Other violations of applicable GDR 
legislation by the contract workers were discussed with the Mozambican 
representation and, depending on the seriousness of the violations, they decided to 
what extent early repatriation on disciplinary grounds was justified. 
Given the fact that after the German reunification many databanks have been 
destroyed, assessing with great accuracy how many Mozambicans had actually 
worked in the GDR is quite difficult. However, some broad macro figures are 
available and it is therefore possible to get a glimpse on the phenomenon, as already 
seen with data presented in the document drafted after 10 years of program. As far as 
it is possible to know, Mozambican contract workers in East Germany were ca. 6,000 
before 1986, and this number jumped to ca. 15,500 between 1986 and March 
1990118, when they accounted for 14.5 per cent of all foreign workers in the GDR. 
                                                
117 Straßburg, R.,  “Persönliche Reminiszenzen zu den Verträgen”, p. 123 
118 See Mulder, A., Report on the Reintegration of Mozambican Workers from the Ex- GDR, 
Weltfriedensdienst, Berlin, August 1991, p. 5, and Schonmeier, H. W., “Prüfung der Möglichkeiten 
eines Fachkräfteprogramms Mosambik”, in Studie im Auftrag, Saarbrucken, March 1991, p. 11 
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Moreover, Oppenheimer reported that during the guest worker programme altogether 
21,600 Mozambican workers stayed in the GDR between 1979 and 1989.119  
3.3. Shared experiences of Mozambican contract workers in the GDR: 
Some interviews 
In the literature many authors argued that the young contract workers from 
Mozambique had been exploited by the GDR. However, many efforts were taken by 
East German competent authorities to ensure and monitor that the employment of 
Mozambican contract workers in East German companies complied with the terms of 
the agreement. It is also true that in the last years of the program, an increasing 
number of Mozambicans were working in about 200-250 companies, and it therefore 
resulted more complicated for the authorities to assert and control whether 
everything complied with the rules. Nonetheless, what cannot be maintained as true 
is that the workers were employed only in simple jobs that East German workers 
didn’t want to make and that were therefore exploited. In fact, most of the 
Mozambican contract workers were given the chance to gain know-how and obtain 
qualifications during their stay, and they were paid and treated just as their German 
counterparts, obviously considering the percentage of their pay that was transferred 
to Mozambique. This has been confirmed by many interviews with former 
Mozambican Vertragsarbeiter. Since personal experiences are rather subjective, it 
cannot be maintained that all contract workers were treated equally, that racism did 
never take place, and that each contract worker was employed in high-qualified jobs. 
Nonetheless, one cannot maintain, the other hand, that contract workers were 
exploited both by the GDR government and companies. This paragraph aims to 
report the experiences of some Mozambican contract workers to show how their life 
in the GDR was actually like. 
  
                                                
119  See Oppenheimer, J., “Magermanes. Os trabalhadores moçambicanos na antiga República 
Democrática Alemã”, Lusotopie, n°11, 2004. Médias pouvoir et identités, pp. 85–105.   
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José Candido. “My parents, they saw a brilliant future for their son.”120 
José was pleased when he found out he was assigned to go to work in East 
Germany, or Alemanha	 Democratica,	as he still calls it. At that time, he red in 
magazines that the GDR “was a developed country, that there was no hunger 
there…that it had no poverty.” José remembers that the Mozambican government 
started sending teams into schools and barrios; they were looking for men and 
women who had completed their secondary education, and encouraged them to sign 
up. “There was a need to make men…we felt it was a good cause”, he explains. 
The opportunity for José, as to many other young Mozambican, to go to work in 
the GDR seemed too good to pass up, particularly because Mozambique wasn’t safe. 
“My parents, they saw a brilliant future for their son.” José still remembers his dazed 
first few days in Dresden. He was guided by a minder who didn’t speak any 
Portuguese; he explained to José how to take the metro with gestures, and he 
introduced him to the local food, “every plate involved a potato.” Then he moved to 
start his work in Rostock, first on a car assembly line, and then cutting metal, where 
he came across the demands placed on the worker in the supply-led East German 
economy. “Everyone had to meet their targets in meters, based on what was set by 
the firm. Your pay was dependent on it.” And though some foreigners who went to 
Germany emphasize the harsh labour conditions and sometimes the racism that, as 
José confirms, could not officially exist in a socialist state like the GDR, he is 
smilingly nostalgic as he recalls his nine years spent in the country. He recalls 
friendships with German people, while in Mozambique white men could only ever 
be distant patraos. What’s more, he felt part of something greater, namely acquiring 
skills to help Mozambique “catch up.” But in 1986, when he returned home for a 
holiday, he saw a nation in a full and brutal civil war. And while shocked to see what 
it had done to Maputo—“everyone surviving on cabbage”—it left him more 
determined than ever to carry on his work in East Germany, to “concentrate on our 
training and our production.” 
                                                
120 From the interview of Sami Kent to José Candido, in “Mozambique’s forgotten ‘East Germans’ are 
still fighting for their communist payday”, October 17, 2007, Quartz Africa, qz.com.  
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José Chiridza. “I am glad to have come to the GDR” 121 
José worked in Görlsdorf, dairy cattle plant, and then was moved to Premnitz, in a 
chemical fibres plant. Before leaving Mozambique, as he says, they “did not receive 
concrete explanations about the content of the agreement”, and they didn’t receive 
any detailed information about the earning possibilities. What they knew, however, 
was that they could be ”trained as a skilled worker in the GDR and then return to 
                                                
121 From the interview of Ralf Straßburg to José Chirindza, July 30, 2013, in Mosambikanische 
Vertragsarbeiter in der DDR-Wirtschaft. Hintergründe - Verlauf – Folgen,  pp. 205-210.  
Figure 2: trainee from Mozambique in KfL ADN-ZB Sindermann 15.9.82, in Rostock. On the side of the 
experienced apprentice engineer Otto Saatze, the young Mozambican Fernando Maromba learns the profession of 
agrucultural machinery mechanic. Source: Bundesarchiv	Bild	183-1982-0915-003  
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Mozambique as specialists in the profession” ready to be employed in their home 
country using the know-how they learned in the GDR. As José recalls, in the last 
week of their preparation for the employment in the GDR, they were divided into 
two groups that would have been sent to work in two different companies. “Our 
group was informed that we had to work in a farm where cows were milked”. They 
did not receive further information, not even about GDR. “I have never been to 
Europe and only knew that the GDR belongs to Europe.” 
José was very young at that time, but he said to himself “this would be my big 
chance if I went there and did an apprenticeship”. Once arrived in Görlsdorf he was 
well-received by his new colleagues and he did not feel any reservations. “I can only 
say that where I started to work in Görlsdorf I had no problems with the German 
work colleagues”. 
He did receive training in the GDR. “In the dairy cattle plant in Görsldorf I got a 
partial work qualification and in chemical fibres plant Premnitz I received a work 
qualification as a chemistry specialist”. 
José tells about his living conditions as well. As many foreign colleagues, he was 
accommodated in a dorm. “In the first dorm in Görlsdorf I was satisfied, as we were 
two in a room. In the dorm in Guben, where 200 Mozambicans were accommodated, 
I was not so satisfied; there were four of us in a room. That was almost a disaster. 
Thank God, I was only one year there and then I changed to the chemical fibres’ 
factory Premnitz. There the dorm was wonderful. I looked after my compatriots there 
and had a room for me.” 
When he is asked whether he felt to be treated differently from his German 
colleagues, he answers: “I did not feel that we were disadvantaged. As I heard, we 
were paid in the companies where I worked as much as the German colleagues”. José 
believes this experience was quite useful. “I am still glad today that I said yes and I 
decided to go to the GDR. During this time I have been able to collect a great deal of 
professional and life experiences”.  
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Serafim Manhice. “The GDR citizens treated us as human beings”122 
Serafim didn’t get much information about the details of the contract before 
leaving Mozambique as well. “We were only informed that we should receive 
training.” However, they didn’t know how much they would have been paid, nor in 
which sector they were going to be employed. “We only knew that we would earn 
considerably more than in Mozambique.” 
Like his colleagues, Serafim recalls how precarious and dangerous the situation 
was in Mozambique. Going to work in the GDR and obtaining qualifications seemed 
the right choice to make. “In Mozambique, the civil war raged at that time and I had 
the opportunity either to become a soldier or to travel to the GDR. I did not want to 
participate in the war, so I decided to support the government indirectly from the 
GDR in this way”. 
Serafim attended a German course and specific training once arrived in the GDR, 
but he rather preferred putting training aside and started working as a forklift lifter, 
as he aimed to earn more. “Actually, I was supposed to be a locksmith, but since I 
had only normal earnings and got less pay than the shift workers. My colleagues, 
who had no qualifications for training and worked in the finishing service, earned 
more money than I did. I then stopped my training and worked in four shifts”.  
As he recalls, Mozambican workers, together with their German colleagues, had 
also the chance to do sport and engage in recreational activities. “We could even play 
our music on Alexanderplatz and use the cultural possibilities of the city of Berlin 
together with friends”. Free time activities were quite an important aspect in the 
socialist-workers lives. Serafim adds, “there was equality, equal work, equal pay. 
There was no discrimination because I was a foreigner; I was treated like a GDR 
citizen. I even had a GDR ID card”. 
 
José Reis. “We got support from the masters and the colleagues” 123 
José before going to the GDR, was accommodated with other contract workers in 
a preparatory camp, where they were informed about the basics of the agreement in 
                                                
122 From the interview of Ralf Straßburg to Serafim Manhice, August 5, 2013, in Mosambikanische 
Vertragsarbeiter in der DDR-Wirtschaft. Hintergründe - Verlauf – Folgen,  pp. 211-215 
123  From the interview of Ralf Straßburg to José Reis, May 31, 2013, in Mosambikanische 
Vertragsarbeiter in der DDR-Wirtschaft. Hintergründe - Verlauf – Folgen,  pp. 231-236 
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meetings and seminars. Unlike his colleagues,, he was told also in what company he 
would be employed. “We knew that we should receive training,” adds José. He 
remembers also about being informed about working condition, and about the 
conduct they had to hold. “We should have performed well as workers on the farm”. 
He goes on telling his first impressions on East Germany once landed in Berlin; 
when they were still in Mozambique, they had been prepared to the “German 
discipline and organisation”. Right after they got off the plane, they understood that 
it was all true, “the pickup was perfectly organized. The supervisors brought and in 
rank and file to the buses”.  
Upon arrival, José and his group already knew what they were going to do and 
where, but they did not have a clear picture of what the workplace would be like. For 
example, “there were different tools for the different jobs. In Mozambique, we did 
not know such specific tools, so we had to improvise”. The training, in José opinion 
was quite difficult, both because they had to undertake courses in German, and 
because learning such specific works was even harder, but they were not left alone, 
“we got support from the masters and the colleagues.” 
José committed himself during his employment in Rostock, and he confirms that 
the conditions of the contract were met in his case. “I received the qualification as a 
skilled worker at the end of the mission”. Then he adds, “not everybody managed 
that. There were also some Mozambicans who did not have the academic 
qualifications and therefore could not achieve this high quality qualification. They 
then received partial qualifications”. 
 
However, the program wouldn’t last long. With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 
1989, the situation changed abruptly. Many of the state-owned enterprises had to 
close. Most contract workers became unemployed and their savings were frozen in 
Mozambique. Therefore, many of them had to return home, to a country which had 
been destroyed by 16 years of civil war. On their return, it became clear that the 
contract workers did not work for themselves and their future, but for the debt 
repayment of their land. There were almost nothing left over from their money nor 
were there any jobs planned for them.  
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4. Young Mozambican students in East Germany: the 
socialist experiment of the ‘School of Friendship’ in 
Staßfurt 
Education represented a great aspect of the GDR ‘socialist solidarity’. Not only 
did East Germany send experts in African states, but also allowed people from those 
states to study in the GDR. From 1970 on, ca. 15,500 persons from developing states 
with a socialist orientation have completed their studies at an East German higher or 
technical education institute. In 1983, in particular, 5,951 citizens from those states 
were enrolled on educational courses in the GDR covering fields as economics, 
engineering, transport and agronomy124. During the Cold War, state-led education 
exchange programmes between post-colonial states and the former German 
Democratic Republic were rather common. As part of this educational cooperation 
and development policy, the GDR dared to bring forward a unique experiment in the 
German educational history up until then: the education of numerous Mozambican 
children and adolescents coming from a different cultural, linguistic and economic 
background, in the GDR. The Schule der Freundschaft, School of Friendship, was 
actually the most ambitious educational programme the GDR has ever undertaken.  
In October 1981 the two countries signed an agreement to set up the School of 
Friendship in Staßfurt, in the district of Magdeburg. As provided in the agreement, 
between 1982 and 1988, a total of 899 Mozambican children completed six years of 
secondary schooling and vocational training at the School of Friendship. Educating a 
future elite for Mozambique was its target. The students eventually returned to 
Mozambique in 1988 and found a country that had changed considerably during their 
absence. 
This chapter aims to discuss the way such programme was carried out, focusing 
on the young Mozambicans’ migration phenomenon together with the guiding 
                                                
124 Winrow, G. M., The foreign policy of the GDR in Africa, p. 206. 
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principles set out by Mozambique and East Germany, as well as their inter-state 
relations.  
4.1. Rationale behind the project of the School of Friendship  
Both Mozambique and East Germany held interests in the realisation of this 
educational experiment. The rationale behind the creation of the school of Friendship 
was twofold, combining economic and ideological objectives. On the one hand it was 
meant to produce an educated elite of socialist-oriented professionals who were to 
assume crucial positions in the future development of Mozambique as an industrial 
socialist state. On the other hand, the students were trained to become qualified 
personnel that were destined to work in new joint ventures between the GDR and 
Mozambique.125 
Moreover, it is to be highlighted that the international development policies of 
East Germany were characterized by the coexistence of two basic objectives: the first 
was securing economic state survival, and the second was advancing socialism and 
honouring a commitment towards international solidarity with “those subjugated by 
the capitalist world order”.126 Within this policy line, it becomes clear that the 
schooling of youth from socialist-oriented developing countries in boarding facilities 
in the GDR represented an important pillar of the international cooperation policy. 
Going into detail, the first big educational project in the GDR took place between the 
years 1955 and 1961, and was devised for youth from Vietnam to support the 
aspirations of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the aftermath of the First Indo-
China War. While from 1979 onwards, several groups of Namibian children, who 
were displaced by the South West Africa People’s Organisation’s (SWAPO) to 
refugee camps in Zambia and Angola during the nationalist liberation war, were 
brought up and educated in the GDR, some for up to 12 years. In all those projects a 
crucial part of the education process was focused on transferring socialist values 
together with patriotism and a propensity to serve the wider community. In the first 
                                                
125  See Reuter, L. and Scheunpflug, A., Die Schule der Freundschaft. Eine Fallstudie zur 
Bildungszusammenarbeit zwischen der DDR und Mosambik, Waxmann, Münster, 2006.  
126 Müller, T. R., “'Memories Of Paradise' — Legacies of Socialist Education in Mozambique”, In 
African Affairs, Vol. 109, No. 436 (July 2010), Oxford University, p. 454. 
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place the GDR set its foreign policy towards Africa under the goal of the worldwide 
spread of socialism. The GDR therefore sought to exert a long-term impact on Africa 
through ideology and value transfer, building lasting security structures and 
educating people in key positions as they progressed in their careers.127 Moreover, 
among the Soviet bloc and the Comecon states, the GDR was held as the socialist 
state with the best education system, regarded as one of the most advanced; this 
therefore made it the natural country for “grooming a future socialist elite”.128 One 
could therefore argue, that the GDR had rich experiences in boarding school 
education in the context of educational cooperation.  
It is no coincidence that the start of the School of Friendship coincided with the 
most active period of East German economic involvement in Mozambique, namely 
from 1977 to 1982. In this period, numerouns big joint ventures were envisaged in 
many sectors, such as agriculture, coal production, fishing, textile industry, radio 
production, light bulb production, and the assembly of lorries. Consequently, an 
important part of the GDR’s rationale for the School of Friendship was to educate 
qualified Mozambican personnel who would have worked in leading positions in 
those joint ventures.129  
Mozambique, on the other hand, held the same rationale behind the request of the 
Mozambican government under Samora Machel to create the School of Friendship. 
At this point it is already well-known that relations between the GDR and FRELIMO 
began in the 1960s. In particular, from 1967, GDR education experts worked within 
the FRELIMO education infrastructure, then situated in exile in Tanzania, in the 
small town of Bagamoyo.130 Thus, when in 1979 the Friendship and Cooperation 
Treaty was signed between the GDR and the People’s Republic of Mozambique, 
FRELIMO started looking to the GDR for receiving further support in creating an 
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education system based on socialist values and which would emphasize a symbiotic 
relationship between academic study, practise and its productive application.131 From 
the Mozambican perspective, the main educational objective was the creation of a 
homen novo, socialist personnel who was equipped with technical and professional 
skills that were needed for the future social and economic development of 
Mozambique. 
The objectives of both parts were actually integrated into the workings of the 
School of Friendship, as will become clear in the following paragraphs.  
4.1.1. Educational problems in Mozambique and the concept of ‘homen 
novo’ 
The most evident reason why Mozambique brought forward the creation of an 
educational program in the GDR was its education system’s underdevelopment. 
During the pre-independence years, the education system was racially segregating, 
meaning that the native population was almost excluded from education under the 
Portuguese colonial power, even though they formed the largest population group.  
After the independence, in 1975, the country had an illiteracy rate of 95% and the 
educational opportunities of the rural population were extremely below average.132 
Given such situation, FRELIMO held education issues in high consideration. During 
the independence struggle, the liberation movement had already established schools 
in the liberated areas of the country and also in the neighbouring liberated Tanzania. 
However, right after FRELIMO took control over the finally independent country, 
the conditions of Mozambique’s education system were disastrous: there were few 
and dilapidated schools, there was an overall shortage of teachers, the teaching 
materials were inadequate, and there was a lack of skilled workers. In the 
construction of the Mozambican education system, FRELIMO decided to establish a 
‘socialist education’, which aim was the unification and centralization of the entire 
                                                
131 Delegation from Maputo to the Conference of Education of African Member States, “Education 
policy in the People's Republic of Mozambique”, in The Journal of Modern African Studies 14, 2 
(1976), pp. 331–339 and Tullner, M., “Die Zusammenarbeit der DDR und Mosambiks auf dem 
Gebiet der Bildung und die Tätigkeit der Bildungsexperten der DDR in Mosambik”, in Voß, Wir 
haben Spuren hinterlassen!, pp. 388–406.  
132  Castiano, J, Das Bildungssystem in Mosambik (1974-1996): Entwicklung, Probleme Und 
Konsequenzen, Institut für Afrika-Kunde im Verbund der Stiftung Deutsches Übersee-Institut, 
Hamburg, 1997, p. 84.  
75 
schooling system. Moreover, the education of ‘socialist personalities’, defined homen 
novo, as already mentioned above, was the ultimate ideological and educational goal. 
According to the law on the National Education system of Mozambique (Sistema 
Nacional de Educação) the education system had to eradicate bourgeois and colonial 
mentality by creating a new man, who had to be freed from obscurantism and 
superstition, and who should have owned appropriate values for a socialist society.133 
Experts from East Germany were contributing as well to the implementation of such 
educational concept. East German educational counsellors even assisted and 
participated in the drafting of Mozambique's first elaborated education law of March 
1983.134 
It follows that Mozambique leaned quite heavily on the educational concepts of 
the GDR. The education system of the GDR was regarded as exemplary and 
guarantor of progressive social development. The idea of the ‘new man’, for 
instance, was a pedagogic concept originally formulated in the GDR. It related to the 
‘universally developed socialist personality’, which eventually became central to 
Mozambique’s educational projects. Certainly, the success of such pedagogic 
concept laid also in the fact that the ‘new men’ were represented, according to 
Marxist-Leninist ideology, as people whose social and cultural background did not 
concur to the development and shaping of their personalities. This concept was ideal 
for a young multi-ethnic state as Mozambique, where the need of a new and unifying 
image of man could perhaps put an end to the civil war and foster the creation of a 
solid state. The homen novo was educated at the School of Friendship, purposefully 
shielded from potentially disturbing influences. Although the pedagogical concept at 
the "School of Friendship" was developed in agreement with the Mozambican side, 
the premises of East German pedagogy ultimately dominated.135 
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4.1.2. Negotiations between Mozambique and East Germany and 
premises behind the creation of the School of Friendship: the school 
as a symbol of solidarity  
The construction of the Schule der Freundschaft can be seen as a novel turn in 
East German relations with Mozambique, and in general with the developing world. 
The project represented an extension of the foreign policy that the SED was pursuing 
since the founding of the East German state. As already noted in the previous 
chapters, central to both the rhetoric and content of East German foreign policy was 
the notion of a shared struggle. This meant that the people of the GDR did not live 
simply in a socialist state, but “fought forefront of a global struggle against 
imperialism”.136 
Many authors have wondered which role the School of Friendship played in this 
broader context of cooperation and solidarity that the GDR was pursuing. The 
School of Friendship was often presented by the print as a symbol of living solidarity 
with the People's Republic of Mozambique. In March 1983, President Machel 
himself, on occasion of his visit the School of Friendship at Staßfurt, praised the 
institution as a ‘shining’ example of solidarity between the GDR and Mozambique.137 
The Schule der Freundschaft represented an actual expression of East German 
commitment to otherwise abstract notions like ‘solidarity’ and the ‘shared struggle 
against imperialism’. Broader speaking, the planning and construction of the school 
reflected both East Germany’s ideological commitment in supporting class struggle 
around the whole world and its pragmatic efforts to win friend states and allies. 138 
The FRELIMO proposal to build schools in the German Democratic Republic for 
children from Mozambique was perhaps the logical extension of the close 
relationship between Mozambique and East Germany. Such proposals coming from 
FRELIMO representatives were specific and persistent. For instance, in September 
1980, the East German embassy in Maputo received a memorandum from the 
Mozambican Ministry of Education and Culture, containing a request for 
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constructing schools in the GDR for a total of 2,000 Mozambican students, as well as 
providing vocational training to the same. The memorandum was also requesting 
assistance in building technical schools for another 700 to 1,000 students in 
Mozambique.139 
The very next day, Günter Mittag, the Central Committee Secretary for the 
Economy of the GDR, was writing to Margot Honecker, the East German Minister 
for Education, to inform her that an identical request was made by a Mozambican 
delegation in Leipzig.140 Some days later, Samora Machel himself was making the 
same request again during a visit to the GDR141 
Despite Mozambican making so many efforts, convincing Margaret Honecker that 
the proposed scope of the project was feasible was rather difficult, since such project 
would have required considerable expenditure and a high commitment from the side 
of the GDR, who should have organised every aspect of 2,000 Mozambican students’ 
lives. Nonetheless, East German leadership made Mozambique a counterproposal. 
One school would be constructed and opened for half as many students, namely one 
thousand instead of two thousand. Those students could then receive instruction from 
fourth to eight-grade. After 4 years of schooling, the young Mozambicans would 
receive two years of vocational training.142 Even if the project was going to be half 
the size of the original one proposed by the Mozambican leadership, it was going to 
be no small undertaking for the GDR, as its realisation would not only require the 
involvement of multiple ministries, both in the GDR and Mozambique, but also 
district officials in Magdeburg. For instance, before the School of Friendship opened, 
local SED officials assumed primary responsibility for public relations within the 
community of Staßfurt, by preparing and handling pamphlets to the local population 
informing them about the school project and the young guests that Staßfurt would 
soon have welcomed.143 
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Prior to the realisation of the project, cost estimates were realised, revealing the 
scope of such ambitious project. Initial projections estimated that only the 
construction of the school were to cost over 30 million East German Marks, 
approximately 7.67 million Euros. 144 In 1981, when the construction began, a little 
more than half that figure was made available right away by the government.145 
Furthermore, another eight million Marks (about 2.05 million Euros) would be 
needed to cover the operating costs for the first academic year. Each year after that, it 
was estimated to cost the GDR at least six and a half million marks (1.66 million 
Euros)146.  
Notwithstanding this, East German leadership decided to move forward with the 
project, considering it as an opportunity to further strengthen its ties with FRELIMO 
and Mozambique. An educational project like the School of Friendship, in line with 
the solidarity and aid policy of the GDR, could directly benefit a fellow anti-
imperialist state. Lothar Oppermann, the head of the SED’s Department of 
Education, stated that the school would serve as “a living expression of the close 
bond between the socialist countries of socialism and those of the national liberation 
movement.”147 In fact, even if in Mozambique the struggle for political independence 
had been won, economic independence was still to achieve. Verber argued that this 
could only be done through a functioning internal industry, together with the hard 
work of an educated workforce. Therefore, the SED offered the school as a means to 
help finally dismantle the old colonial system. Not surprisingly SED officials were 
describing the school as a GDR’s “contribution to overcoming the difficult legacy of 
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colonialism,” and a “direct contribution to the emergence and advancement of 
socialism.”148 
 
 
Figure 3: Berlin (East), 3.3.1983: meeting of Samora Machel, President of the FRELIMO party and 
President of the People's Republic of Mozambique, with Margot Honecker, Minister of Education of the 
GDR, and the management of the Staßfurt "School of Friendship". Source: Bundesarchiv Bild 183-1983 
0303-423. 
4.2.  Carrying out the educational project of the School of Friendship 
The School of Friendship, as already stated, was a unique project in the 
educational landscape of the GDR. According to the agreement, 900 Mozambican 
children were supposed to go to the small industrial city of Staßfurt in 1982. On their 
arrival, the young students should have been nominally twelve years old and should 
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have successfully completed four years of elementary school in Mozambique. In the 
Schule der Freundschaft, they would receive a four-year general education. After 
that, two years of vocational training should follow. In the autumn of 1988 they 
would then return to their country of origin as a young, qualified elite of skilled 
workers that were to help build the new decolonised socialist state of Mozambique. 
This meant that the students of the School of Friendship would be able to meet their 
families again only after 6 years of education and training, apart from some 
exceptions.  
4.2.1. Selection of the young candidates 
The actual number of students who were sent to Staßfurt to attend the School of 
Friendship was 899, of which 695 were boys and 204 girls149. The reasons behind this 
gender ratio of 1:3 were not officially named. However, it can be assumed that the 
Mozambican side held interest in having male skilled workers trained and educated.  
In February 1982, coordinated by the Mozambican Ministry for Education and 
Culture, the selection of pupils destined to continue their education at the School of 
Friendship started. The aim was to recruit children from all over the country, 
including rural outposts. 900 candidates were originally selected on the basis of 
equal representation from each province, with special preference for the children of 
workers, peasants, and revolutionaries. The political proximity of the students’ 
families to FRELIMO was therefore taken into account. Others criteria were 
academic performance, (students who had successfully completed the primary school 
in Mozambique with good grades, if possible as the best of their year), discipline at 
school, social behaviour, state of health, social background, age (ideally, the children 
should have been between 12 and 14 years of age),150 good health and the agreement 
of parents or guardians, which was decisive for the selection. 
One reason for targeting children from all over Mozambique was FRELIMO’s 
objective to form a new man, spreading common Mozambican identity among 
participants, together with a deep commitment towards the country and FRELIMO as 
the leading agent of progressive change, opposing to as opposed to ethnic or regional 
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identities. 151 In reality, however, the selection resulted disproportionate, as most of 
the pupils came from the area of Maputo. Their age also deviated roughly from the 
requirements. When they arrived in Staßfurt, the young Mozambicans were supposed 
to be between ten and twelve years old; in fact, they were between nine and sixteen 
years old. 152 More than half of the students (56%) were born in 1968, 1969 or 1970 
and therefore they were between eleven and fourteen years old when they arrived in 
the GDR.153 For the student themselves, a personal reason for applying was the 
prospect of a professional career and the hope for a consequent social and 
economical advancement of Mozambique. Another reason for applying to the School 
of Friendship was, of course, the chance to avoid the dangers posed by the civil 
war.154 
Once selected, the children were then gathered at four centres in the cities of 
Maputo, Inhambane, Tete, and Nampula. In the second part of 1982, together with 22 
Mozambican pedagogic personnel, they left for the GDR. 
4.2.2. Practical realisation of the educational ‘experiment’ of the School 
of Friendship 
The selected students, after four years schooling and two years vocational 
training, would obtain the Fachabitur, comparable professional A-levels. The 
professions the young Mozambicans were going to get qualified in, corresponded to 
the ones needed in the operation of the planned joint ventures between East Germany 
and Mozambique. The apprenticeships were therefore centred in the metal-
processing industry, building and construction, electrical engineering, and 
agricultural technology.155  
The choice of location for the school was guided by the need to have enough 
training facilities in near areas. Therefore, the choice fell on the small industrial town 
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of Staßfurt, which at that time had about 74,500 inhabitants.156 A school complex for 
900 students could only be built on the outskirts of the city. The construction took 
only 13 months, from May 1981 to July 1982, and eventually a school building, four 
residential buildings, a large kitchen with dining room and a sports hall in the style of 
typical East German prefabricated were built. Great importance was laid on green 
areas and outdoor facilities, such as the so-called "African village", which were 
covered wooden seating areas on a lawn, and various sport fields. Furthermore, there 
were administrative and warehouse buildings. The "African village" pointed to the 
culture-sensitive design of the entire site. For this purpose, a "pictorial conception" 
was specially developed to support the "emotional bond with the homeland".157  
 
 
Figure 4: in the picture students of the School of Friendship eating in the common dining room. In the 
background, the glass window depicting typical foods and utensils of Mozambique. Source: Lehrbuch für Klasse 
7. Schule der Freundschaft. Berlin 1984, p. 57. 
  
The students were accommodated in 3- or 4-bedrooms with recreation rooms, 
toilets with washing facilities and shower rooms in the basement. The Mozambican 
educators lived in fully equipped flats as well as German educational staff, who also 
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lived in the school facility due to an unreasonably long work journey. There was also 
a modern equipped medical area with the possibility of inpatient treatment.158  
Once arrived at the School of Friendship, the 899 children were divided into 30 
groups and given intensive language training, since German was going to be the 
primary medium of their education, and they would also be taught by German staff. 
Mozambican staff was taking part to the teaching activity as well. Both East German 
and Mozambican teachers taught in thirty parallel classes, each with 30 pupils. 
However, the majority of the 25 Mozambican teachers and educators were employed 
in extra-curricular areas159. The first year of schooling was dedicated to German 
language courses. During this first year, the number of East German teachers had 
been increased to one hundred people in order to enable language learning in small 
groups and, in particular, to provide teachers from Mozambique with adequate 
language training as well. 
Teaching was geared towards three main objectives. The first was educating and 
providing the students with qualifications to promote the economic development of 
Mozambique. Secondly, it aimed to provide a socialist education in order to prepare 
the young elite of the 'brother state' for their activities. Thirdly, lessons had to help 
prevent the alienation of young Mozambicans from their real home. The GDR 
curricula were therefore specifically modified and some subjects, such as political 
education, history, geography and Portuguese, were taught in Portuguese by 
Mozambican teachers.160 Furthermore, basing on the school programme, they taught 
the students "cultural activities", which included the teaching of Mozambican typical 
dances, songs and prose. In addition, on public holidays of the People's Republic of 
Mozambique it was holiday at the School of Friendship.161 
In their first four years of schooling and stay in Staßfurt, the lives of the young 
Mozambicans were strictly regulated in every aspect, meaning that every day was 
carefully organised and there were hardly any private retreats.162  The weekends were 
also "used to visit art and cultural institutions, in the broader sense to get to know the 
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GDR, with excursions and hikes, they are filled with sporting events and artistic 
competitions and serve for recreation and the settlement of personal needs."163 The 
pupils were allowed to leave the boarding and schooling complex only in groups and 
for special occasions, which included also visits to allocated guest families. Most of 
their free time was taken up by communal activities aimed to install a socialist, 
communal spirit.  
In contrast, when professional training commenced in 1986, such situation 
changed radically. Traineeships didn’t take place in Staßfurt, but in other East 
German cities. This often involved frequent travel, since sometimes it happened that 
the young Mozambicans should follow their apprenticeships in different towns 
during the working week.  
The students, "who have distinguished themselves through good performances 
during the school year”, were given the opportunity to spend their holidays in 
Mozambique, with their families. 164  
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4.2.3. Educational staff of the School of Friendship 
A really interesting aspect of the School of Friendship was that not only young 
Mozambicans could stay and study in the GDR, but also some Mozambican teaching 
experts could go in the GDR to work as staff of the school. The educational staff 
consisted of trained teachers and trained educators both from East Germany and 
Mozambique. The number of German educational staff fluctuated considerably in the 
course of the project, in particular, from 200 at the beginning to 58 at the end of the 
project.165 The number of Mozambican educators varied between 16 and 25166. It is 
striking that the Mozambican pedagogues were in a clear minority over the entire 
period. Moreover, parallel to the GDR usual school party secretary, at the school 
there was a FRELIMO representative. 
The selection of the German staff was carried out by taking into consideration the 
owned qualification, which was the most important prerequisite, but also other 
aspects were taken into consideration. In particular, experts who had already had 
experiences in Mozambique were sought, especially for management positions; a 
further desired requirement was SED membership. This latter aspect was meant to 
secure ‘political safety’ inside the School of Friendship and in the teaching activities 
that were carried out. Political attitude played also a quite fundamental role, as the 
personnel should show tendencies to the exercise of “practical solidarity".167 
On the other hand, Mozambican teachers and educators were not primarily 
selected for their qualification, but rather for political ‘characteristics’, such as their 
contributions to the liberation struggle, their proximity to FRELIMO, and of course 
special achievements during their life and career were taken into consideration.168  
The school was run by a German director, who could count on a school 
management that comprised several area directors. The school management also 
included a FRELIMO representative, to whom all Mozambican educators were 
subjected in disciplinary terms.169 
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4.2.4. Ideological and disciplinary challenges  
Although the life of the students was organised in every aspect, and despite the 
fact the young Mozambicans had been handpicked, disciplinary problems emerged. 
This resulted in several students being sent back to Mozambique during their four 
years of general education. Having become adolescents and having begun their 
traineeship, difficulties increased throughout the two-year programme of the 
vocational training. One could argue that a possible reason, besides the fact students 
had to follow tight and strict schedule, can be that they were becoming aware about 
the fact many apprenticeships would not be viable professions in Mozambique once 
they would return home. Since 1982, plans to abandon the various joint ventures 
projects with Mozambique had gathered pace. This was partly a consequence of the 
rejection of Mozambique as a new member of the COMECON in 1981; a further and 
more evident reason for abandoning the joint ventures was widespread economic and 
political destabilisation as a consequence of increased counterinsurgency activities 
by the RENAMO, during which the FRELIMO government lost control over parts of 
state territory. 170  
In concrete terms, about 30 youths were reported in relation to serious 
delinquency, but only a few of them were sent back to Mozambique prematurely. 
Among them, 28 girls were sent back because of pregnancy.171 
In order to better control defiant behaviour or outright resistance, especially 
during the time spent in dorms or leisure time, the Stasi, the East German secret 
service, in cooperation with the FRELIMO representative at the Schule der 
Freundschaft, recruited some students of the school to report on possible defiance. 
Very interesting is the content of an interview to Mano, one young Mozambican, 
chief of his class, who was engaged in such activities. He described his recruitment 
and tasks as follows:172  
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Our [German] director chose some people, around 30, and he said ‘we have a celebration and 
we would like to take you along so you get an idea how our politics work [...]’ so we went, 
we ate and drank, then they said ‘we need your help, it is not easy to control all the students, 
we don’t know exactly what happens in the bedrooms and it would be a great honour for us if 
you could work with us and tell us if something wrong happens’ [...] and I knew among us 
also there were some few people who did things that were not good.  
Mano recalls that his first reaction after being asked such thing was:  
‘But if we agree to help you we need to be paid’ [...] they laughed but then I was elected to 
participate in the pioneer movement and I got money for that, I don’t know whether that was 
a reward for being a pioneer or for my work for the Stasi, for being quasi a spy.  
Mano goes on saying he did report some students, but only when he personally 
felt what they were doing was really wrong. He tried mostly to speak to those 
causing minor troubles, trying to help them and understand why were they doing 
what they were doing. In fact, the majority of the students of the School of 
Friendship followed their education through without being recorded for any kind of 
behaviour against the rules. This happened because the predominant sentiment 
among the students was that, ‘we were all patriots, we really believed we will help 
and develop our country so we need to study and work hard, and that is what we 
did’.173 
Another matter of concern for the GDR and the SED was the “politics of FRELIMO” 
during the operation of the school from 1982 to 1990. In particular it was the kind of 
socialism developing in Mozambique that concerned SED officials, and that was 
being spread in the School of Friendship by Mozambican teachers.  
As noted above, the teaching staff at the School of Friendship was made up of 
both Mozambican and East German instructors. As a consequence, one potential 
problem for GDR authorities was the lack of control they had over political 
education inside the classroom. East German instructors outnumbered Mozambican 
ones, and taught everything from German language to natural sciences, but 
Mozambican teachers had its own tasks as well. During the negotiations, FRELIMO 
officials had insisted that students learnt certain subjects from Mozambican teachers, 
a condition to which GDR officials, the Ministry for Education and the SED had 
agreed on. The subject that would be taught by Mozambican staff included 
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Portuguese, geography, history, and political education.174  Before the school started 
operating, the fact Mozambican would teach and have control over these subjects 
made sense, as one of the educational objectives of the school was not to alienate 
students from their country of origin. However, East German administrators and 
government officials eventually began to have doubts about the political lessons that 
the students at the School of Friendship were taught. After only a few months of 
operation, the government was already considering how to address the problem at the 
school. In November 1982, Werner Engst, the Vice-Minister for Education, 
remarked they “must be prepared to retrain the Mozambican teachers in the truest 
sense of the word, because they were trained to teach according to bourgeois 
methods and naturally also practice bourgeois methods. This retraining is necessary 
and we must consider how we can best accomplish it.”175 
What at first raised concern among authorities was the way Mozambican staff 
addressed specific themes and issues. For instance, Minister for Education Margot 
Honecker noted that “it must be checked how to best help the teachers respond more 
clearly to the students’ political questions.” 176  In detail, Mozambican teachers 
received and answered many questions about the division of Germany, which 
appeared to be the main issue. 
Nonetheless, as the years went by, East German concerns extended far beyond 
about questions and the content of respective answers. This time it was the way that 
Mozambican instructors organised and ran their lessons and the way they managed 
their classrooms that came under increasing scrutiny. As especially troubling were 
regarded certain ‘bourgeois’ tendencies having “democratic traits,” like majority rule 
when it came to select students for certain tasks and positions or making simple 
decisions about trips or holiday travels. GDR authorities were concerned that 
students were receiving an “education towards autonomy/independence 
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[Selbständigkeit]” of the worst possible sort for a socialist state as the GDR.177 Such 
tendency to emphasise the individual strongly opposed the East German approach in 
place at the school. As it was reported by an internal document: “we operate from the 
well-known theoretical and methodological position that socialist character 
development cannot succeed without the collective and outside the collective.”178  
4.3. Considerations about the of the socialist education experiment of 
the School of Friendship  
The feeling of being privileged, combined with the sense of obligation towards 
their homeland, was being reinforced by the fact that at the School of Friendship the 
students were constantly reminded that they would form part of a future professional 
elite and they would contribute to the socialist transformation of Mozambican 
society and its economic progress. 
4.3.1. Results obtained by the students  
The educational goal can be formally defined as successful: in line with such 
sentiments, the majority, 839 students altogether, completed their education and 
apprenticeship successfully, the grade average among the students was 2.2 (between 
B and B-), while only eleven students did not pass the examination for the 
Fachabitur.179 Unluckily three pupils have passed away and a total of 46 students 
have been sent back to Mozambique for a variety of reasons, most of them related to 
disciplinary issues180. As already mentioned above, 28 girls out of the total of 46 
students were sent back due to pregnancy.  
On the other hand, most of the students were unable to find jobs in Mozambique 
on their return, since the major joint industrial projects had been dismissed, both due 
to the political and economic situation and to the change in the bilateral relationship 
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between the GDR and Mozambique.181 The youth at the School of Friendship might 
not have been completely aware of all the details concerning their envisaged 
employment in newly created joint-venture enterprises; still, they knew the situation 
would have changed irrevocably in Mozambique with the death of Samora Machel in 
1986, the same year they started their traineeship. The School of Friendship was 
rather a project connected to the FRELIMO guided by Samora Machel, and it 
suddenly became clear that his successor, Joaquim Chissano, would follow a 
different political line. 
Moreover, the degree obtained in East Germany (which today would qualify for 
university entrance in Mozambique today) was not recognized in Mozambique; their 
School of Friendship leaving certificates, according to the original agreement, had to 
be considered equal to the completion of secondary school or Grade 12 in 
Mozambique. In fact, they were recognized as completion of Grade 10 only. As a 
consequence, the students had basically the same status of those who dropped out 
school and did not obtain any qualification.182 Accordingly, they would receive a 
lower salary within Mozambican labour market.183 In addition, some graduates and 
their families became estranged and the students did only conserve a passive 
knowledge of their languages of origin, Portuguese, although they had been keeping 
in contact with their relatives via letters during their stay in the GDR. Moreover, in 
1984 and 1985 two groups of up to 50 children were allowed to spend their summer 
holidays in Mozambique, trip that was granted as a reward for their exemplary 
grades and discipline. It was clearly not enough; this resulted in what Reuter and 
Scheunpflug defined as cultural and emotional uprooting and alienation.184  
An estimated number of 70-90 graduates from the School of Friendship stayed 
after the German reunification with a different residence status185. Some of them 
have been able to find an employment in their chosen occupations, others found 
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employment in aid organisations thank to their language knowledge and other 
skills.186  
4.3.2. Experiences of Mozambican youths at the School of Friendship 
With no doubt the experience of spending the most crucial years of their lives in a 
foreign country with a different language and different cultural background deeply 
influenced the young Mozambicans. The majority of participants of the experiment 
of School of Friendship felt as their experience in the GDR had tangible effects on 
them, making them different. ‘We are German children to this day’187 how Fabio puts 
it. This is what Müller referred to as ‘Germanness’; it made them feel different and 
yet they were role models who would influence future generations in Mozambique. 
As Roberto, another former student of the School of Friendship remarks: 
It made a big difference to have studied in Germany… I can say those who wanted to learn 
brought back many things. We are different from those who stayed behind [in my family] 
others now regard me as a role model and try to follow in my footsteps. (Interview, Beira, 14 
June 2008) 188 
This feeling of being different was related not only to the fact they became 
inclined towards socialist solidarity, but also secondary skills which gave them a 
different approach to one’s life. As Mia, another former student interviewed by 
Müller, explains: 
We learned how to live and help each other, and we learned how to plan our lives. Here [in 
Mozambique] people simply live from day to day, they do not think about the consequences 
of what they do… but if you really want to achieve something you need to plan and work for 
it. What I am now I am because I was in Germany… and because of socialism, and now at 
least we have to help each other. (Interview, Chimoio, 9 June 2008) 189 
It is clear that both of the interviewees feel that their time in Germany decisively 
influenced the trajectories of their adult lives, as Fernando further explains:  
I am very happy I went to the GDR. I learned so many things. The foundations on which my 
present life rests, starting with my family and my work, were built in Germany, if I had 
stayed here I for sure would live a different life. (Interview, Chimoio, 9 June 2008)  
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Mia then both confirms and expands Fernando’s sentiments when she describes 
what are the legacies of their stay in the GDR:  
We have learned in particular how we should live and how we can help each other. At first 
for me it did not work to learn the profession I wanted [Mia wanted to become a medical 
doctor] because the government had certain ideas what we should learn and my favourite 
profession was not among those… but everything else was good. All the things I do now, the 
way I approach things, how I educate my children, all that comes from the time when we saw 
how people in Germany go about those things. Also with our children we try to educate them 
the same way we were educated there, and sometimes people think about [the older daughter] 
that she was actually born in Germany… If something like the School of Friendship would 
still exist I would send my daughters there. I would not have to think twice to let them go. 
(Interview, Chimoio, 9 June 2008) 190 
Nonetheless, neither Mia nor Fernando seriously contemplated returning to 
Germany as guest workers as some former students of School of Friendship did. 
They could apply for the guest workers programme, but they decided to remain in 
their homeland. 
Clearly, the rejection by their government after their return to Mozambique did 
not destroy their strong sense of patriotism nor the general feeling that with the 
FRELIMO of Samora Machel, Mozambique was on the right track. As Mia explains:  
The government simply left us, they did not profit from our experience... but what Samora 
had planned was a good project and we were unlucky it did not turn out the way he had 
planned it. Overall I think it was good here in Mozambique when we took that socialist way. 
We did not have such nice houses and cars, but we had food and the children went to school. 
Now there are some who own a lot and many who have nothing. Socialism has helped to 
balance that. (Interview, Chimoio, 9 June 2008) 191 
Unluckily, the experiences of other students of the School of Friendship were not 
so positive after their return to Mozambique. The brilliant future that was promised 
to them couldn’t exist any longer, given the fact the country was in the middle of the 
civil war. Many of them, after they returned to Mozambique, were forced to join the 
FRELIMO Army.  
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5.  Military training of Mozambican troopers in East 
Germany 
Besides economic, technical and educational cooperation, the GDR and 
Mozambique cooperated also in the field of military training, meaning that many 
Mozambican troopers stayed in the GDR to follow a military training. 
It is well-known that the Cold War affected indirectly the African continent too. 
On the one side, South Africa's government, military and intelligence services saw 
themselves acting in the context of the Cold War, more specifically on the side of the 
West in a "proxy war", and they regarded themselves as a "bulwark against 
communist aggression"192. South Africa was viewed as a bastion against communism 
since that several of its northern neighbours, Mozambique and Angola, for instance, 
were led by socialist parties and backed by the Soviet bloc. Mozambique and the 
other South Africa's immediate or indirect neighbours therefore resulted to be "front 
states", they found themselves - intentionally or unintentionally - on the side of the 
Eastern Bloc and the Soviet Union. Consequently, the Soviet Union, the GDR, Cuba, 
and other states provided military support.193  
Since the GDR, was considered a relatively rich country among the Comecon 
states, and given its relative freedom of manoeuvre, it was held more than able to 
take on African aid. At the same time, East Germany was considered to be efficient 
in setting up political parties and organizing cadres and security organs. In supplying 
such assistance during the Cold War, the GDR had come to portray itself as 'the 
natural ally of former colonial peoples’.194 As Erich Honecker underlined, East 
Germany was standing “side by side against common enemies. Common effort 
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inspires us to do everything for the good of working people, for peace and for social 
progress”. Therefore, supporting the new government of Mozambique, as well as the 
liberation movement FRELIMO prior Mozambican independence was a natural step 
towards such policy.195  
In March 1980, Der Spiegel reported that the focus of GDR military support was 
not on arms supplies, but rather on the training of foreign military personnel both in 
Africa and especially in the GDR. This latter form of military aid will be taken in 
consideration in this chapter, as it represents a quite interesting phenomenon of 
regulated migration, even if the Mozambican military personnel was granted a stay 
of 2-4 years, depending on the length of training. 
5.1. Stages of the GDR military aid towards Mozambique: building a 
‘socialist’ army 
In 1987, Hillebrand196 dealt in great detail with the possible motives and goals of 
the GDR in its engagement in Africa, subsuming not only military aid but also all 
forms of cooperation. Hillebrand emphasised the importance of political and 
ideological training during the military training of Third World military personnel in 
the GDR. As action fields of the GDR military aid, he named material and weapon 
supplies, military and technical training of cadres, advice on how to build armies, 
political indoctrination as well as help in building defence industries. Thus, he 
underlined that weapon supplies represented rather a small part of military aid, as in 
fact the GDR had no significant weapons production of its own. 197 
A much higher importance, as already mentioned, was given to the deployment of 
military advisors and the training of Third World military personnel in their 
homelands and on East German territory. A Warsaw-Treaty internal division of tasks 
provided that the Soviet Union, the Czechoslovak Republic and Poland had to take 
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care of arm deliveries, while the GDR had the task of providing advice and 
training.198  
In November 1974, for the first time Machel directly requested the East German 
Ambassador in Dar es Salam for military training. According to Machel's request, 
300 FRELIMO fighters should have been trained in the GDR.199 The realisation of 
such project would have meant a new form of military aid. In six months, the 
FRELIMO fighters should firstly have received a basic education and then a special 
education. They should have been employed in border control and security, in 
custom authorities, in the "fight against economic sabotage", in state security and in 
personal protection.200 Moreover, in this occasion Machel praised the GDR’s great 
experience in these areas, especially referring to the protection of borders, which 
was, in Machel’s words, "solved in a hasty manner”. 
Right after the request made by Machel, internal voting process began in the 
GDR. Subsequently to the request of the Central Committee on Security Affairs on 
the feasibility of such project, Army General Hoffmann replied, at the end of 
November 1974, that in principle such combined training could be approved. Among 
other things, the requirements for the trainees and most importantly the costs that had 
to be undertaken should have been clarified in the first place.201  
At the beginning of December 1974, during a visit in East Berlin, Samora Machel 
expressed his urgent and extensive wishes "for material assistance, consultants and 
experts especially in non-civil fields”. In this occasion, he personally thanked the 
SED leadership and especially Honecker, "because the GDR in the most difficult 
moments was a faithful fellow combatant [Mitkämpfer] and a comrade in arms 
[Waffengefährte] of FRELIMO". However, he did "not come to bring flowers, but to 
explain the difficulty of our struggle and to find solutions here."202 In particular, 
Machel asked for further support and advice aimed to build and control an army in 
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relation to the future state founding of the People Republic of Mozambique in June 
1975.203 Machel made quite specific requests to the Central Committee for Security 
Affairs of the GDR, extending them considerably as well. With East German military 
aid, 250 soldiers should receive basic military training and special training in 
Mozambique in order to be employed in “decisive positions” such as police forces, 
border patrols and state security personnel from June 1975 onwards.204 Therefore, the 
training by the East German Unterweisungskräfte, the training forces, would have to 
start in January 1975 and be completed by 25 July, the planned Independence Day.  
In December 1974, during a visit by the FRELIMO leadership in the GDR, 
Honecker declared his readiness to "continue to actively develop the alliance 
between the socialist community and the national liberation movement"205 It comes 
as no surprise that, as a result of the GDR's commitments, the FRELIMO leader 
expressed his deep satisfaction with the GDR's constructive attitude and quick 
response. He asked for a fast implementation of the proposed measures, especially in 
the field of military training.206  
In early January 1975, under the supervision of Lieutenant general Borufka, 
officer of the NVA (National People’s Army of the GDR), conditions and premises 
for the implementation of the project were sounded out on-site in Mozambique, in 
order to support the final decision of the SED Central Committee on the matter. 
Borufka reported that Machel reiterated his initial request: the training of 2,500 
soldiers, police officers for border security, criminal investigators, personal 
protection and state security personnel. Through a more precise assessment of the 
situation, the large-scale project turned out to be not feasible: the FRELIMO 
volunteers neither had the necessary education nor sufficient Portuguese language 
skills. Hence, Borufka asserted that the conditions for an effective training in 
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Mozambique did not exist. Machel eventually agreed to have 250 instructors trained 
in the GDR instead.207  
In April and May 1975, as agreed, 250 FRELIMO members were trained in the 
"armed organs" of the GDR: 110 in the Stasi (the State Security Service), 90 in the 
Federal Police and 50 in border troops. According to the correspondence, the 
implementation of the agreement on the training of the 250 cadres was co-ordinated 
and controlled by the Central Committee on Security Affairs.208  
A first interim report by the Central Committee on Security Affairs at the end of 
April highlighted the outstanding attitude of the Mozambican cadres; they were 
defined as "very disciplined and eager to learn".  
5.1.1. The military clause included in the Friendship and Cooperation 
Treaty, 24 February 1979 
Honecker's official visit in Mozambique in February 1979 marked the culmination 
of bilateral relations with the country, as already underlined in chapter 2. With the 
conclusion of the Treaty of Friendship of February 24, 1979, the military cooperation 
between the GDR and Mozambique reached therefore a new level. Indeed, the Treaty 
of Friendship and Cooperation, which was concluded for a period of twenty years, 
contained two military clauses. The first is contained in Article 5: 
In the interest of strengthening the defence capacity of the High Contracting Parties, they will 
govern cooperation in the military sphere through bilateral agreements. (Translated by the 
author, see p. 122 of the Appendix, Article 5, Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation) 
The military passages of the agreement were by no means kept secret. The SED 
Central Newspaper Neues Deutschland published the text of Art. 10 on the front 
page of June 26th newspaper: 
In the event of a situation that might threaten or violate peace, the High Contracting Parties 
will immediately contact each other to coordinate their positions to eliminate the threat or to 
restore peace. (Translated by the author, see p. 122 Appendix, Article 5, Treaty of Friendship 
and Cooperation) 
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On June 28, 1980, in his speech to the People's Chamber of the GDR on the 
Friendship and Cooperation Treaties concluded with Angola and Mozambique, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Oskar Fischer addressed military questions, yet without 
expressly mentioning neither the military aid from the GDR towards these countries 
nor the military clauses contained in the Treaty with Mozambique. In fact, military 
clauses were not contained in any other agreement concluded with any state outside 
the system of the Warsaw Treaty.209 According to Döring, Article 10 in particular 
was meant to guarantee the safety of a large number (ca. 1,200) of East German 
citizens who were working in Mozambique.  
In accordance with Article 5, a Protocol of Military cooperation was agreed on 
May 1979 during the visit of Minister of National Defence of Mozambique Armando 
Emilio Guebuza, in East Berlin.210 However, as already noted in chapter 2, the 
published military clause between the GDR and Mozambique promised by no means 
a definite military commitment of troops in the event of conflict. 
5.1.2. Intensification of training support in the GDR from 1980 
A principled agreement on the training of Mozambican military personnel in the 
GDR was reached in East Germany in November 1979, as a result of an official 
friendly visit by Armando Guebuza. The fact that military training mostly took place 
in East Germany meant that the GDR had the benefit of avoiding sending its officers 
as trainers in Mozambique. Whenever the leadership in Maputo insisted on the 
deployment of NVA officers in their country, the Ministry of National Defence of 
the GDR would suggest having them trained in the GDR instead. Qualified training 
could be carried out "more effectively" in the NVA, as argued by the head of the 
NVA, Günter Lorenz, during a visit in Maputo in 1985 211 
On April 1, 1980 in Maputo, NVA Colonel General Helmut Fleißner, Deputy 
Defence Minister of the GDR, and Guebuza signed the corresponding agreement on 
the training of Mozambican military cadres in the GDR. The agreement provided 
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that the GDR had to train 279 Mozambican military personnel for a period ending in 
1989. The subdivisions included 70 training units at Officers' School of the Land 
Forces, 62 at Officers' School of Air Forces, 62 at Officers' School of Naval Forces 
and 60 as Political commissars. In addition, 15 officers and 10 dog handlers of the 
border troops were trained. The duration of the training was set at rotating years for 
all the sub-forces and branches of service.212 
According to Fleißner's report, the NVA had originally planned a two-year 
apprenticeship, but the FRELIMO leadership had insisted on the making of a three-
year training in Mozambique. After persistent negotiations, the Department of 
Defence in Maputo agreed to send its cadres to the GDR and to bear one-third of the 
training costs, a monthly allowance and a one-time clothing allowance of 400 Marks 
for each cadre. In addition, Maputo had to bear the travel expenses of its soldiers. In 
particular, Maputo's cost share, according to Fleißner's calculations, was $ 7.3 
million, or equivalent to $ 13.8 million value date.213 Annex 4 of the Agreement 
regulated in detail the cost allocation and the terms of payment. In total, according to 
the GDR Ministry of Defence, 263 Mozambican officers and non-commissioned 
officers were trained in the NVA between 1981 and 1990. 
 
Month 
and year 
12.1981214 11.1983215 11.1984216 01.1986217 01.1987218 10.1989219 Total 
Number 178 192 78 40 8 18 263 
Table 2: Training of Mozambican military authorities in the NVA 
The data show significant differences over the years. First two years of the 
training project had the highest number of cadres, number that reached its peak in 
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November 1983. Then the numbers shows a sharply decreasing trend in the 
following years. 
 Of the 178 Mozambicans who began their training in the NVA in 1981/1982, 61 
were at the Officers' School of the Air Forces in Kamenz, 50 at the Officers' School 
in Prora, 15 at the Officers' College of the Border Forces in Plauen and 22 for the 
language training in Naumburg. In addition, 30 naval officers studied at the Officer’s 
School in Stralsund.220 It should not be overlooked that the GDR also trained students 
of military finance and economics. They should have been employed to build up a 
functioning administration of the armed forces of Mozambique.221 
In 1985, given such decreasing trend regarding the sending of military personnel 
in the GDR, Günter Lorenz directly referred to a Mozambican politician and pointed 
out that Mozambique had clearly fallen below the agreed rates for training in the 
NVA from 1983 on. Mozambique, in response, offered to send over 380 military 
personnel in the GDR over the following years.  
NVA Major General Lorenz explained that the training of officers in the GDR, 
who in turn could train Mozambican soldiers on a larger scale once having returned 
to their home country, was particularly important. Basically, the guiding principle 
was the ‘training of the trainer’ [Ausbildung von der Ausbilder]. This would provide 
a greater breadth, since in this way it was possible to reach a broader number of 
military personnel than with a direct training by NVA officers in Mozambique. The 
training approach was therefore the training of multipliers. Since it was impossible to 
train all Mozambican soldiers in the GDR, the key to the desired success laid in the 
training of the instructors.222 However, for this plan to succeed it was also necessary 
that once the trained officers returned to Mozambique, they would be employed to 
train military personnel there. Lorenz expressed his concern to the Mozambican 
military leadership, as some Mozambicans who had been trained in the NVA until 
1984 had not been employed in the armed forces after their return and had not been 
                                                
220 BStU, MfS, HA II, 29466, P. 2, originally quoted by Storkmann, K., in Geheime Solidarität. 
221 BArch, AZN 8487, Bd 1, P. 152: MfNV, Chef Aufklärung an Chef Hauptstab, 14.10.1983 
222 Storkmann, K., Geheime Solidarität., p. 275 
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appointed officers. The "investment of a four-year training" thus resulted to be "not 
effective".223  
5.2. The stay of Mozambican troopers in the GDR: organisation of the 
training project 
5.2.1. Legal aspects of the stay 
The legal guidelines and organisational provisions for the stay of the soldiers in 
the GDR were regulated by the intergovernmental agreements with great detail. The 
contractual provisions were implemented by the orders of the Minister responsible 
for the training of the Mozambican military cadres, as well as the following orders of 
the chiefs of the armed forces responsible for the training, in whose responsibility the 
training took place. The orders reflected specifically the contractual arrangements.224 
In 1980, general legal and organisational provisions were established with an order 
of the Minister and with following implementing orders of various Deputy Divisions. 
During their stay in the GDR, the Mozambican military personnel were 
subordinated to the commanders of the training institutions, which had disciplinary 
authority towards the trainees. In order to facilitate and support internal organisation 
within the groups of trainees and to secure direct connection between the commander 
of the teaching facility and the military cadres, a senior among the trainees was 
appointed with command authority. It was the Defence Ministry of Mozambique that 
had to name the Nationaliätenältester. The seniors were responsible for tasks such as 
supporting the fulfilment of training goals, maintaining discipline and order, and 
ensuring the connection between the commanders of the teaching institutions and the 
military cadres and vice versa.  
The intergovernmental agreement expressly stipulated that the soldiers were 
subject to the provisions of GDR law. In the event of serious violations of East 
German legislation, the stay permit could be withdrawn and the military trainee had 
to return to Mozambique. Indeed, the agreement provided for the possibility of early 
                                                
223 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/2.039/298, Pp. 292-297: Informationgespräch mit Marcelino dos 
Santos, 18.10.1995, originally quoted by Storkmann, K., in Geheime Solidarität. 
224 Storkmann, K., Geheime Solidarität, .p. 410 
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termination of training. The given reasons were "gross violations of discipline and 
order" [grobe Verstöße gegen die Disziplin und Ordnung] as well as "physical or 
mental unfitness" [körperliche oder geistige Nichteignung], "serious violations of the 
legislation of the GDR" [schwerwiegende Verstöße gegen die Rechtsvorschriften der 
DDR] or it could simply be related to a request coming from the sending country.225  
In general, while on service, the foreign military personnel had to wear the 
uniform of the GDR armed forces with the corresponding NVA military insignias, 
but without the national emblem of the GDR. The soldiers received a one-time 
allowance amounting of 600 Marks for the purchase of civilian clothing and a 
monthly allowance of 200 Marks for officers and 150 Marks for non-commissioned 
officers. 
5.2.2. Prora, the chosen location for the training 
Before starting the actual training of foreign troopers, the NVA had to take 
decisions on the location in which the training would have taken place. The Chief of 
the Politischen Hauptverwaltung, the supreme party organisation within the NVA, 
backed the decision of the Minister of not training foreign military personnel in East 
Berlin. The trainees should therefore not be trained at the Military Political College 
of Berlin-Grünau. As a consequence, the Military Technical School (MTS) in Prora 
seemed to be the ideal solution.226 However, in June 1980, when co-authorizing 
Operation No. 74/80 on the training of Mozambican military cadres in the GDR, the 
Chief of the Land Forces pointed out that the special training course at the MTS 
"Erich Habersaath" Prora had reached full capacity, and training further troopers 
would not have been possible.227 In other words, the sharp increase in the annual 
contingents of foreign military trainees brought the existing training structure of the 
Land Forces to their capacity limits. As a result, in order to "prepare and carry out 
the social science, military, technical and German-language training of foreign 
military cadres in the land forces", the Ministry of Defence of the GDR ordered the 
creation of another officer college in November 1980. The training facility settled in 
                                                
225 Storkmann, K., Geheime Solidarität, p. 412 
226 BArch, DVW 1/61661, p. 113. MfNV, Chef PHV an Hauptinspektor NVA, 9.6.1980, originally 
quoted by Storkmann, K., in Geheime Solidarität. 
227 Ebd., p. 127 
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Prora, on the island of Rügen, was later named after the former Foreign Minister of 
the GDR, Otto Winzer.228 The largest construction investment in the context of this 
programme was the creation of an officers’ college only for foreign military 
personnel.  
The seclusion of the location and the access control possibilities on the island 
were decisive for the location choice, as well as the security of the site and the shield 
against Western observers, since the island of Rügen was foreclosed to Allied 
military forces. 229  In addition, logistical, technical and organisational-practical 
reasons were also decisive for the election of Prora. First of all, the existence of a 
huge architectural complex, the "Colossus of Rügen", which could accommodate 
20,000 guests, the buildings extend over a length of 4.5 kilometres. It was originally 
constructed during the third Reich, but it was never operational. After the onset of 
the Second World War, a diverting of resources stopped construction before the 
resort could be completed. After the formation of the German Democratic Republic's 
National Peoples Army in 1956, the buildings became a restricted military area, 
housing several East German Army units. 230 In addition, in Prora the MTS land 
forces training facility "Erich Habersaath" was already operative, and had been 
training foreign military personnel for years, initially from Vietnam and the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo. Therefore, qualified and trained teaching staff 
was available for new OHS. About the training of the foreign military, the NVS tried 
as little as possible to penetrate the public.  
Secrecy issues played a major role. In particularly sensitive cases, the training 
agreements contained a special clause, according to which the military cadres had to 
keep their nationality or affiliation with their organisations secret from anyone else 
outside the educational establishment.231 As stressed by Major General Geisler in 
1988: "We exist, yet we do not exist. I do not need to explain this concept in detail. 
Issues of secrecy and vigilance had to be respected. The other side [...] was very 
interested in what happened in Prora "232  
                                                
228 Storkmann, K., Geheime Solidarität, p, 419 
229 Ibid., p. 421 
230 See Reinhardt, Dieter, Meine Zeit, ed. By KulturKunststatt Prora, Hüllhorst 2003, p. 2, for detailed 
information on the NVA and Prora. 
231 Storkmann, K., Geheime Solidarität, p. 480. 
232 See Geisler, MGI 1988, P.6 and P. 16. 
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Figure 6: Picture of the Prora’s architechtural complex, taken on May 21, 2011. Source: Klugschnacker, own 
work. 
5.2.3. Military training or ideological education? 
The agreement explicitly stipulated that training should take place only in 
accordance with the military provisions of the NVA and exclusively on their 
weapons and equipment. As a consequence, the training was largely based on the 
contents and standards of NVA officer training, albeit adapted to the trainee groups. 
The need for modification became necessary before the start of training in September 
1981. Both the military and the social sciences training programmes appeared to be 
unusable and were adapted to each group of trainees depending on each situation.233 
For instance, the relatively low education level of the Mozambicans had to be 
balanced with measures aimed to expand and promote mathematical and scientific 
knowledge.234 
The training of the Mozambican troopers was divided into a one-year basic course 
and a multi-year, one to four years, main course. Training language was German. In 
the basic course, counting a total of 1,600 training hours, 180 hours alone were 
dedicated to the teaching of German as a foreign language. Significantly less training 
time was allocated to further education in the fields of mathematics and natural 
                                                
233 Grosche, W., Die geschichtliche Entwicklung der Offizierhochschule „Otto Winzer“ von 1981 bis 
1986, Militärpolitische Hochschule der NVA „Wilhelm Pieck“, Berlin (East), 1988, pp 19-21. 
234 van der Heyden, U.; Schleicher, I.; Schleicher, H. G.,  Engagiert für Afrika: die DDR und Afrika II, 
Lit Verlag, Münster, 1994, p. 21. 
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sciences (160 hours of training), political education (180 hours of training) as well as 
basic military training and sports (90 hours each).235. 
Ideological requirements and rules dominated the whole training process, which 
becomes rather clear after reading the Program for the training of foreign military 
cadres of the GDR Land Forces. The first point reads as follows: 
The trainee officer is convinced of the rightfulness and victoriousness of Marxism-Leninism 
[...], of the legitimacy of the victory of Socialism [...], of the leading role of the working class 
and its Marxist-Leninist party as the political, ideological and organisational leadership 
centre of the society, as the most important source of force and strength of the armed forces, 
of the role of Socialism within the international community, lead by the Soviet Union as the 
main force of the world revolutionary movement, of the historical lack of perspective of 
imperialism and especially its neo-colonialist manifestation [...]. (Kommando 
Landstreitkräfte: Programm für die Heranbildung ausländische Militärkader, published on 
June 9, 1981, translated by the author). 
 Only the last three out of a total of eight points on the Program defined typical 
military demands. In those points soldierly virtues such as courage and bravery were 
rather emphasised. In point seven are set the requirements defining the concrete 
goals of the training in each field of training. Point eight defined that each foreign 
officer would receive close combat training, explosives expert training and driving 
instruction.  
According to the program, the Mozambican troopers had to obtain a qualification 
as trainers and commanders and had to be able to use their knowledge and skills 
creatively basing on the conditions to be found in their home country.236 
Other purposes of the training were politically related; among other things, the 
trainees should have been aware of the correctness of the anti-imperialist and 
socialist orientation and been loyal to the revolutionary party, meaning that they 
should have supported the struggle of their own people in this direction. Strongly 
ideological was also the goal of "strengthening the anti-imperialist attitude and unity 
in the fight against the reactionary, aggressive and neo-colonialist policies of 
                                                
235 BArch, DVH 8-12/47543, pp.16-22: Auskunftbericht Kommandeur OHS “Otto Winzer” zum 
Besuch Botschafter und Militärattaché PLO und JAE, 20.4.1983, originally quoted by Storkmann, 
K., in Geheime Solidarität. 
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imperialism and the readiness and ability to deal with the phenomena of anti-
communism, anti-sovietism, racism, neo-colonialism" among the trainees.237 
5.2.4. Data about the number of Mozambican trainees and the length of 
their stay in the GDR 
In the following table can be found the training directions and periods and 
teaching facilities for the training of 70 officers of the Land Force, 62 officers of the 
Air Force, 22 officers and 40 NCOs of the Navy, 15 officers and 20 NCOs of the 
border troops and 60 political officers from Mozambique. The training period lasted 
four years for officers and two years for non-commissioned officers238.  
 
Military branch and 
training profile 
Trainees Period of time Facility 
  German Course 
Political, military 
and technical 
training 
 
I Officers Land 
Forces 
70    
Rifle units commanders 10 1981/82 1982/85 MTS LaSK Prora 
Armoured units 
commanders 
10 1980/81 1981/84 MTS LaSK Prora 
Message units 10 1982/83 1983/86 MTS LaSK Prora 
Tank service 10 1980/81 1981/84 MTS LaSK Prora 
Motorists 10 1981/82 1982/85 MTS LaSK Prora 
Weapon technical service 10 1981/82 1982/85 MTS LaSK Prora 
Backward services 10 1982/83 1983/86 MTS LaSK Prora 
II Officer School Air 
Forces 
62    
                                                
237 From the 4. Durchführungsanordnung des Stellvertreters des Ministers und Hofs der Politischen 
Hauptverwaltung der NVA zur Anordnung Nr. 049(9/007 des Ministers, shorter version to be found 
in: Grosche, W., Die geschichtliche Entwicklung der Offizierhochschule „Otto Winzer“, p. 49. 
238 Storkmann, K., Geheime Solidarität, p., p. 402. 
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Helicopter pilots and 
aviation engineer service 
8 1980/81 1981/84 OHS LSK/LV239 
(Helicopters) 4 1980/81 1981/84 OHS LSK/LV 
Fighter controllers 5 1980/81 1981/84 OHS LSK/LV 
Aviation Engineer 
Service (Combat 
Aircraft) 
21 1980/81 1981/84 OHS LSK/LV 
Anti-aircraft missile 
troops 
16 1980/81 1981/84 OHS LSK/LV 
Radio-technical troops 8 1980/81 1981/84 OHS LSK/LV 
III.a Officer School 
Naval Forces 
22    
Marine officers  1980/81 1981/84 OHS VM240 
Ship engine officers  1980/81 1981/84 OHS VM 
III.b NCO naval forces 40    
 8 1980/1981 1981/82 OHS VM 
 8 1981/82 1982/83 OHS VM 
 8 1983/84 1984/85 OHS VM 
 8 1984/85 1985/86 OHS VM 
 8 1985/86 1986/87 OHS VM 
IV.a Officer school for 
border troops 
15 1980/81 1981/84 OHS GT241 
IV.b NCO student 
border forces (dog 
handler) 
20 1981/82 1982/83 
US IV of the 
GT242 
V Political Officers 60    
 12 1981/82 1982/85 MTS LaSK243 
 12 1982/83 1983/86 MTS LaSK 
                                                
239 The German training should be carried out at the NCO School VIII of the LSK / LV "Harry Kuhn" 
in Bad Düben. 
240 The German training should also be carried out at the Officers College of the Volksmarine 
241 German language training should be conducted at the Institute for Foreign Language Education 
(IfFA). 
242 The German training should be carried out at the IfFA. 
243 The German training should be carried out at the IfFA. 
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 12 1983/84 1984/87 MTS LaSK 
 12 1984/85 1985/88 MTS LaSK 
 12 1985/86 1986/89 MTS LaSK 
Table 3: Planned training courses and periods as well as teaching facilities for the education of the Mozambicans 
from 1980 to 1989. Source: BArch, DVW 1/61661, pp. 79-100: Befehl Nr. 74/80 des Ministers für Nationale 
Verteidigung über die Ausbildung von Militärkadern für die Volksbefreiungsstreitkräfte Mosambiks in der NVA 
der DDR vom 28.7.1980, originally quoted by Storkmann, K., in Geheime Solidarität. 
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6. Brief reference to the situation of Mozambican migrants 
right after the German reunification  
Within the framework of the analysis carried out in this paper, a brief reference 
should be made regarding the situation of Mozambican migrants after the German 
reunification. Uncertainty and confusion characterized the period immediately 
following the reunification and Mozambican migrants found themselves in a rather 
difficult situation concerning their stay in Germany. Many of them felt forced to 
return to their country. This chapter therefore aims to provide a brief representation 
of such situation, here presented as a conclusive topic.  
Particular attention was paid on contract workers, both because they made up the 
broader number of Mozambican migrants in the GDR, and because they spent longer 
time in East Germany than the other two groups. Moreover, the socialist education 
project of the School of Friendship was due on 1988 and was not renewed; therefore 
the young Mozambicans who arrived in the GDR in 1982 had already gone back to 
their country. On the other hand, military trainees spent from 2 to 4 years in the GDR 
and had not the chance to build a life in the country, as contract workers did. In fact, 
many contract workers had children with German women and men and many of 
them got married with German people. In other words, not only did they learn the 
language and work there, they integrated among the German population. 
6.1. The end of the “socialist aid” period 
As briefly mentioned in chapter 2, the collapse of Eastern Europe in 1989 marked 
the end of socialist aid to the developing world, while the future of people coming 
from Third World countries who were working in the GDR was uncertain due to the 
German reunification. East German interim Ministry for Economic Cooperation was 
disbanded right after the reunification. As a consequence, the aid programme came 
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fully under the jurisdiction of  the FRG’s Ministry of Economic Cooperation. 
Therefore, from  that point onwards, only those projects that were compatible with 
the development principles of the former West Germany were to be continued.  
Intergovernmental treaties between the GDR and other countries posed problems, 
since Federal Germany did not felt responsible for treaties concluded by the GDR. A 
total of 200 cooperation and intergovernmental agreements with 60 developing 
countries had been signed by East Germany up to 1989. In addition, at that time there 
were as well as 72,000 foreign workers in East German factories, among them 
15,500 Mozambicans, the second largest group after the Vietnamese. 244 Undeniably, 
within the reunification context, there was no time for in-depth analyses or plans to 
solve such situations in the most effective and logical way, and many contract 
workers were put in a rather difficult and uncertain position. 
As already mentioned above, the Federal Republic did not feel responsible for the 
contract workers, even if organisations kept pointing out that such issue lied in the 
joint responsibility of both German governments, since the status of Mozambican 
contract workers was comparable to that of guest workers in the former Federal 
Republic. Nonetheless, in autumn 1989, the situation of the Mozambican contract 
workers in the GDR suddenly changed: the German reunification meant the de facto 
the end of the agreements between the GDR and Mozambique. Thus, many East 
German companies could not survive the conversion process from a socialist system 
towards a free-market unified German state. As a consequence, many companies 
were then taken over by West German companies. For foreign contract workers, this 
generally meant dismissal, although their contract was theoretically not terminable 
before its official end. As Almuth Berger, Federal Commissioner for Foreigners of 
the State of Brandenburg, summarized, the fundamental problems that accompanied 
the reunification of Germany were to be found in the fact that "it was clear that this 
type of intergovernmental agreement could no longer function: in a free-market 
country, the government cannot assign any workers to any factory and make them 
work there.”245 
                                                
244 “Rechenschaftsbericht der Länderabteilung”, M.W.Z., Berlin, 2 October 1990, p. 37.   
245 Berger, A., “Schwierige Wendezeit”, in: Mosambik-Rundbrief, Nr. 63, April 2004, p. 22.  
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According to Berger, for the Mozambican contract workers the new situation 
meant that they economically became a "disagreeable cost factor", since the 
employment of the contract workers was a state organized employment, which was 
possible in a state-controlled planned economy but impossible under the conditions 
of the free market economy.246 Therefore, within the reunification context, the 
government of the GDR firstly stopped the planned entry of contract workers. The 
next step was to propose amendments to the intergovernmental agreements with 
Mozambique. The result was a new agreement that was concluded on 28 May 1990 
between the GDR and Mozambique. The agreement was to be valid until 31 
December 1990. As stated by Berger, who took part to the talks in Maputo as 
representative, the negotiations on this point were extremely difficult.247 According 
to the original agreement of 1979, a termination of the contract of employment was 
only possible with the agreement of both contracting parties: 
The premature termination of the employment contract in accordance with subparagraphs b 
and c of this paragraph shall be effected with the agreement of the authorized representatives 
of both parties. (Art 4, Treaty of February 24, 1979, translated by the author) 
While according to the amended agreement of May 28, 1990, this same article reads 
as follows:  
The hiring company of the German Democratic Republic can prematurely terminate the 
agreed employment contract with Mozambican workers upon notification of the partners of 
the agreement if it has compelling reasons or must reduce the production staff for economic 
reasons for the purpose of increasing the efficiency of the production due to the change of the 
production profile or because of the change in the production profile or because of cessation 
of production for reasons of environmental protection. (Art 4, Treaty of May 28, 1990, 
translated by the author) 
The agreement was clearly adapted to the economic needs of the GDR. 
All this resulted in approximately 12,300 Mozambican contract workers leaving 
the GDR within a year from 31.12.1989 to 31.12.1990.248  
                                                
246 Berger, A., quoted in: Döring, H.; Rüchel, U., Freundschaftsbande und Beziehungskisten, p. 123. 
247 Ibid. 
248 See Marburger, H., „Und wir haben unseren Beitrag zur Volkswirtschaft geleistet“ – Eine aktuelle 
Bestandsaufnahme der Situation der Vertragsarbeitnehmer der ehemaligen DDR vor und nach der 
Wende. Verlag für interkulturelle Kommunikation, Frankfurt/Main, 1993.  
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6.2. A compulsory choice for Mozambican contract workers 
After the German reunification, the status of contract workers was not clear and 
there were hardly any information about their stay permit. In fact, after months of 
silence, Federal Germany, as reported by von Lucius in the Frankfurter Allgemeine, 
mentioned that no one would be expelled against his will. However, in the meantime, 
the silence had created great uncertainty among foreign workers. 249 
However, as reported by von Lucius, contract workers were actually given three 
options by Federal Germany. They could either return home, apply for a continuance 
of employment until the termination of the standing labour agreements (most ending 
in 1994, at the latest) if they weren’t already been dismissed by the company, or 
obtain an individual work permit, that would be valid as long as the contract workers 
could prove they had both a job and a residence. 
Therefore, in theory, it was possible to stay in Germany, however, in practice, the 
conditions were not so easy to comply with. The Mozambicans who were dismissed 
by East German companies were even entitled to unemployment benefits, support, a 
work permit or a business license, and they could rent somewhere.250 These rights 
were rather difficult to claim, due the vicious cycle of "no home without work and no 
work without home". Mozambican people in East Germany, by virtue of being 
employed as contract workers, were accommodated in dorms; after their contract of 
employment was terminated, Mozambican former contract workers had to personally 
find other accommodations, which was not so easy, since many of them couldn’t find 
a new job. 
In this regard, there were also hardly any consulting options for the contract 
workers.251 There was little information on how contract workers would be treated in 
the future, what rights, duties and opportunities they would have.  
Moreover, many authors reported that right-wing extremism and xenophobia 
exploded against foreign working people right after the German reunification. After 
                                                
249 von Lucius, R., “Nostalgie trotz unerfüllter Versprechen”, in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
August 30, 1994. 
250 Reimer, J., “Interview mit der Ausländerbeauftragten des Landes Brandenburg, Almuth Berger: 
Schwierige Wendezeit.” In: Mosambik-Rundbrief, Nr. 63, April 2004, pp. 22-23.  
251 See Ahrens, E., “Im Osten was Neues. Mosambikanische Vertragsarbeiter/innen in der DDR zur 
Zeit der Wende”, in: Mosambik-Rundbrief, Nr. 73, September 2007, pp. 22-23. 
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“The Turnaround”, a widespread fear towards the future and unemployment spread 
especially among East German population, who felt as second-class citizens, 
compared to the West German ones. Several East German companies had to operate 
mass layoffs for economic reasons. Added to this was the feeling of not being 
employed and lack of prospects. In Berger’s opinion, such circumstances led to 
xenophobia and open racism in part of German society. 
Cost-of-living and rent increases after the currency reform, dismissal, xenophobic 
pressure and a lack of information therefore led approximately 2.000 Mozambicans 
to choose premature return. 252 The contract workers were entitled to a severance 
payment of DM 3,000 if they chose to leave, plus two full months’ salary. They were 
also offered help with transporting possessions and paid free flight. Sums that 
companies would have to pay under governmental agreements. However, there were 
some cases of embezzlement on the side of the companies, which paid either none or 
only part of the money. Not to mention the fact that several East German companies 
went into default because of the conversion towards free-market and were not able to 
pay any due money to contract workers.253  
Eventually, of the 15,100 Mozambican who were registered in East Germany in 
1989, only 2,800 Mozambicans were left by the end of 1990254 while by the end of 
June 1991, the number of former contract workers from Mozambique in the new 
federal states and Berlin had fallen to just under 1,000.255 
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253 See Unknown, “Lächeln zum Abflug”, in: Der Spiegel, Nr. 41, 1990, p. 77.   
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Conclusions 
Starting from a detailed reconstruction of the bilateral relations between GDR and 
Mozambique and by systematically analysing the rationale behind the migratory 
projects that were agreed between the two states, it was possible to obtain a full 
picture of the migration of Mozambicans into the GDR. This work took into 
consideration the ‘causes’ upstream of such migratory phenomenon, in order to 
better document the phenomenon itself, contributing to provide a description in 
which the cause-effect relationships of what has occurred are never ignored, also by 
taking into account the results expected by the two countries. Contract workers, 
students and troopers have indeed had the opportunity to spend a period of their lives 
in East Germany by virtue of bilateral treaties, as has been amply discussed 
throughout this research. This migration represented a particular movement in a 
country where East German citizens would rather emigrate. It is evident that the 
migration of Mozambicans into the GDR was a particular exception to the current 
system in the GDR. Such migration, however, could only take place thanks to the 
relatively close intergovernmental relations between Mozambique and the GDR. 
Over the period 1975-1989, the two countries cooperated intensively on many fields, 
in particular on the exchange of knowledge and expertise, which were aimed at long-
term economic cooperation. This latter, nonetheless, could not take place due to two 
main factors. The civil war in Mozambique, on the one hand, resulted in the 
destruction of a nation already impoverished by the long colonial rule. The 
dissolution of the Soviet Bloc and the collapse of the GDR on the other hand marked 
the end of the aid policy carried out during the Cold War. As a consequence, joint 
cooperation projects between the two nations were then dismissed. Those who have 
been most affected by these happenings were and still are the Mozambican returnees.  
It proved to be very complicated to allow the approximately 16,000 former 
contract workers to integrate back into Mozambique. High unemployment due to the 
civil war made it almost impossible to integrate the many former contract workers 
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into working life. Most of them had received the compensation of 3,000 DM, but in 
order to survive, many former contract workers spent this compensation quickly, 
since they had no other source of income. Furthermore, contract workers could have 
their belongings shipped with containers: clothes, furniture and household 
appliances. The latter were rather useless, since in some areas there was still no 
electricity. The returnees eventually parted with their newly acquired goods from 
abroad in order to survive. Returnees found themselves catapulted into conflict 
economies that were not able to provide employment and facing governments that no 
longer had the ability to provide them with appropriate jobs, for which they received 
training in the GDR. Moreover, towards the end of the 1980s, it was clear that skilled 
workers were no longer needed in Mozambique, at least in the foreseeable future. 
The Mozambican government kept attaching great importance to sending young 
people to toe GDR, since the country became increasingly insecure, as it was 
unsettled by a series of raids by the insurgent group RENAMO. As a result, at that 
specific moment the best option for young Mozambicans was to go to migrate in the 
GDR as contract workers. 	
Once returned to their country, the former contract workers were, socially 
speaking, marginalised by the ones who couldn’t or didn’t want to leave. The 
returnees were called Madgermanes, a compound word made up by the English 
“German” and Bantu-prefix “ma”, and literally translates to “the Germans”. 
The contract workers in the GDR had also the opportunity to transfer part of their 
net pay to Mozambique, which they were to receive back after their return. From 
1979 to 1985 one could transfer up to 25% of the wage to Mozambique according to 
the 1st Additional Protocol. With the 2nd Additional Protocol of 1986 this clause 
was amended, it was then made obligatory to transfer 60% of their wages to 
Mozambique. The purpose of this measure was that the contract workers could use 
this money once they returned to Mozambique to start a new life there. However, 
according to some authors, like Oppenheimer and Döring, this money - or part of it - 
was used to reduce Mozambique's debts towards the GDR. In fact, such founds were 
paid only sporadically and sometimes chaotically to the former contract workers by 
the Mozambican government. Pacific protests are still taking place in Maputo, where 
the ‘headquarters’ of the Madgermanes can be found. They are fighting to receive 
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parts of their salaries, as well as their social insurance contributions. The total 
amount still owned to the Madgermanes is still unclear. However, according to the 
Federal Foreign Office, East Germany transferred a total of 74.4 million US dollars 
in wage deductions and 18.6 million US dollars in social insurance payments to the 
Mozambican government. This totals 93 million dollars. On average, they would be 
4,300 dollars for each worker.256 
After their return to Mozambique, the students of the School of Friendship project 
were sent straight to the army in order to complete compulsory military service, since 
in 1988 the civil war between FRELIMO and RENAMO was still going on. As a 
result of the prolonged war, by the time the School of Friendship youth were 
demobilised, Mozambique had become one of the world’s most impoverished 
countries offering few opportunities for formal employment257. The students thought 
they would have gone back to their provinces and started working there. However, 
when they got back to Mozambique, most of them could not return to their 
provinces because the civil war that affected certain rural areas. Since they had 
to undertake military training, they were separated from their friends. Such 
state of affairs began to change slowly only after the 1992 peace accord. Then, 
qualified personnel was needed for the process of reconstruction, but there were 
scant opportunities for the former students of the School of Friendship, as they had 
acquired technical skills which were at best useful for industries that no longer 
existed in the country, since the major joint industrial projects had been dismissed, 
both due to the political and economic situation and to the German reunification. 
Furthermore, their certificates, that according to the original agreement should have 
been equal to the completion of secondary school after grade 12 in Mozambique, 
were recognised as completion of grade 10 only. This denied the School of 
Friendship graduates to access further education in Mozambique. One can argue that 
such training program had a crucial weakness; the long-term goal was to educate and 
train personnel who would obtain a degree and know how but, in fact, the 
devastation of the civil war prevented the implementation of contractually regulated 
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economic projects and the implementation of the plans to build a high-performance 
industry in Mozambique, for which educated personnel was needed. 
In addition, some graduates did only conserve a passive knowledge of their 
language of origin, Portuguese, although the young Mozambican had kept in contact 
with relatives back home via letters during their stay in the GDR. 
The post 1992 reconstruction process, which was mainly financed by foreign aid 
and based on structural adjustment programmes, free market and democratisation, 
resulted in the monopolization of political and economic power in the hands of a 
small elite.258  
Eventually, there was a discrepancy between the socialist code of conduct that the 
Mozambican migrants were taught during their stay in the GDR and the Mozambican 
reality characterised by corruption and devoid of concern for the common good. This 
reinforced a distinct group identity among the returnees. Forgotten by their 
government, they took and are still taking part to an active political engagement, as 
the case of the protest of Madgermanes for their ‘socialist’ payday. Solidarity in the 
private realm between returnees also flourished. In addition, meetings are held on a 
regular basis among returnees, and thank to mobile phones they still keep in touch 
after many years.259  
One could then argue that the long-term results of such cooperation were not 
successful, especially for the returnees, who were promised a brilliant future and a 
decisive role in the development of their country. Two nations with different needs 
and interests, and a project of solid economic and scientific-technical cooperation 
that faded away, mainly because of the civil war in Mozambique and the German 
reunification. It left returnees, who should have been the players through which such 
cooperation was to be realised, with unfulfilled promises. Clearly, the two states 
couldn’t have possibly foreseen what would happen in the future; however, it is quite 
self-evident that all the efforts taken – both by the two states and by the migrants – 
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were quite ineffective. From the second half of 1980’s on, it was clear that it could 
be no longer possible to build an industrial economy in Mozambique due to the civil 
war and the destabilising activities of RENAMO, yet, at that moment, for more than 
21,000 people was still better to migrate to the GDR rather that staying in a country 
in which there were no possibilities. 
Today, this large-scale migration of Mozambican migrants to East Germany is a 
faint memory of a bygone era: both The German Democratic Republic and the 
People’s Republics of Mozambique ceased to exist. Yet legacies of this migration 
keep on influencing the present day lives of thousands of Mozambicans, who now 
are Madgermanes and whose government apparently forgot about their existence. 
 
 
Figure 7: demostration of the Madgermanes in Maputo. Source: Joan Bardeletti, own work. 
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Summary – Riassunto esteso in lingua italiana 
I. La politica estera della Repubblica Democratica tedesca nei confronti del 
continente africano e del Mozambico  
Fin dai primi tempi dopo la sua costituzione, la Repubblica Democratica Tedesca 
si impegnò in una politica di ricerca di una propria legittimazione come stato 
indipendente e sovrano tramite il riconoscimento da parte di altri stati. Allo stesso 
tempo, la RDT rappresentava il tramite d’eccellenza tra l’Europa e l’Unione 
Sovietica, che mirava ad espandere la propria influenza. La Germania Est era uno dei 
più fedeli ed attivi alleati dell'Unione Sovietica, pertanto le fu concessa una certa 
libertà di manovra nella sua politica estera, specialmente per quanto riguardava la 
sua Afrikapolitik. La politica estera della Germania Est nei confronti degli Stati 
dell’Africa merita quindi di essere sottoposta ad una seria analisi, proprio perché essa 
agì in modo relativamente indipendente dall'URSS. Di recente, come teorizzato dagli 
storici, la RDT non rappresentava uno stato fantoccio o una mera appendice delle 
attività sovietiche nel continente, come era ritenuto fino a quel momento. Il suo ruolo 
è stato piuttosto quello di agire come un “affiliato” dell’Unione Sovietica. Dal punto 
di vista storiografico, la RDT seguì consapevolmente un percorso di “affiliazione”, 
anzitutto appoggiando le scelte dell’URSS, finendo con l’essere considerata come un 
utile ed efficiente alleato. Ne conseguì la libertà di manovra nella politica estera, 
soprattutto in Africa. 260  
Gli interessi perseguiti in Africa dalla Germania Est, secondo la storiografia, 
furono principalmente due. Innanzitutto, durante gli anni ’60 la RDT mirava ad 
ottenere il riconoscimento da parte degli Stati africani. In seguito, il continente 
africano venne coinvolto negli scontri ideologici e le conseguenti tensioni della 
Guerra Fredda. Perciò, a partire dagli anni ’70 l’obiettivo della Germania Est divenne 
quello di diffondere idee e principi socialisti per poter espandere l’influenza del 
Blocco Sovietico. In particolare, da un lato la essa appoggiò i movimenti 
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anticoloniali di paesi come l’Angola e Mozambico. 261 Dall’altro lato, si oppose 
fortemente all’operato della Germania Ovest, apostrofata più volte come neo-
colonialista. Molti autori continuano tuttavia a sottolineare che, in realtà, la politica 
di aiuti perseguita dalla RDT era piuttosto simile a quelle delle controparti 
capitaliste, enfatizzando come l'interesse economico abbia giocato un ruolo vitale 
nello sviluppo di tale programma di aiuti. Gli autori sono generalmente convinti che 
la RDT, come i paesi capitalisti occidentali, mirasse ad ottenere forniture di materie 
prime per favorire la propria industria, promuovendo al tempo stesso un mercato per 
i suoi prodotti, rappresentato dai paesi del Terzo Mondo. 
Nel frattempo, nel Mozambico di inizio anni ’70 imperversava ancora la 
guerriglia contro il potere coloniale del Portogallo, portata avanti dal movimento di 
liberazione nazionale FRELIMO, di orientamento Marxista-Leninista. Per tale 
ragione, i paesi del Comecon e in particolare la RDT supportarono la campagna 
finalizzata all’indipendenza, con l’obiettivo di poter supportare il movimento nella 
costruzione di un futuro Stato socialista. Dopo aver ottenuto l’indipendenza nel 
giugno del 1975, FRELIMO cessò di essere un movimento di liberazione nazionale 
convertendosi in un partito di governo. Tuttavia, quest’ultimo prese in mano le redini 
di un paese che versava in una situazione economica e finanziaria a dir poco 
disastrosa. Il mercato lavorativo era inoltre saturo, mentre invece vi era una grave 
mancanza di personale specializzato e con particolari expertise. Elementi che, come 
si vedrà, costituiranno una delle basi per la cooperazione tra Mozambico e RDT.  
La Repubblica Democratica Tedesca fu infatti il primo stato a stringere accordi 
con il movimento FRELIMO prima che il paese ottenesse l’indipendenza.  
 
II. Relazioni bilaterali tra la RDT e il Mozambico (1975-1990) 
Dopo che il Mozambico ottenne l’indipendenza e FRELIMO passò alla guida del 
paese, le relazioni tra i due Stati divennero più intense. Innanzitutto, il 25 giugno 
1975, data dell’indipendenza, la RDT procedette con il riconoscimento della 
Repubblica popolare del Mozambico, che fece altrettanto. 262  Le relazioni 
diplomatiche ebbero quindi ufficialmente inizio. Benché il FRELIMO avesse 
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programmato complesse misure di cooperazione, la RDT prese impegni vincolanti 
solamente dopo aver accuratamente valutato la situazione. I progetti di cooperazione 
ricevettero maggior impulso dopo che la situazione economica della Germania Est 
peggiorò a partire dalla seconda metà degli anni ’70, e i progetti con il Mozambico 
vennero considerati una soluzione al problema economico. 263 Di conseguenza, nel 
periodo 1975-1978 vennero conclusi numerosi trattati concernenti vari ambiti: 
cooperazione tecnico-scientifica, cooperazione nel settore ittico, avvio di progetti 
congiunti riguardanti l’estrazione di materie prime, l’avvio di industrie in 
Mozambico e trattati commerciali. Nel 1978 fu inoltre fondato il 
Wirtschaftssauschuss (un comitato economico congiunto) con lo scopo di coordinare 
la cooperazione tra i due paesi e di valutarne i risultati. La svolta nei rapporti 
bilaterali giunse con il Trattato di Amicizia e Cooperazione, firmato il 24 febbraio 
del 1979, concluso in occasione del primo viaggio in Africa di Honecker, che segnò 
l’apice del successo del coinvolgimento della Germania dell'Est. 264  Il trattato 
promuoveva la cooperazione in numerosi settori quali scienza e tecnologia, politica e 
cultura. Particolarmente enfatizzate furono le relazioni economiche, la cooperazione 
industriale e commerciale, la cooperazione nel settore delle telecomunicazioni e la 
formazione dei lavoratori mozambicani. Inoltre, nell'articolo 2 si stabiliva che i 
rapporti economici dovevano essere realizzati sulla base di vantaggi e di interessi 
reciproci.  
Nella prima metà degli anni '80 numerose visite ufficiali ebbero luogo; nel 
quotidiano Neues Deutschland l'atmosfera amichevole e collaborativa tra i 
rappresentanti dei due paesi veniva sempre enfatizzata. 
Nella seconda metà degli anni '80, la cooperazione su alcuni progetti, tra cui erano 
la fabbrica tessile di Mocuba e la rete ferroviaria di Moatize, dovettero essere fermati 
a causa dei numerosi attacchi alle infrastrutture da parte del RENAMO, movimento 
reazionario contrario al FRELIMO, e del conseguente peggioramento delle 
condizioni economiche. Alcuni tecnici inviati dalla RDT furono inoltre presi di mira 
dai militanti del RENAMO ed ebbero luogo alcuni incidenti.  
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Negli anni successivi, ossia nel biennio 1989-1990, il crollo della RDT e la 
riunificazione tedesca comportarono la fine della politica di aiuti e cooperazione nei 
confronti dei paesi del Terzo Mondo. Il Ministero per la Cooperazione Economica 
della Repubblica Democratica fu sciolto subito dopo la riunificazione e il programma 
di aiuti passò sotto la giurisdizione del Ministero della Cooperazione Economica 
della Repubblica Federale Tedesca. Da allora in avanti furono perseguiti solo i 
progetti conformi e compatibili con i principi di sviluppo della Repubblica Federale 
Tedesca. 
 
III. Lavoratori mozambicani in Germania Est 
Come già accennato, nel febbraio 1979 fu concluso il Trattato di Amicizia e 
Cooperazione tra Mozambico e Germania Est. Lo stesso giorno i due Stati 
conclusero un altro trattato, sulla base del quale un determinato numero di 
mozambicani sarebbe potuto emigrare in RDT in qualità di Vertragsarbeiter, 
lavoratori a contratto. Tale programma veniva considerato un’eccezione nell’ambito 
di un paese da cui la popolazione preferiva piuttosto emigrare. Alla base dell’accordo 
vi furono numerose motivazioni. Un progetto del genere poteva essere in grado, da 
un lato, di alleggerire il Mozambico dal surplus di forza lavoro, dall’altro di fornire 
forza lavoro ad un paese, come la RDT, che invece non ne aveva a sufficienza. 
Durante il periodo coloniale, i giovani mozambicani erano soliti emigrare per 
lavorare nelle miniere del Sud Africa, nelle piantagioni e nelle imprese industriali 
degli Stati dell'apartheid. Quando il Mozambico divenne indipendente nel 1975, i 
flussi migratori verso i suddetti paesi diminuirono drasticamente. Quindi, il mercato 
del lavoro mozambicano ebbe improvvisamente un surplus di forza lavoro. Pertanto, 
l'accordo intergovernativo con la RDT avrebbe alleggerito il mercato dal costante 
aumento della disoccupazione. Al contrario, la RDT stava subendo una perdita di 
forza lavoro: milioni di cittadini emigravano in Germania Ovest, anche 10 anni dopo 
la costruzione del Muro di Berlino. 265 Gli effetti a lungo termine dell'esodo di massa, 
insieme a tassi di natalità piuttosto bassi, lasciarono la Germania dell'Est con una 
carenza di manodopera.  
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"Arbeit und Ausbildung", lavoro e formazione, era il motto del programma, 
concordato da entrambe le parti. L'obiettivo a lungo termine era quello di educare e 
formare lavoratori che avrebbero così ottenuto qualifiche e know-how. I lavoratori a 
contratto avrebbero quindi dovuto assumere il controllo della produzione nel giovane 
paese nel sud-est dell'Africa, sia nelle miniere, nell'industria tessile o in altre aree, 
per combattere il sottosviluppo e la povertà.  
Sono stati identificati due distinti stadi nell’impiego dei lavoratori a contratto dal 
Mozambico. Il primo va dal 1979 al 1985. Durante questi anni, i lavoratori che 
furono inviati in RDT furono accuratamente selezionati da tutto il paese. La loro 
formazione in RDT era ben organizzata e sarebbe dovuta durare dai tre ai quattro 
anni. Successivamente, nel periodo tra il 1985 e il 1989, il Mozambico continuò ad 
inviare un numero crescente di forza lavoro. Quindi, anche i lavoratori con qualifiche 
inferiori furono accettati. A causa della situazione economica sempre più difficile 
nella RDT, l'attuazione degli accordi era più orientata alle esigenze economiche, 
mentre il Mozambico mirava ad alleggerire il proprio mercato del lavoro. Non va 
inoltre dimenticato che la guerra civile provocò sempre più insicurezza in 
Mozambico, pertanto molti mozambicani ritennero che l’opzione migliore era quella 
di emigrare, seppur temporaneamente, in Germania Est, approfittando del progetto.  
I lavoratori a contratto furono selezionati da tutte le province del Mozambico. 
Dovevano essere di età compresa tra i 18 e i 25 anni. Prima di essere considerati 
idonei, i lavoratori erano sottoposti ad un esame medico che ne dimostrasse la  buona 
salute e l’idoneità al lavoro. Infine, era richiesto almeno un livello di istruzione 
primaria corrispondente alla quarta elementare. Al loro arrivo, gli fu fornito un 
permesso di soggiorno temporaneo. Infatti, con la partenza dalla RDT, il permesso di 
soggiorno rilasciato sarebbe scaduto. Una volta arrivati in Germania Est, i 
Vertragsarbeiter erano tenuti a seguire un corso di lingua tedesca durante l’orario di 
lavoro, per il quale era garantito un permesso pagato. 266 Al 20 percento dei lavoratori 
che presentavano i migliori requisiti relativamente alle prestazioni e qualifiche venne 
concessa una proroga di un anno del permesso di soggiorno, e in seguito poteva 
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essere concessa una proroga per un massimo di cinque anni. Con un successivo 
emendamento, la durata del soggiorno fu estesa a un massimo di dieci anni. 267 
Gli aspetti organizzativi alla base del progetto erano vari, ma piuttosto 
interessanti. Ad esempio, il Ministero del Lavoro della RDT coordinava sia quanti 
lavoratori avrebbero dovuto lavorare in quale azienda, sia in quale periodo avrebbero 
dovuto essere impiegati. Persino la compagnia aerea con cui i lavoratori a contratto 
sarebbero dovuti essere trasportati veniva designata dal Ministero. Al fine di 
assicurare che lo svolgimento del progetto rispettasse quanto disposto dal trattato, lo 
Staatssekretariat für Arbeit und Löhne, la più alta autorità statale della RDT per il 
lavoro, aveva il compito di verificare la conformità dell’impiego con il trattato, 
tramite dei sopralluoghi nelle aziende in cui i lavoratori a contratto erano impiegati. 
Molti autori hanno sostenuto che in realtà i lavoratori mozambicani furono 
sfruttati dalle aziende della Germania Est in quanto gli furono affidate mansioni 
semplici che i cittadini tedeschi non volevano svolgere. Ciò era vero all'inizio 
dell'occupazione, poiché  il lavoro qualificato richiedeva delle qualifiche. Dopo aver 
fatto alcune esperienze e aumentato le loro conoscenze teoriche e pratiche, ai 
lavoratori a contratto vennero affidati incarichi che richiedevano una qualifica. 268  
Il sistema di pagamento dei lavoratori fu un aspetto rilevante del programma e, 
pertanto, non dovrebbe essere omesso. I lavoratori a contratto ricevevano salari e 
bonus in conformità con le disposizioni della legislazione sul lavoro della RDT. 
All'inizio, a discrezione del lavoratore, fino al 25 percento del salario poteva essere 
trasferito in Mozambico. Tuttavia, dal 1986 in poi, i lavoratori si trovarono obbligati 
a trasferire il 60 percento delle loro retribuzioni mensili nette superiori a 350 Marchi 
in Mozambico. Secondo molti autori, questi fondi servirono ad adeguare gli attuali 
obblighi di pagamento del debito che il Mozambico aveva nei confronti della RDT.269  
Per quanto riguarda l'impiego di lavoratori a contratto, esso rimase stabile fino 
alla fine degli anni '80. Nel 1987 si registrò il numero più elevato con l'entrata di 
3.203 lavoratori mozambicani; questo numero raddoppiò nel 1988 con l'entrata di 
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6.464 lavoratori.270 Tale situazione portò inevitabilmente ad un maggiore sforzo di 
controllo da parte delle autorità competenti, che non fu tuttavia sufficiente a 
controllare la totalità di oltre 200 imprese in cui lavoravano migliaia di 
Mozambicani. In alcuni casi le autorità si resero conto troppo tardi che in alcune 
aziende l'occupazione non era conforme alle condizioni dell'accordo. Alla fine del 
1988, 18.886 lavoratori mozambicani erano impiegati in ben 245 imprese industriali, 
edili e agricole della Germania Est. Nel febbraio 1989, 14.675 lavoratori del 
Mozambico erano impiegati in 220 società.271 
Secondo una valutazione congiunta redatta nel febbraio 1989, due terzi dei 
lavoratori, dopo il loro incarico quadriennale, furono in grado di ottenere delle 
qualifiche come lavoratori specializzati mentre un terzo di loro ricevette degli 
attestati per aver ottenuto competenze e specializzazioni. 272 
La maggior parte dei lavoratori a contratto del Mozambico ebbe la possibilità di 
acquisire know-how, ottennero qualifiche durante il soggiorno. I mozambicani 
furono pagati e trattati allo stesso modo delle loro controparti tedesche, ovviamente 
considerando anche la percentuale della loro retribuzione trasferita in Mozambico. 
Ciò è stato confermato da molte interviste con gli ex Vertragsarbeiter. Poiché le 
esperienze personali sono piuttosto soggettive, non si può sostenere che tutti i 
lavoratori a contratto siano stati trattati allo stesso modo, ma le interviste prese in 
considerazione nell’elaborato confutano quanto sostenuto da alcuni autori, ossia che i 
lavoratori furono sfruttati e che furono oggetto di trattamenti degradanti e razzisti. 
 
IV. Giovani studenti mozambicani in Germania Est: l’esperimento della 
“Schule der Freundschaft” 
La cooperazione tra Mozambico e RDT non si realizzò solamente in campo 
lavorativo, ma anche in quello dell’istruzione, che rappresentava uno dei capisaldi 
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della politica di aiuti della RDT nei confronti dei paesi in via di sviluppo. In tale 
ambito, venne ideato uno dei progetti educativi considerato tra i più ambiziosi mai 
realizzati: la Schule der Freundschaft, letteralmente “scuola dell’amicizia”, il cui 
obiettivo era quello di educare giovani studenti mozambicani nella città di Staßfurt. 
Tra gli stati del Comecon, la RDT era considerata lo stato socialista con il miglior 
sistema di istruzione, reputato uno tra i più avanzati; questo lo rese quindi il paese 
ideale per "istruire una futura élite socialista".273 Dopo che nel 1979 fu firmato il 
Trattato di Amicizia e Cooperazione tra la RDT e la Repubblica popolare del 
Mozambico, il FRELIMO iniziò a guardare alla RDT per ricevere ulteriore sostegno 
nella creazione di un sistema educativo basato sui valori socialisti e che enfatizzasse 
una relazione simbiotica tra studio accademico, pratica e la sua applicazione 
produttiva. 274 
Nell'ottobre del 1981, i due paesi firmarono un accordo per istituire la Schule der 
Freundschaft. Come previsto dell'accordo, tra il 1982 e il 1988 un totale di 899 
bambini mozambicani completò sei anni di scuola secondaria e di formazione 
professionale presso la scuola. Sia il Mozambico che la Germania dell'Est ebbero 
interesse nella realizzazione di questo esperimento educativo. La logica alla base 
della creazione della scuola era duplice, combinando obiettivi economici e 
ideologici. Si intendeva formare una élite di professionisti che avrebbero assunto 
posizioni cruciali nel futuro sviluppo del Mozambico come stato socialista ed 
industrializzato. Allo stesso tempo, gli studenti furono istruiti col fine di poter essere 
inseriti in nuove joint-venture tra la RDT e il Mozambico.275 Dal punto di vista del 
Mozambico, il principale obiettivo educativo era la creazione di un homen novo. Il 
termine era un concetto pedagogico originariamente formulato nella RDT. Si riferiva 
alla personalità socialista universalmente sviluppata, che alla fine divenne centrale 
nei progetti educativi del Mozambico. L’homen novo era rappresentato come una 
persona il cui background sociale e culturale non interferiva nello sviluppo e la 
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formazione delle sua personalità, un concetto ideale per un giovane stato multietnico 
come il Mozambico, dove la necessità di una nuova e unificante immagine di 
cittadino avrebbe potuto forse porre fine alla guerra civile e favorire la creazione di 
uno stato solido. 
Per realizzare questo obiettivo, vennero reclutati bambini provenienti da tutto il 
paese, comprese le aree rurali. 900 candidati furono originariamente selezionati, sulla 
base di una rappresentanza equa di ogni provincia, con particolare preferenza per i 
figli di lavoratori, contadini e rivoluzionari. I criteri di selezione erano la vicinanza 
politica delle famiglie degli studenti al FRELIMO, il rendimento scolastico, 
disciplina a scuola, comportamento sociale, stato di salute, ed età. Idealmente, i 
bambini avrebbero dovuto avere tra i 12 ei 14 anni. 276 Quando arrivarono a Staßfurt, 
i giovani mozambicani avrebbero dovuto avere tra i dieci ed i dodici anni; in realtà, 
avevano tra i nove ei sedici anni.277 Per gli studenti stessi, una ragione personale per 
candidarsi era la prospettiva di una carriera professionale e la speranza di un 
conseguente progresso sociale ed economico del Mozambico. Naturalmente, un 
ruolo importante era giocato dalla possibilità di evitare i pericoli posti dalla guerra 
civile. 278 Gli studenti selezionati, dopo quattro anni di scolarizzazione e due anni di 
formazione professionale, avrebbero ottenuto il diploma. Le professioni in cui i 
giovani mozambicani si sarebbero qualificati corrispondevano a quelle necessarie per 
il funzionamento delle joint-venture pianificate tra la Germania dell'Est e il 
Mozambico. Gli apprendistati erano quindi incentrati sull'industria della lavorazione 
dei metalli, sulla costruzione e l’edilizia, sull'ingegneria elettrica e sulle tecnologie 
agricole. 279 
Una volta arrivati a Staßfurt, gli 899 bambini furono divisi in 30 gruppi e furono 
sottoposti a corso intensivo di lingua, poiché il tedesco sarebbe stato il mezzo 
principale della loro istruzione. La maggior parte del corpo docenti era costituita da 
insegnanti tedeschi, ma furono coinvolti anche insegnanti mozambicani che 
avrebbero insegnato materie come la lingua portoghese. Anche gli insegnanti 
emigrarono quindi in RDT. Nei primi quattro anni di scuola e soggiorno a Staßfurt, 
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le vite dei giovani mozambicani erano rigorosamente regolamentate sotto ogni 
aspetto. La maggior parte del tempo libero era occupato da attività comuni incentrate 
sullo spirito socialista e comunitario. Al contrario, quando la formazione 
professionale iniziò nel 1986, tale situazione cambiò radicalmente. I tirocini non si 
sono svolti a Staßfurt, ma in altre città della Germania dell'Est. Questo spesso 
comportava frequenti viaggi, poiché a volte accadeva che i giovani mozambicani 
seguissero i loro apprendistati in diverse città durante la settimana lavorativa. 
Sebbene la vita degli studenti fosse organizzata in ogni aspetto, emersero 
problemi disciplinari. Ciò ha comportato il ritorno di numerosi studenti in 
Mozambico durante i loro quattro anni di istruzione generale. In termini concreti, 
circa 30 giovani sono stati segnalati in relazione ad atti considerati di grave 
delinquenza, ma solo alcuni di loro sono stati rimandati in Mozambico 
anticipatamente. Tra questi, 28 ragazze furono rimpatriate a causa della 
gravidanza.280 Al fine di controllare meglio il comportamento deviante, specialmente 
durante il tempo trascorso in dormitori o nel tempo libero, la Stasi, il servizio segreto 
della Germania dell'Est, in collaborazione con il rappresentante FRELIMO della 
Schule der Freundschaft, reclutarono alcuni studenti della scuola per riportare 
eventuali violazioni. 
In conclusione, l'obiettivo educativo può formalmente definirsi un successo: la 
maggioranza degli studenti, in tutto 839, completò con successo istruzione e 
apprendistato, mentre solo undici studenti non superarono l'esame per il diploma. 281 
Sul totale di 899 studenti, tre erano deceduti e 46 furono rimandati in Mozambico per 
una serie di motivi, la maggior parte dei quali disciplinari. 282 Tuttavia, in pratica, 
dopo il ritorno in Mozambico,  le esperienze degli ex studenti non furono positive. Il 
brillante futuro che era stato loro promesso non poteva più esistere, vista la 
situazione in cui versava il paese.  
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V. Addestramento militare dei soldati mozambicani in Germania Est 
L’ultimo gruppo di migranti mozambicani preso in considerazione è quello dei 
soldati che furono addestrati in RDT. Non si tratta di un movimento migratorio vero 
e proprio, tuttavia i soldati trascorsero dai 2 ai 4 anni in Germania Est ed erano 
relativamente numerosi, pertanto hanno costituito un fenomeno piuttosto 
interessante. Anzitutto poiché, come già noto, la Germania Est non era specializzata 
nel fornire armi e strumenti militari, ma nell’addestramento di soldati. Una divisione 
interna dei compiti del trattato di Varsavia prevedeva che l'Unione Sovietica, la 
Repubblica Cecoslovacca e la Polonia dovessero occuparsi delle consegne di armi, 
mentre la RDT aveva il compito di fornire consulenza e formazione in campo 
militare. 283  
Dopo una lunga negoziazione, su richiesta di Machel, nell'aprile e maggio 1975, 
250 membri del FRELIMO furono addestrati negli "organi armati" della RDT: 110 
nella Stasi (il servizio di Sicurezza dello Stato), 90 nella polizia federale e 50 nelle 
truppe di frontiera. 284 
Con la conclusione del Trattato di Amicizia e Cooperazione del 24 febbraio 1979, 
la cooperazione militare tra la RDT e il Mozambico fu portata su un nuovo livello. 
Conformemente a quanto disposto dall'articolo 5 del trattato285, un protocollo di 
cooperazione militare fu concordato nel maggio 1979 durante la visita del Ministro 
della Difesa Nazionale del Mozambico, Armando Emilio Guebuza, a Berlino Est. Un 
accordo sulla formazione del personale militare mozambicano nella RDT fu 
raggiunto in questo contesto nel novembre 1979. La formazione militare si sarebbe 
svolta in Germania Est. Il concetto alla base del progetto era “l’addestramento degli 
istruttori”, che a loro volta avrebbero potuto addestrare i soldati del Mozambico su 
larga scala una volta tornati nel loro paese d'origine. Dal momento che era 
impossibile addestrare tutti i soldati del Mozambico nella RDT, la chiave del 
successo desiderato era quindi la preparazione degli istruttori. 286 
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Il 1 aprile 1980 a Maputo, Helmut Fleißner, vice Ministro della Difesa della RDT, 
e Guebuza firmarono il corrispondente accordo sulla formazione dei quadri militari 
mozambicani nella RDT. L'accordo prevedeva che la RDT addestrasse 279 militari 
per un periodo che sarebbe terminato nel 1989. In totale, secondo il Ministero della 
Difesa della RDT, 263 ufficiali e sottufficiali mozambicani furono addestrati nelle 
forze della NVA tra il 1981 e il 1990. 
Per quanto riguarda l’organizzazione dell’addestramento, durante la permanenza 
nella RDT, il personale militare del Mozambico era subordinato ai comandanti delle 
istituzioni di addestramento, che avevano autorità disciplinare nei loro confronti. Al 
fine di facilitare e sostenere l'organizzazione interna nell’ambito dei gruppi militari e 
di assicurare una connessione diretta tra il comandante della struttura didattica e i 
quadri militari, un senior tra i soldati veniva nominato e appuntato con l'autorità di 
comando, il cosiddetto Nationaliätenältester. I senior erano responsabili di compiti 
quali favorire il raggiungimento degli obiettivi di allenamento, mantenere la 
disciplina e l'ordine e assicurare il collegamento tra i comandanti delle istituzioni 
didattiche e i quadri militari e viceversa. L'accordo intergovernativo prevedeva 
espressamente che i soldati fossero soggetti alle disposizioni della legge della RDT. 
In caso di gravi violazioni della legislazione, il permesso di soggiorno poteva essere 
ritirato e l’interessato veniva rimpatriato.287 I soldati ricevevano un'indennità una 
tantum pari 600 Marchi per l'acquisto di indumenti civili e un'indennità mensile pari 
a 200 Marchi per gli ufficiali e a 150 Marchi per i sottufficiali. 
La formazione delle truppe mozambicane era suddivisa in un corso base di un 
anno e un corso pluriennale, da uno a quattro anni. La lingua utilizzata era il tedesco. 
Nel corso base, costituito da un totale di 1.600 ore di formazione, 180 ore venivano 
dedicate all'insegnamento del tedesco come lingua straniera. Significativamente 
meno tempo fu destinato all'istruzione superiore in materie quali matematica e 
scienze naturali (160 ore di formazione), educazione politica (180 ore di 
formazione), nonché formazione militare di base e sport (90 ore ciascuno), mentre 
l’ideologia socialista dominava piuttosto chiaramente l’intero addestramento.288 
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I militari mozambicani avrebbero ottenuto la qualifica di istruttori e comandanti, e 
sarebbero stati in grado di utilizzare le loro conoscenze ed abilità in modo creativo, 
basandosi sulle condizioni che avrebbero trovato nel proprio paese d'origine. 289 Gli 
altri scopi della formazione erano politicamente correlati; tra le altre cose, secondo il 
programma, i tirocinanti dovevano essere resi consapevoli della correttezza 
dell'orientamento antimperialista e socialista ed essere leali al proprio partito 
rivoluzionario. 
 
VI. Cenni sulla situazione dei migranti mozambicani dopo la riunificazione 
tedesca 
Incertezza e confusione caratterizzarono il periodo immediatamente successivo 
alla riunificazione e gli immigrati mozambicani si trovarono in una situazione 
piuttosto difficile relativamente alla loro permanenza in Germania. Poche 
informazioni erano rese disponibili su come i lavoratori a contratto sarebbero stati 
trattati in futuro, quali diritti, doveri e opportunità avrebbero avuto. 
I trattati intergovernativi tra la RDT e altri paesi rappresentavano piuttosto un 
problema, poiché la Germania federale non si sentiva responsabile per i trattati 
conclusi dalla RDT. A quel tempo un totale di 72.000 lavoratori stranieri erano 
impiegati in Germania dell'Est, tra cui circa 15.100 Mozambicani, il secondo gruppo 
di stranieri più numeroso dopo i vietnamiti. Molte aziende della Germania Est non 
riuscirono a continuare le proprie attività a causa del processo di conversione dal 
sistema economico pianificato verso un libero mercato unificato. Di conseguenza, 
molte aziende furono rilevate da società della Germania Ovest. Per i lavoratori a 
contratto stranieri, questo in genere implicava il licenziamento, sebbene il loro 
contratto non fosse teoricamente risolvibile prima della fine ufficiale. 
I lavoratori a contratto potevano, in teoria, restare in Germania, tuttavia avrebbero 
dovuto procurarsi un altro lavoro e un domicilio. In pratica, le condizioni non erano 
così facili da rispettare, a causa del circolo vizioso creato da queste ultime: senza 
lavoro non era possibile trovare un domicilio e viceversa. Inoltre, molti autori hanno 
riferito che correnti estremiste e xenofobe contro i lavoratori stranieri si diffusero tra 
la popolazione tedesca subito dopo la riunificazione. 
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Gli aumenti del costo della vita e dell'affitto dopo la riforma valutaria, il 
licenziamento, la pressione xenofoba e la mancanza di informazioni hanno quindi 
portato circa 2.000 mozambicani a scegliere un ritorno prematuro. 290 Alla fine, dei 
15.100 mozambicani che furono registrati nella Germania dell'Est nel 1989, solo 
2.800 mozambicani erano rimasti alla fine del 1990291, mentre alla fine di giugno del 
1991, il numero di ex lavoratori a contratto dal Mozambico era sceso a poco meno di 
1.000. 292 
 
Conclusioni 
Al loro ritorno, i mozambicani che studiarono e lavorarono in RDT non furono 
ricompensati con le posizioni lavorative che gli erano state promesse dal proprio 
governo. Il Mozambico versava in una situazione disastrosa: a causa della guerra 
civile, il paese era distrutto; non vi era alcuna possibilità per lo sviluppo industriale 
auspicato, nel contesto del quale gli ex lavoratori a contratto e studenti erano 
destinati ad assumere un ruolo lavorativo essenziale. Coloro che fecero ritorno, dai 
propri connazionali venivano – e sono tutt’oggi – chiamati Madgermanes, “i 
tedeschi”. Ancora oggi i Madgermanes si stanno battendo per ricevere i contributi 
che, ai tempi della loro permanenza in Germania Est, furono detratti dal loro 
stipendio e inviati in Mozambico con la garanzia di poterli riottenere al loro ritorno.  
In conclusione, la cooperazione ha certamente avuto il merito di garantire una 
istruzione, sia scolastica che professionale, ai mozambicani che emigrarono; tuttavia, 
tale forma di cooperazione fu continuata persino quando divenne chiaro che il suo 
obiettivo – creare una economia industrializzata in Mozambico – era ormai 
chiaramente irrealizzabile nel breve termine. Così, oggi ai Madgermanes rimangono 
ricordi nostalgici del periodo passato in Germania Est, mentre continuano tutt’ora a 
sentirsi dimenticati dal proprio paese. 
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